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JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY AND THEJOINT 
RETURN: ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN 
Amy C. Christian* 
I. INrRODUCTION 
For sixty years the Internal Revenue Code has imposed joint and 
several liability on taxpayers who flle joint returns1-a flling status 
available only to married couples. 2 Of course, under joint and several 
liability, each spouse is responsible for any tax deficiency attributable to 
either spouse. The government need not seek payment from the spouse 
whose income or improper deduction created the deficiency but, 
instead, may look to the non-delinquent spouse to satisfy that deficiency 
even if that spouse neither knew of, nor benefited from, the tax under-
payment. 3 Indeed, imposition ofliability on the non-delinquent spouse 
can occur even if the spouses have divorced and a final property 
setdement has been approved.4 By obligating the non-delinquent spouse 
to satisfy a tax deficiency attributable to someone else, joint and several 
liability works an obvious injustice. 
Several justifications are commonly offered· in support of joint and 
several liability and are described in Part III of this Article. 5 As this 
Article demonstrates, however, each of these rationales is fatally flawed 
and, in the end, none actually justifies the regime of joint and several 
liability. 
* Associate Professor, Detroit College ofLlw at Michigan State University; B.S.B.A, Georgetown 
University, School ofBusinessAdministration, 1988; J.D., Hatvard Llw School, 1991. I am indebted to 
Professors Susan H. Bitensky and Robert A. McCormick for reviewing prior drafts of this Article and to 
·Professor Kevin C. Kennedy for illuminating my understanding of certain civil procedure issues. I also wish 
to express my thanks to Ann Johannes for her able research assistance. Special gratitude is extended to the 
library staff ofDCL at MSU for their invaluable assistance and to Amy Z. Persson for her expert typing 
assistance. Of course, any errors in this Article are my own. 
I. Set Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 554, ch. 289, §51 (b), 52 Stat. 447, 476; su aLro I.R.C. § 
60 13(d)(3) (1994). 
2. Set I.R.C. § 60 13(a) (1994). 
3. An "innocent spouse" exception to joint and several liability exists, sec: I.R.C. § 60 13(e) (1994), 
but it often fails to apply even when the non-dc:linquent spouse neither knew of, nor benefited from, the 
underpayment. For an excellent discussion of the innocent-spouse rules and their inadequacies, see 
generally Richard C. E. Beck, The lnnocenJ Spouse Problem: Juinl and Several liaJJiJi!y for lneome Taxes Slwuld be 
&pealed, 43 V AND. L. REV. 317 (1990); Jerome Borison,JntiiJCtiiJ Spouse &Jiefi A Call for LlgislaJWe and Judicial 
liber~ation, 40 TAX LAW. 819 (1987). 
4. Set Beck, supra note 3, at 328; LisaK. Edison-Smith, Comment, "!fTou Love Me, Tou'U Sign MY 
Tax Return:" Spousal ]uinJ and SeveralliaJJiJi[y for Federalln&Dml Taxes and 1M "lnnocenJ Spouse" Exception, 18 
HAMUNEL. REV. 102 (1994). 
5. Set in.fra notes 69-203 and accompanying text. 
535 
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Joint and several liability is generally inequitable on its face regardless 
of which spouse is required to bear its burden because it imposes the tax 
burden of one person on someone else. Moreover, it also has the effect 
of burdening women more frequendy and more onerously than it does 
men, both as it is applied6 and in its very structure.' First, the joint and 
several liability scheme is applied to collect husbands' tax deficiencies 
from wives much more frequendy than it is to collect wives' deficiencies 
from husbands. 8 Second, as demonstrated for the first time in this 
Article, the very structure and interrelation of the laws governing joint 
returns impose further inequities on women. When combined with 
other features of the joint return rate structure, namely income splitting 
and aggregation,9 joint and several liability works a particularly 
pernicious injustice upon women. As this Article explains, 10 aggregation 
and income splitting make the joint return most beneficial to spouses 
with disparate incomes: the greater the income disparity, the greater the 
couple's incentive to filejoindy. Consequendy, the ranks ofjoint filers 
are likely to be highly populated by couples in which one spouse earns 
significandy more than the other. Because the husband is much more 
commonly the higher wage earner in a marriage, this incentive structure 
causes joint fliers to consist frequendy of couples in which the husband 
earns significandy more than his wife. As a further result, it is precisely 
in this same circumstance-marriages in which the husband earns 
significandy more than his wife-where the regime of joint and several 
liability is also most likely to apply. This circumstance of couples flling 
joindy when the husband earns significandy more than his wife, 
however, is precisely when joint and several liability is most inequitable 
because, as this Article will show, it falls upon the person least likely to 
be responsible for the deficiency and least able to meet it-the lower-
earning wife. Put simply, through the combined regimes of joint and 
6. Su in.fra notes 277-95 and accompanying text. 
7. Su in.fra notes 296-349 and accompanying text. 
8. Su in.fra notes 280-88 and accompanying text. Su also Beck, supra note 3, at 320. 
9. Income splitting is the phenomenon built into the joint return rates whereby the income of one 
spouse is attributed half to the earner and half to the non-earner for tax computation purposes. Compare 
the tax brackets in I.R.C. § 1(a) (1994) with the brackets in I.R.C. § 1(d) (1994). In our progressive income 
tax system, income splitting thereby provides a financial benefit by shielding the higher earner's top 
earnings from the highest otherwise applicable tax rates. 
Income aggregation is also required whenever a married couple files jointly and is the phenomenon 
whereby the spouses must aggregate their incomes together before subjecting them to joint return rates. 
Su I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1994). In our progressive system, the requirement of income aggregation imposes 
a financial burden by preventing both spouses from enjoying separate starts up the progressive rate ladder. 
When a couple files jointly both income splitting and income aggregation apply simultaneously. The 
impact of these elements of joint filing and their interaction with joint and several liability will be explained 
further. Su in.fra notes 296-349 and accompanying text. 
10. Su in.fra notes 297-304 and accompanying text. 
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several liability, income splitting, and income aggregation, the joint 
return produces a powerful structural bias against wives. 
The imposition of joint and several liability, thus, poses a significant 
marital dilemma for many wives. If they elect to file joindy with their 
husbands to reduce their husbands' tax exposure, they subject 
themselves to potential liability for deficiencies not of their own making. 
At the same time, however, if they insist on filing separately to avoid the 
strictures of joint and several liability, they place marital harmony at 
risk. 11 
Part II of this Article discusses the regime of joint and several liability, 
examining its historical origins. 12 Drawing upon the work of Professor 
Richard Beck and others, 13 Part III analyzes and debunks the asserted 
doctrinal and policy justifications for joint and several liability. 14 In 
connection with the analysis of purported justifications for joint and 
several liability, Part III also examines the doctrine of transferee liability, 
an alternative, less draconian means for accomplishing joint and several 
liability's few valid goals. 15 This Article then describes how joint and 
several liability violates various norms entrenched in the federal tax 
system, especially the fundamental principle that tax should be imposed 
in accordance with ability to pay. 16 An analysis follows detailing the 
weaknesses of the current system in which to be made whole, the non-
delinquent spouse must institute a state contribution action against the 
delinquent spouse. 17 Part IV of this Article focuses on how joint and 
several liability interacts with various social and economic patterns that 
make it of special concern to women. This Part first reviews tax 
literature that asserts joint and several liability harms women in its 
application. 18 More importantly, as exposed in this Article, joint and 
several liability interacts with other legal features of the joint return to 
create a variety of systemic gender-correlated biases. In this manner, 
the very structure of the Internal Revenue Code is biased against 
women. 19 
II. S« Beck, supra note 3, at 332; cj Edison-Smith, supra note 4, at 126 (describing how joint and 
several liability promotes marital discord because of "the duty placed on spouses to inquire to [sic] each 
other's tax items"). 
12. S« in.fra notes 22-68 and accompanying text. 
13. E.g., Beck, supra note 3; Edison-Smith, supra note 4. 
14. S« in.fra notes 77-203 and accompanying text. 
15. S« in.fra notes 173-203 and accompanying text. 
16. S« in.fra notes 204-59 and accompanying text. 
17. S« in.fra notes 260-73 and accompanying text. 
18. See in.fra notes 280-95 and accompanying text. 
19. S« in.fra notes 296-349 and accompanying text. 
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I have argued recendy that the joint return feature of the Internal 
Revenue Code, through the rate structure, works to the detriment of 
women and should be repealed or significandy altered. 20 This Article, 
in tum, demonstrates that joint and several liability is similarly 
unnecessary, inequitable, and imprudent. Like the joint return, it, too, 
should be abolished or substantially reformed.21 
II. THE ORIGINS OF jOINT AND SEVERAL I.JABILITY 
Under current law, taxpayers who file joindy submit to joint and 
severalliability.22 When the income tax was adopted in its constitutional 
form in 1913, spouses had no option other than to file separate, or 
"individual," returns, the same returns unmarried individuals flled.23 In 
20. See Amy C. Christian, The }oinl &tum Rate Structurt: Idmliffing and Addmsing the Gendered NaJuTe '![ 
the Tax Lrw, 13J.L. & PoL 241 (1997) [hereinafter Christian,}oinl Rate Sbuclli.Tt]; Amy C. Christian, ]oint 
Ver.rus Separate Filing: Joint Return Tax Roles and Federal Compli&ig in Directing Economic Resourus.from Women to 
Men, 6 S. CAL REV. L. & WOMEN'S STIJD. (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 443, on file with the U~ 
'![Cin&inruJA Lrw Review) [hereinafter Christian, Camp~] (describing a variety of adverse consequences that 
flow from the decision to file jointly, including: (I) disincentives that arise under income splitting and 
aggregation that tend to discourage wives from participating in the paid work force; and (2) a coerced 
annual transfer of wealth, relative to separate filing results, from the lower-earning to the higher-earning 
spouse, usually from the wife to her husband). A separate and distinct problem arises from filing 
jointly-joint and several liability-and is the subject of this Article. 
21. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 3, at 319; Edison-Smith, supra note 4, at 104, 127; Fred F. Murray, 
Problems '![Taxalion and the IT~&DTM '![Spouses in the Conl4xt '![Diwrce and SeparatiDn, 14 COMMUNITY PROP.j. 20, 
58 (1987); Stephen A. Zorn, Innocent Spouses, Reasonable Women and DWorce: The Gap &twem ~and the 
Internal Rnimue Cotk, 3 MICH.j. GENDER & L. 421, 488,491-92 (1996). 
Both the American Bar Association (ABA) and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(AI CPA) have also recently recommended that Congress repeal joint and several liability for joint filers. 
In February of 1995, the House of Delegates of the ABA adopted the following resolution: 
RESOLVED that the American Bar Association recommends to the Congress that sections 
6013(d) and (e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 be repealed (l) to eliminate joint and 
several liability of a taxpayer who has signed a joint return with his or her spouse for tax on 
income properly attributable to his or her spouse, (ii) to substitute separate liability for tax 
shown to be due on the joint return, and (Iii) to repeal innocent spouse relief from liability 
for tax on the joint return when the liability arises from erroneous items of the taxpayer's 
spouse. 
Domestic Relations Comm., ABA Sec. of Tax'n, Commmts on Liabili!J! '![ DWorced Spouses for Tax 
Dejicimcies on Iteuious!Y Ftltd)oinl Returns, reprinJ.ed in 50 TAX LAW. 395, 395 (1997) [hereinafter CommenLr on 
Liabili!J! '![ DWorced Spouses]. 
In comments submitted to the IRS in response to Notice 96-19, 1996-1 C. B. 371, the AI CPA also 
recommends repealing joint and several liability, or in the alternative, eliminating joint returns altogether. 
See Ken Rankin, A/CPA Advises IRS on Fairer DWorce Procedures, 10 ACCOUNTING TODAY,July 29, 1996, at 
8, available in 1996 WL 8970070. 
22. See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1994) ("[l]fajoint return is made, ... the liability with respect to the tax 
shall be joint and several."); Beck, supra note 3, at 319. For an excellent history of the adoption and 
development of joint and several tax liability, see generally it1. 
23. See Tariff of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, ch. 16, § II(A)(2), 38 Stat. 114, 166; Beck, supra note 3, 
at 333; Toni Robinson & Mary Moers Wenig, Mmry in Has/4 Repent al Tax T11114: Marilal Stalus as a Tax 
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1918, Congress introduced optional joint returns24 for the convenience 
of married taxpayers.25 No statutory or administrative rules existed at 
that time governing the allocation of a couple's tax liability between the 
husband and wife. A number of different options were theoretically 
possible: the joint tax liability could be split between the spouses by 
mutual agreement; it could be split in proportion to the spouses' 
respective net incomes; it could be divided in proportion to each 
spouse's respective tax liabilities had they flled as two individuals;26 the 
additional tax attributable to the secondary earner could be charged to 
that earner, and the tax from the lower brackets charged to the primary 
earner; or the spouses could be made jointly and severally liable for the 
combined joint tax liability. 
DelmninanL, 8 VA. TAX REV. 773, 774 n.2, 776-77 (1989); Carolyn C. jones, Split Income and &parak Spheres: 
Tax Law and Gerukr Roles in the 1940s, 6 L. &HIST. REv. 259 (1988); Frederick R. Schneider, mzich Tax Unit 
fur the Fedrral Income Tax?, 20 U. DAYTON L. REv. 93, 93 (1994). 
24. Sa Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 254, ch. 18, § 223,40 Stat. 1057, 1074 (1919); Beck, rupra 
note 3, at 333; Edison-Smith, rupra note 4, at 105. 
25. See Uifi'a note 142 and accompanying text. At the time Congress made joint returns available, 
the only other filing option was the individual return, the same one unmarried taxpayers used. Beginning 
in 1918, spouses could file jointly or individually. &e Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income TaxaJiJm and the Family, 
27 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1400 (1975). 
26. In 1918, spouses· could either file jointly, or as two individuals using the rates available to 
unmarried individuals. The "Married Filing Separately'' return status did not become available until the 
Tax Reform Act of 1969, first effective for the 1971 tax year. Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 803,83 Stat. 487 
(1969) (codified at I.R.C. § I (1993)); see also S. REP. No. 91-552, at 260 (1969), reprin~d in 1969 
U.S.C.C.AN. 2027, 2299; Bittker, rupra note 25, at 1429. Once income splitting had been made available 
to married couples in 1948, see Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 471, § 301, 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. (62 Stat. 
110, 114) 85, 91; S. REP. NO. 80-1013 (1948), reprin~din 1948 U.S.C.C.AN. 1163, single taxpayers for 
whom income splitting was not available began to protest that they were bearing a disproportionately high 
tax burden relative to married taxpayers. &e Edward]. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at 
/Jehouimal Gerukr Biases in the Cotk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 990-91 (1993); Robinson & Wenig, rupra note 23, 
at 782. Under 1969 rates, a single taxpayer could pay as much as 42.1% more in tax than a married couple 
with equivalent income. &e Bittker, rupra note 25, at 1418-28; Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital StaJ;us 
as a Fac/Qr inAIUJcaJing Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REV. I, 18-20, 28, 31 (1980); Beck, rupra note 3, at 
371; STAFFOFjOINTCOMM.ONTAXATION,96TIICONG.,THEINCOMETAXTREATMENTOFMARRIED 
COUPLFSANDSINGI..EPERSONS 23 (Comm. Print 1980); S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 261 tbl.21 (1969), nprinJed 
in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2298; Johnson v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 958, 966 (N.D. Ind. 1976); 
Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896, 899 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Druker v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 46, 48, 50 
(2d Cir. 1982). In 1969, Congress responded by creating a new filing status for "Unmarried Individuals" 
or singles and by lowering the rates applicable to those single taxpayers. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. 
L. No. 91-172, §§ 801-05, 83 Stat. 487 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 509, 740-81; S. REP. No. 
91-552, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. 262 (1969), rtprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2298-99; Gann, rupra, at 19, 
27; McCaffery, rupra, at 991; Robinson & Wenig, rupra note 23, at 782; Mapes, 576 F.2d at 899; Druk.er, 
697 F.2d at 49; Johnson, 422 F. Supp. at 966. Rather than simultaneously lowering the rates applicable 
to married individuals who did not want to file jointly, Congress made the new, lower rates apply only to 
unmarried individuals and retained the old, higher "Individual" rates for married couples who chose to file 
separately. Congress renamed those higher "Individual" rates the "Married Filing Separately'' filing status. 
SeeS. REP. No. 91-552, at 261, reprin~d in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2297-98; Bittker, rupra note 25, at 1429; 
Gann, supra, at 21 n.79; Druk.er, 697 F.2d at 49; Beck, rupra note 3, at 371 & n.261; Robinson & Wenig, 
rupra note 23, at 782-83 & n.33. 
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In 1923, the Bureau oflnternal Revenue, the functional predecessor 
of the Internal Revenue Service, began insisting on joint and several 
liability for couples using joint returns. 27 The Bureau ruled that a 
husband and wife "are individually liable for the full amount of tax 
shown to be due on [a joint] return,"28 basing this liability rule on the 
notion that when a couple flies jointly, it becomes one taxpaying unit 
not only for fliing purposes, but also for liability purposes. "[A] single 
joint return is one return of a taxable unit and not two returns of two 
units on one sheet ofpaper."29 The first time the government adopted 
a unitary approach to joint fliers was in 1921 when it ruled that one 
spouse's deductions could be used to offset the income of the other in 
computing tax liability.30 No authority existed, however, for extending 
this unitary approach to the issue of who was liable for tax. 
The first reported court decision to address explicitly whether joint 
fliers should be jointly and severally liable for tax was the Board of Tax 
Appeals decision in Cole v. Commissioner. 31 There, the Board ruled that 
joint and several liability was appropriate for spouses who had flied a 
joint return in 1929. 
In our opinion the theory of petitioner's counsel requires little 
discussion. In the first place the joint return contains no data upon 
which the separate taxable income of the two spouses can be 
computed. There is no segregation of the amounts of gross income 
severally received or any designation of the deductions to which each 
27. ·See I.T. 1575, II-I C.B. 144 (1923) (ruling that when one spouse pays more than her "share" of 
the joint tax, she is not entitled to a refund from the U.S. Treasury). In that case, none of the tax was 
attributable to the wife because all of the income for the year in question had been earned by her husband. 
It is noteworthy that the wife in the ruling could not have instituted an equitable action against her former 
husband to recover the tax she paid on his income because she had made the payment voluntarily. The 
option of suing her former husband for contribution would be available to the wife only if the government 
had compelled her to pay his taxes. See infia notes 260-73 and accompanying text (discussing contribution 
actions); set also Beck, supra note 3, at 338, 340 n.93. 
28. I.T. 1575, II-I C.B. at 144. 
29. /d. 
30. See Op. Solicitor 90, 4 C.B. 236, 238 (1921), cited in Hdvering v.Janney, 311 U.S. 189 (1940) 
(holding that the husband and wife should be treated as one taxable individual if they file jointly, permitting 
excess deductions of one spouse to be allowed against the net income of the other spouse) and Taft v. 
Hclvering, 311 U.S. 195, 197 (1940) (concerning the limitation on charitable deductions to fifteen percent 
of the donor-spouse's separate net income). Op. Solicitor 90 stated: 
If a single joint return is filed it is treated as the return of a taxable unit and the net income 
disclosed by the return is subject to both normal and surtax as though the return were that 
of a single individual. In cases, therefore, in which the husband or wife has allowable 
deductions in excess of his or her gross income, such excess may, if [a] [sic] joint return is 
filed, be deducted from the net income of the other for the purpose of computing both the 
normal and surtax. 
4 C.B. 236, 238. 
31. 29 B.T.A. 602 (1933), rev'd, 81 F.2d 485,490 (9th Cir. 1935). 
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would be entitled. Since the joint return, though made by the 
husband, reports the income as a unit, we think it is perfectly clear 
that liability for the tax is joint and several and may be asserted 
against and collected from either spouse.32 
541 
The Board ruled that administrative necessity required joint and several 
liability for couples who filed jointly even though, in other contexts, 
entities that filed one consolidated return were not held jointly and 
severally liable for each others' tax liabilities. Thus, corporations filing 
consolidated returns were not jointly and severally liable at that time for 
the taxes of affiliated corporations that were included in the consolidated 
return.33 
In a divided court, the Ninth Circuit reversed the Board's decision in 
Cole that joint flling required joint and severalliability.34 Relying in part 
on Treasury Regulations promulgated in 1935 that treated spouses flling 
jointly as separate taxpayers, the majority of the Ninth Circuit held that 
joint filing does not require joint and severalliability.35 Because the 
regulations did not treat the joint filers as one individual taxpayer for 
some purposes, 36 the Ninth Circuit concluded in Cole that joint filing did 
not transform the spouses into one unified taxpayer for other purposes, 
and, therefore, joint and several liability did not result. 37 The Ninth 
Circuit also relied on the long-standing principle that tax should be 
32. Id. at 604-05. 
33. &e Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 20, ch. 27, § 240, 44 Stat. 9, 46; s« also Woolford Realty 
Co. v. Rose, 286 U.S. 319, 325-26, 328 (1932) (quoting tax code provision in which tax is "assessed upon 
the respective affiliated corporations in such proportions as may be agreed upon among them, or, in the 
absence of any such agreement, then upon the basis of the net income properly assignable to each," but not 
upon any or all of the corporations as under joint and several liability). 
34. 81 F.2d 485,490 (9th Cir. 1935), rev;g, 29 B.T.A 602,604-05 (1933). 
35. By 1935 the Treasury Department, abandoning the approach taken earlier in Opinion Solicitor 
90 (1921), had promulgated regulations that prevented joint filers from netting the gains of one spouse 
against the losses of the other. Article 117-5 of Regulations 86 (1935) stated that "~)n the application of 
section 117, a husband and wife, regardless of whether a joint return or separate returns are made, are 
·considered to be separate taxpayers. Accordingly, the limitation under section 117(d) on the allowance of 
losses of one spouse from sales or exchanges of capital assets is in all cases to be computed without regard 
to gains and losses of the other spouse upon sales or exchanges of capital assets." Levy v. Commissioner, 
46 B.T .A 1145, 1147 (1942). In the same year, the Treasury also issued regulations limiting one spouse's 
charitable deduction to fifteen percent of the donor-spouse's separate net income, rather than the spouses' 
combined net income, even when spouses had filedjoindy. Article 23(o)-l of Regulations 86 (1935), stated: 
"Whether a husband and wife make a joint return or separate returns, the 15 per cent limitation on the 
deduction for contributions or gifts is based on the separate net income (computed without regard to such 
contributions or gifts) of the spouse making the contributions or gifts." Taft v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 
229,230 (1939). If the spouses really became one taxpayer by filingjoindy, then the excess deductions of 
one should be used to offset the net income of the other, and any charitable. deductions would be limited 
to fifteen percent of both spouses' combined net income. 
36. Su in.fra notes 79-85 and accompanying text. 
37. &e Colt, 81 F.2d at 487. 
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imposed in accordance with the taxpayer's ability to pay.38 Tax 
attributable to one spouse's income should not, therefore, be assessed 
against and collected from the other spouse. Furthermore, according to 
the majority in Cok, the Commissioner's argument that joint and several 
liability was required as a matter of administrative necessity was specious 
because, among other reasons, the separate net incomes of the spouses 
in that case had been stipulated. 39 
After the Ninth Circuit's ruling, other circuit courts, as well as the 
Board, followed Cok, likewise holding that joint returns do not trigger 
joint and several liability. 40 In 1938, however, with minimal 
explanation, Congress abrupdy incorporated joint and several liability 
into the statute for taxpayers that flledjoindy. 41 After 1938, the courts 
continued holding that, for tax years prior to 1938, joint filing did not 
require joint and several liability, thereby effectively ruling against 
retroactive application of the new law. 42 However, in 1941, the Court 
of Claims in Moore v. United States43 interpreted the new law as merely 
clarifying existing law, and held that joint filing had always required 
joint and severalliability.44 In Moore, the Court of Claims upheld the 
Commissioner's assessment of a deficiency for the year 1932 against a 
wife who had no income of her own and who had considerable net 
losses in that year. For a variety of reasons, the Moore court held that 
joint and several liability was appropriate for couples who flied joindy. 
38. See id. 
39. See id. at 490. 
40. See, e.g., Sachs v. Commissioner (unreported B.T.A. decision filedjune 15, 1937); Crowe v. 
Commissioner, 86 F.2d 796 (7th Cir. 1936); Seder v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 874 (1938); F1aherty v. 
Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 1131 (1937); Darling v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 1062 (1936); Hyman v. 
Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 202, 208 (1937). 
The only instances in which courts held spouses jointly and severally liable were cases in which the 
taxpayer negligently or purposefully failed during the audit to provide the spouses' respective net incomes, 
the information needed to apportion liability. See, e.g., Calafato v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 881,890-92 
( 1940) (explicitly stating that the court was not overruling Cole, !Wberwld, or Seder); Rogers v. Commissioner, 
38 B.T.A. 16 (1938), qffd, Ill F.2d 987 (6th Cir. 1940); Anderson v. United States, 48 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 
1931). 
41. See Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 554, ch. 289, §51 (b), 52 Stat. 447,476. 
42. See Commissioner v. Rabenold, 8 B.T.A.M. (P-H), 39,121 (1939), offd, I 08 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 
1940) (expressly ruling that the 19381egislation imposing joint and several liability could not be applied 
retroactively because after the Ninth Circuit's Cole decision, Congress had reenacted prior law without 
change). The Second Circuit ruled against joint and several liability in Raberwld despite language in the 
1938 Act's legislative history indicating that joint and several liability had been enacted to clarify existing 
law. See in.fra note 51 and accompanying text. After Cole, Congress would have had to amend the law to 
make joint filers jointly and severally liable in pre-1938 tax years. See, e.g., Sachs v. Commissioner, Ill F.2d 
648 (6th Cir. 1940) (affirming an unreported B.T.A. decision filed on June 15, 1937); Rogers v. 
Commissioner, Ill F.2d 987 (6th Cir. 1940), offg, 38 B.T.A. 16 (1938). 
43. 37 F. Supp. 136 (Ct. Cl. 1941). 
44. See id. at 140; Beck, rupra note 3, at 346 n.l21. 
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First, the Court of Claims asserted that joint and several liability was 
required as a matter of administrative necessity.45 Second, the court 
noted that the recent Supreme Court rulings in Helvering v. Janru'!/6 and 
Tqft v. Helvering47 "ma[d]e clear that the filing of a joint return create[d] 
a joint 'taxable unit' at least to the extent that it [was] to the advantage 
of one of the spouses to create such a unit."48 Without citing any 
authority, the Court of Claims then extended this unity theory to the 
issue of who could be held liable for tax/9 rationalizing its position by 
claiming that joint and several liability was the cost that must be borne 
for the privilege and benefits of joint filing. 5° Last, the court quoted 
ambiguous language in the legislative history of the Revenue Act of 
1938 to conclude that the new legislation enacting joint and several 
liability was intended only to "clarify" what the law had always been: 
Section 51 (b) of the bill expressly provides that the spouses, who 
exercise the privilege of filing a joint return, are jointly and severally 
liable for the tax computed upon their aggregate income. It is 
necessary, for administrative reasons, that any doubt as to the 
existence of such liability should be set at rest, if the privilege of filing 
such joint returns is continued.51 
As a result, the Court of Claims in effect applied the rule ofjoint and 
several liability retroactively to the tax year 1932,52 despite Cole and the 
numerous cases following Cole. The legislative history also stated that 
"[s]ection 51 of the bill restates in amplified form the provisions relating 
to filing returns in the case ofindividuals."53 Although these passages 
from the legislative history could be read to imply retroactivity, they do 
not clearly require such an interpretation.54 Rather, it is equally 
plausible that Congress intended section 51 merely to restate the earlier 
joint return provisions and to amplify them, adding the new, additional 
requirement of joint and several liability for tax years following 1938. 
Despite this possible interpretation, the Board of Tax Appeals followed 
45. See Moore, 37 F. Supp. at 140. 
46. 31J u.s. 189 (1940). 
47. 311 u.s. 195 (1940). 
48. Moore, 37 F. Supp. at 139. 
49. See Beck, mpra note 3, at 346 n.l21. 
50. See Moore, 37 F. Supp. at 140. 
5 I. H.R. REP. No. 75-1860, at 29, 30, rtprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 728, 749, quoted in Moore, 37 F. Supp. 
at 140. 
52. See Moore, 37 F. Supp. at 140-41. 
53. H.R. REP. NO. 75-1860, at 29, 30. 
54. But see Commissioner v. Rabenold, 108 F.2d 639, 641 (2d Cir. 1940) (Patterson,J. dissenting) 
(interpreting this very language in H.R. REP. No. 75-1860 as implying that joint and several liability, as 
contained in the new section 51 (b), was a restatement in amplified form of existing law). The legislative 
history as written, however, does not clearly compel the Rabenold dissent's reading. 
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Moore, applying the 1938 statute retroactively to earlier tax years both 
in Schoenhut v. Commissioner, 55 in which the Board announced that it would 
no longer follow the Ninth Circuit's Cole opinion, and in Gillette v. 
Commissioner. 56 
Although the Board followed the Moore approach,57 other courts 
continued to follow Cole for disputes relating to pre-1938 tax years. In 
Commissioner v. Uniacke, 58 the Second Circuit, contrary to Moore, ruled 
expressly that the Revenue Act of 1938 should not be applied 
retroactively. The Second Circuit reasoned that the statute did not, by 
its terms, claim to apply retroactively. 59 The court also stated that the 
1938 amendment could not be treated merely as declaratory of existing 
law because the only existing law, the pre-1938 court decisions on point, 
had all ruled againstjoint and several1iability.60 The Second Circuit 
also noted that the government had not adopted joint and several 
liability in any regulation or administrative pronouncement.61 The only 
administrative authority in favor of joint and several liability prior to 
1938 had been an office decision from the Income Tax Unit, LT. 
1575,62 which had little authoritative weight.63 The Supreme Court had 
ruled in Helvering v. New York Trust Co.,64 and the Commissioner himself 
argued in Ambassador Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, that such Income Tax 
Unit decisions "have none of the force and effect of Treasury Decisions 
and do not commit the [Treasury] Department to any interpretation of 
the law."65 According to the Second Circuit in Uniacke, in light of the 
pre-1938 cases holding against joint and several liability, the legislative 
history claiming to clarify existing law should be accorded little weight. 66 
55. 45 B.T.A. 812 (1941). 
56. 46 B.T.A. 573 (1942). 
57. ~alro United States v. Rosebush, 45 F. Supp. 664,666-67 (E.D. Wise. 1942). In Rosebush, the 
court decided against joint and several liability even though it stated that joint and several liability was the 
correct approach under Moort. ~ id. Sitting in the Seventh Circuit, the Rosebush court felt constrained by 
Crowe v. Commissioner, 86 F.2d 796 (7th Cir. 1936), which had followed the Ninth Circuit in Colt. ~ id. 
58. Estate of Hague v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 104, 113 (1941), qffd sub nom, Commissioner v. 
Uniacke, 132 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1942). 
59. ~ Unilu:ke, 132 F.2d at 782. 
60. ~id. 
61. ~ id. 
62. I.T. 1575, II-I C.B. 144 (1923); see Beck, supra note 3, at 343 n.I08. 
63. ~Beck, supra note 3, at 343 n.l 08. 
64. 292 u.s. 455,468,469 (1934). 
65. 81 F.2d 474, 481 (9th Cir. 1936). 
66. ~ Unilu:ke, 132 F.2d at 783. The dispute between the Moore approach on the one hand and the 
Colt and Unilu:ke approach on the other hand was never resolved for pre-1938 tax years. ~ in.fra notes 86-
107 and accompanying text. 
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Of course, for post-193 7 tax years, the Revenue Act of 1938 required 
joint and several liability,67 and cases relating to those later years 
consistently and correctly held, therefore, that flling a joint return had 
triggered joint and severalliability.68 
III. jOINT AND SEVERAL LIABIUTY IS NOT jUSTIFIED AS A POUCY 
MATTER 
Many arguments have been advanced in support of and against joint 
and several liability. At various times the government has asserted that 
joint and several liability is required under the theory that a joint return 
transforms spouses into one taxpaying unit.69 The government has also 
argued that joint and several liability is required as a matter of 
administrative necessity70 and that it is a fair price couples pay for 
obtaining the advantages of joint flling. 71 Another argument in favor of 
joint and several liability is that it prevents the spouse to whom the 
deficiency is not attributable from enjoying the economic benefit of the 
unpaid tax. 72 If one spouse understates his taxes, then the other spouse 
could consume money that should have been paid to the U.S. Treasury. 
Imposition of joint and several liability prevents the unjust enrichment 
of the non-delinquent spouse at the Treasury's expense. 
By contrast, joint and several liability has been criticized as unfairly 
taxing one person on the income of another, violating one of the 
fundamental norms of taxation by taxing without regard to ability to 
pay.73 One rule designed to ensure that tax is imposed according to 
67. See Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 554, ch. 289, §51 (b), 52 Stat. 447,476. 
68. See, e.g., Grimes v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 1662 (1961); Dellit v. Commissioner, 24 
T.C. 434,434-35 (1955). Some cases, however, ruled against joint and several liability for post-1937 tax 
years on the basis either that the wife's signature on the joint return was procured fraudulently or by force, 
or that the wife was so incompetent with regard to financial matters that she should not be treated as having 
understood the return she filed with her husband. See, e.g., Furnish v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 
1958) (holding that if the wife had signed the joint return under duress, she could not be held liable for the 
tax deficiency attributable to her husband's fraud), rernantiUig Funk v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 279 (1957); 
Scudder v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 222, 222, 226 (6th Cir. 1968) (granting relief to the wife, holding that 
husband's fraud against her in embezzling money from her business also constituted fraud in inducing her 
to sign the joint return and invalidated it), revj, 48 T.C. 36 (1967); Frederick v. Commissioner, 16 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1022 (1957) (husband's actions of putting his fingers around his wife's throat constituted duress and 
invalidated joint return). These cases served as judicial precursors to the innocent spouse provisions enacted 
in 1971. 
69. See in.fra notes 77-107 and accompanying text. 
70. See in.fra notes I 08-36 and accompanying text. 
71. See in.fra notes 137-65 and accompanying text. 
72. See in.fra notes 166-203 and accompanying text. 
73. See in.fra notes 204-06 and accompanying text; see also Cole v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 485, 487 
(9th Cir. 1935); Beck, supra note 3, at 320 & n.4, 324-25; Murray, supra note 21, at 64 (Suggestion #I); 
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ability to pay is that the party with a proprietary interest in the earnings 
should bear the tax liability on those earnings. 74 Liability should not be 
imposed on a party with no property rights in or control over the taxed 
earnings. This norm has been generally accepted and firmly entrenched 
in tax jurisprudence except with regard to the joint and several liability 
rule. Joint and several liability fails to impose tax on the income owner 
because it arbitrarily shifts tax liability to the non-earning spouse--a 
taxpayer who under state law often has no property interest in or legal 
control over the earnings.75 Joint and several liability may also be 
if. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, M011e) and the IRS: Fami9, Income-Siuzring, and the Joint Income Tax JUtum, 45 
HAsTINGS LJ. 63, 92 (1993) (noting that the "burdens of tax ought to be distributed according to relative 
ability to pay"). 
74. See in.fra notes 207-53 and accompanying text. 
75. See Christian,Joinl Rau Structrm, supra note 20, at 255-56 & n.52, 321-23. Common-law states 
confer ownership of earnings solely on the earner. See Jones v. Farris, 69 P.2d 344, 346 (Okla. 193 7) 
(holding that a wife's heirs could not inherit a farm because it had been acquired with the husband's 
earnings, precluding her from having a vested or divisible interest in it); WULIAMJ. BROCKELBANK, THE 
COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW OF IDAHO 41-43 (1962) (noting that in common-law states savings out of 
earnings belong to the earner spouse:); Gann, supra note: 26, at 27; Scott Greene:, Comparison of/he Proper!J 
AspecLr of the Communi!J Proper!J and Common-lAw MariJaJ l'rope7'9 Systnns and Their JU/aJWe Compatibili!J with the 
Curren/. Vzew of the Matriage JU/aJionship and the RighJs of Women, 13 CREIGHTON L REV. 71, 83 (1979) 
("Property acquired by the spouses [subject to the common-law property system] during marriage is either 
his or hers, never theirs .... The common-law system rewards the spouse who is directly responsible for 
the acquisition of property and generally ignores the nonmonetary contributions of the other spouse toward 
that acquisition.") (footnote omitted); 0. Kahn-Freund, Inconsirtmcies and Injustices in the lAw of Husband and 
Wife, 15 MOD. L. REV. 133, 135-36 (1952) (savings out of earnings belong to the earner spouse); Susan 
Westerberg Prager, Shifting PerspectWe.r on MariJal ~Law, in RETHiNKING TiiE FAMILY: SOME FEMINIST 
QUESTIONS Ill, 116 (Barrie Thome & Marilyn Yalom c:ds., 1982); Katharine: Silbaugh, Tumily: Worinlo 
Love: Housnoorlc and the Law, 91 Nw. U.L. REV. I, 51 (1996) (noting that "nothing in family law requires 
couples to share their monetary income"); Jeannette Anderson Winn & Marshall Winn, Tul DeaJh Do We 
SpliL· Married Coupw and Sily:le Persons Urukr the IndWidual Income Tax, 34 S.C. L REV. 829, 878 (1983); 
Elizabeth A Cheadle, Comment, The DeveiDpmmJ of Shoring Print:iples in Common Law MariJaJ Proper!J Stales, 28 
UCLA L. REV. 1269, 1276, 1307 n.208 (comparing Texas, where only the earner controls his own 
earnings, with common-law states like Missouri and indicating that, in common-law states, one spouse's 
earnings are shielded from the other spouse), 1312 (1981). See alro NEB. REV. STAT.§ 42-203 (1995) 
(earnings of a married woman belong solely to her). 
Even the Married Women's Property Acts, which were adopted in the last half of the nineteenth century 
and which gave wives in common-law jurisdictions the right to own and manage their own property, did 
not give them any present property interest in their husband's earnings. "The act[ ] ... ignored the 
realism that it was the husband who was largely responsible for acquiring property during the marriage. 
The wife was left with hollow legal equality since she had little opportunity to acquire property to which 
the Married Women's Property Acts could apply." Greene, supra, at 80 (footnote omitted); su also Henry 
H. Foster,Jr. & Doris Jonas Freed, MariJal .ltoJier!y JUfonn in New rork: Partnership of Co-Equals?, 8 FAM. L.Q, 
169, 173 (1974); Mary Ann Glendon, Is There a FutureforSeparaJe ~?, 8 FAM. L.Q, 315, 316 (1974); 
Prager, supra, at 115-16. 
Furthermore, IRS Publication 555 establishes that, for federal income tax purposes, only residents of 
the nine: community property states are considered to have a present ownership interest in their spouses' 
earnings. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OFTiiE TREAsURY, PuiiUCATION 555, COMMUNITY 
PROPERTY I, 2 (1996) [hereinafter PuiiUCATION 555] (implicitly acknowledging that common-law states 
do not give the non-earner an ownership interest in the earnings of his or her spouse by limiting income 
splitting for separate filers to residents of the nine community property jurisdictions); su also Murray, supra 
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note 21, at 23. These states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, 
Washington, and Wiseonsin. See PuBLICATION 555, supra, at I. From the perspective of the federal 
government, residents of other states do not have a present ownership interest in the earnings of their 
spouses. 
In common law states, sharing principles are never legally applied until the end of the 
marriage. As long as the marriage continues, each spouse is the sole owner of his or her 
earnings. . . . Any rights of the other spouse to a portion of those earnings are inchoate and 
vest only at death or upon the filing of a divorce action. 
Cheadle, supra, at 1269 n.2; see also id. at 1312; Greene, supra, at 87, II 0-11; Emily Osborn, Comment, 
The Trealmml of Unearned &parole~ oJDWorce in Common Law ~}uris&tions, 1990 WIS. L. REv. 903, 
907; Keith D. Ross, Note, SJwing Debts: CwliJors and Debtors Under tJr.e Uniform MariJall'toper!y Act, 69 MINN. 
L. REV. Ill, 117 (1984). 
During marriage, common-law states confer on the nonearning wife only an inchoate dower right or, 
more recently, the right to elect a statutory share in the husband's property upon his death. See Greene, 
supra, at 77 & n.29, 87; see also id. at 107-09 (discussing common-law elective share statutes); Osborn, supra, 
at 907; Ross, supra, at 115 n.25. Common law does not permit her indirect access to her husband's 
earnings by making him liable for most debts she incurs. See Greene, supra, at 97 ("Except for necessities 
purchased on credit, the Married Women's Property Acts generally relieve the husband and his separate 
property for his wife's debts.") (citing 3 CH~TER G. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE FAMILY LAW OF THE FOR1Y-EIGHT AMERICAN STATES, ALAsKA, THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, AND HAW All (TO JAN. I, 1935) 47, 49 (1935)); Ross, supra, at 112, 117-18. Not 
only does state law deny women a present ownership interest in their husbands' earnings, it also fails to 
prevent the husband from misspending or wasting those earnings, or from using them for his own benefit. 
Because only the husband has a present property right in his earnings, he may use them however he wants. 
He may use his earnings to acquire property in his own name. See Ross, supra, at 114-15. The wife has no 
legal remedy in an intact marriage if he uses the funds for his own benefit or even if he gives them away. 
See Lawrence Zelenak,Marriogfand tJr.e IT~&tJTM Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339,379 n.l95 (1994); if. Ross, supra, 
at 115-17 (discussing how a spouse in a common-law state can use only his own assets, including his own 
earnings which are usually titled in his own name, to establish creditworthiness. The nonearning spouse 
generally cannot rely on earnings titled in the other's name to establish her own credit because she has no 
present right during the marriage to those earnings). If the couple divorces, however, earlier waste by one 
spouse may be taken into account under the equitable distribution laws of some states to reduce his or her 
share of the property division. See Lewis Becker, Conduct of a Spouse that Dissipates ProfJer9 Available for Equitable 
Proper!"J Distribution: A Suggested Anafysis, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 97-98 (1991); Zelenak, supra, at 385. 
It is far from clear, however, what constitutes dissipation, beyond the easy case of gifts to a 
lover. Conceivably dissipation doctrine could some day develop to the point where both 
spouses would truly share control over property subject to equitable distribution, so that 
they should be taxed as co-owners, but that day has not arrived. 
Zelenak, supra, at 385-86 (footnote omitted). 
In this manner, the husband's earnings can be placed beyond the wife's reach as a practical matter. 
In common-law jurisdictions, the earner has the sole right to determine how his earnings will be used. He 
has the sole power to manage and control his earnings. See Greene, supra, at 90; Kornhauser, supra note 
73, at 74, 76-77; Ross, supra, at 127. No restrictions for the wife's benefit limit that power. By contrast, 
in the community property state of California, for example, each spouse is bound by a fiduciary duty to the 
marital community not to waste or misuse community property. See CAL. FAM. CODE§§ IIOO(e), 721 (JVest 
1998); see also Elizabeth De Armond, It T okr T WQ: Remodeling tJr.e Manogemenl and Control Provisions r!f 
C0111111'U11i!J Proper!"J Law, 30 GONZ. L. REV. 235, 271 n.l93 (1995). Other community property states also 
impose duties, either by statute or under case law, on the managing spouse not to misuse or waste the 
community property although the duties in those other states do not rise to the level of fiduciary duties. 
See id. at 271-72 & n.194. 
Only by divorcing is it possible for the wife to gain access to her husband's prior earnings. All 
common-law jurisdictions have adopted equitable distribution regimes that permit property division upon 
divorce without regard to title. See Christian, Joint RoJe Structure, supra note 20, at 326 n.309. In these 
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jurisdictions, judges have the discretion to divide the marital property, including any accumulated earnings, 
in an equitable fashion. See Ross, supra, at 115 n.25; Mary A. Throne, Note, Pension Awards in Divorce and 
Bankruptq, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 194, 197 (1988). Consequently, upon divorce a wife may acquire part of 
her husband's earnings from prior years if the couple has property to divide. 
Nevertheless, equitable distribution upon divorce does not ensrm that wives will share adequately in 
their husbands' earnings. First, equitable distribution laws are triggered only if a couple divorces. See 
Greene, supra, at 87, I 02 (noting that wives would be better off with a present, vested one-half interest in 
the marital property than with an inchoate right which a divorce court may bestow on her); Murray, supra 
note 21, at 25; Cheadle, supra, at 1269 n.2, 1312; Osborn, supra, at 910; Ross, supra, at 115 n.23; Lily 
Kahng, Gender Bias in the Estate and Gift Tax 15, 20 (Aug. 14, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author). Bul cj Kornhauser, supra note 73, at 75-76, 104 (noting that equitable distribution laws apply 
only upon divorce but suggesting that their existence may constrain one spouse from spending more than 
his fair share of assets during the marriage). During the marriage the wife continues to lack a legal 
guarantee to her husband's earnings. See Zelenak, supra, at 379 n.l95; Cheadle, supra, at 1312; Kahng, 
supra, at 21 n.62. 
Second, equitable distribution is also insufficient to guarantee wives a fair share of their husband's 
earnings both because judges have tremendous discretion in fashioning a division of property, see Gann, 
supra note 26, at 48 (the "uncertainty of [judicial discretion] ... is unsatisfactory to the economically 
dependent spouse, who has no automatic right to a part of the property") (footnote omitted}; Greene, supra, 
at 98; Silbaugh, supra, at 57-59; Cheadle, supra, passim; Osborn, supra, passim, and because equitable 
distribution does not guarantee equal distribution. See, e.g., Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, 401 So. 2d 1372, 1374 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Cherry v. Cherry, 421 N.E.2d 1293, 1298-99 (Ohio 1981); Scott v. Scott, 218 
P.2d 373, 376 (Okla. 1950); Cheadle, supra, at 1290, 1298 & n.l63, 1303 n.l88; Osborn, supra, at 935. 
Far-reaching judicial discretion in determining property distribution means that wives often receive less 
than they should. See LENORE]. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985) [hereinafter 
WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION]; Saul Hoffman &John Holmes, Husbands, Wwes, and Divorce, 
in 4 FIVE THOUSAND AMERICAN FAMIUES-PA TIERNS OF EcONOMIC PROGRESS 23, 28-34, 61-62 (Greg 
J. Duncan &James N. Morgan eds., 1976); Robert E. McGraw et al., A Case Stu~ in DWarce Law Reform and 
Its Ajlermalh, 20 J. FAM. L. 443 (1981-82); Karen Seal, A Decatk I![ J{o-Fau/J DWorce: l+7zat It Has Meant 
FinanciaJ!yfor Women in California, FAM. ADVOC., Spring 1979, at 10; Cynthia Starnes, Applications I![ a 
C11111emporaty POTtnmlrip Mtxklfllf DWorce, 8 BYU J. PuB. L. I 07, I 08 (1993) [hereinafter Starnes, Applications]; 
Cynthia Starnes, DWorce and 1/u Displo.ced HomemalreT: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and 
Dissocialion Under No-Fau/J, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67, 92-95 (1993) [hereinafter Starnes, Dolls]; Lenore J. 
Weitzman, 'Th4 Eammni&s I![DWorce, Social and &nomic Consequences I![~' A~ and Child Support Awards, 
28 UCLA L. REV. 1181 (1981) [hereinafter Weitzman, 'Th4 Eco1UITIIics I![ Divorce]; Heather Ruth Wishik, 
Economics I![DWarce: An Exploratory S~, 20 FAM. L.Q 79, 80, 100 (1986); Osborn, supra, at 915. "Some 
recent research has indicated that judges have misused the extensive discretion available under modem 
divorce statutes." /d. at 937 n.l39. "[O]ur largely male judiciary has forfeited its traditional claim to 
extensive discretion by its sorry performance. The data for New Haven and elsewhere is [sic] clear: a 
discretion-laden system has resulted in uniformly unfair awards to, and decreased standards of living for, 
women and children." James B. McLindon, Separate But UnequaL· TM &o1UITIIic Disaster I![ Divorce for Women 
and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q 351,404 (1987) (citation omitted). 
Judges' wide latitude in determining a distribution of property fails to protect wives because it does 
not guarantee a right to half of the marital assets. "What person will enter a business or professional 
partnership or joint venture if the only liquidation rule is that a court will have a discretion to make any 
order it thinks fit in regard to all the money and property?" Ian F. G. Baxter, Fami!J! Law Reform in Ontario, 
25 U. TORONTO LJ. 236, 261 (1975) (discussing how judicial discretion in determining property 
distribution upon divorce provides inadequate protection for wives). 
This discretion has frequently resulted in judges awarding the majority of the marital property to 
husbands. See Greene, supra, at I 04 n.l89 (acknowledging that wives are normally awarded less than half 
of the marital property). Bul see id. at I 02 (stating elsewhere that there seems "to be a recent movement in 
the common-law states toward a more equal division of the property") (footnote omitted). These awards 
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reflect the view that only the husband contributed economically to the family during marriage. This view, 
of course, fails to account for wives' very real economic, but nonfinancial, contributions to the family: child 
rearing and household management. See De Armond, supra, at 240-41; Silbaugh, supra, at 16, 18-19 
(asserting that housework and child care have been treated in the disciplines of both sociology and 
economics as producing economic value); Cheadle, supra, at 1310-11; Osborn, supra, at 907, 914, 931 
n.l18; Ross, supra, at 115, 138 n.l27; Throne, supra, at 197. The domestic services that a wife renders 
often make it more difficult for her to contribute financially, see Greene, supra, at 85; De Armond, supra, 
at 240; Cheadle, supra, at 1310-11, and furthermore, her services "contribute[ ] indirectly to the [family's 
economic] acquisitions by making it possible for the ... [husband] to be employed." Greene, supra, at 85; 
see also id. at 83 ("Even if she did not contribute directly to the acquisition of property, her services enabled 
or hastened her husband's ability to acquire property.") (footnote omitted); De Armond, supra, at 240-41; 
Throne, supra, at 196-97; Joan Acker, Class, Gender, and the Relat.Wns tfDirtributUm, 13 SIGNS 473, 474 (1988) 
(arguing that without women's unpaid labor, the capitalist system could not function as beneficially for 
men); Cheadle, supra, at 1271 & n.ll; Sylvia A Law,~: Tnt Poweraru/Limitr tfthe Law, 95 YALELJ. 
1769, 1771 (1986) (reviewing ZIUAHR. EISENSTEIN, FEMINISM AND SEXUAL EQUAliTY (1984)) ("(O]ur 
liberal society depends upon the unpaid work performed by women in the home."). 
Judicial discretion permitting unequal property division often fails to provide the wife with an 
adequate result, precluding her from reaching her husband's earlier earnings. Even when state law requires 
judges to consider a wife's nonfinancial contribution to the family in determining an equitable distribution, 
see Timothy B. Walker & Linda D. Elrod, Fami!J Low in the Fifty States: An Overview, 26 FAM. L.Q. 319, 360-
61 tbl.6 (1993) (Indicating that most states now recognize spouses' nonmonetary contributions in 
determining equitable distribution upon divorce); Cheadle, supra, at 1311 n.223 (same); Greene, supra, at 
I 03 (same); Osborn, supra, at 914 (same), those judges consider it as only one of many factors in dividing 
the property, see Greene, supra, at I 03; Silbaugh, supra, at 58-59; Cheadle, supra, at 1289-90 (Indiana law), 
1302-03 (Massachusetts law), 1304-05 (Ohio law), and they consistently undervalue the wife's contributions. 
See Greene, supra, at 87 (stating that if the wife does not get the right to half of the marital property, her 
contribution to the marital unit will be "under-recognized"), I 03 (stating that in considering the wife's 
nonmonetary contributions as a factor in equitable distribution "the possibility exists that the court in the 
exercise of its discretion will fail to give the factor proper weight"); Silbaugh, supra, at 57-59; Cheadle, 
supra, at 1293 (discussing trial courts' undervaluation of the wife's contributions in the home in decisions 
which were reversed on appeal), 1299 n.164 (discussing an Oklahoma court decision that valued a wife's 
homemaking activities lower than her husband's labors on the farm). 
As has been noted, case law often interprets "equitable" as not meaning "equal." As a result, the 
equitable distribution laws do not guarantee a lower-earning wife access to her husband's earlier earnings 
upon divorce. During the marriage, as noted above, those laws do not apply at all. In some cases, 
equitable distribution laws are waived by prenuptial agreements and, consequently, do not apply even upon 
divorce. See Kahng, supra, at 20. Therefore, state property and divorce laws are inadequate to ensure the 
wife's access to any part of her husband's earnings. Accqrd Kahng, supra, at 51. 
Some critics might argue that a wife has access to her husband's earnings because state law obligates 
him to support her. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 25, at 1420-22; Greene, supra, at 77; Kornhauser, supra 
note 73, at 98-99. The support obligation, however, has never been successfully invoked to enable a wife 
to recover from her husband taxes she paid on his behalf under joint and several liability. Modern courts 
tend not to interfere or to enforce the husband's obligation to support his wife except in extreme cases, like 
a husband refusing to pay his wife's hospital bill. See, e.g., Cranford v. Cranford, 772 S.W.2d 48 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1989) (holding that husband's alimony payments are to be increased based on his obligation to 
support wife who suffered debilitative multiple sclerosis). The support obligation was a creature of common 
law, especially before the advent of the Married Women's Property Acts. Before wives could own property 
of their own, they needed, and the law provided them with, support from their husbands. See, e.g., Greene, 
supra, at 77; Throne, supra, at 195. Once wives could own their own property under the Married Women's 
Property Acts, see Greene, supra, at 79 n.43; Ross, supra, at 114 n.20, the support obligation under common 
law, although not ceasing altogether, see Cheadle, supra, at 1275 n.31, gradually became less important, as 
is evidenced by the recent decline in the importance of alimony, see Osborn, supra, at 908,915, a payment 
traditionally based on the concept of spousal support. See Cheadle, supra, at 1274 & n.26, 1283, 1295 
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criticized as being inconsistent with the government's administrative 
approach to tax refunds. 76 The following discussion addresses and 
criticizes the various arguments that have been asserted in favor of joint 
and several liability. 
A. Taxpayer Uniry 
As discussed above, the government has asserted that filing a joint 
return causes the spouses to become one taxpaying unit. Under this 
argument, tax liability may be collected in full from either part of that 
unit. This argument fails both as a matter of logic and legislative 
history. Although it may be true that the taxpayer-unity theory applies 
for computational purposes, it does not follow that the theory should 
apply in determining who can be held liable for tax. 
The theory of taxpayer unity was the Commissioner's primary 
argument in Cole v. Commissioner77 and was the same argument the 
government asserted in LT. 1575.78 The Ninth Circuit rejected the 
Commissioner's taxpayer-unity argument, however, noting that the 
government had not permitted taxpayer unity in a variety of other 
contexts in which doing so would have benefited the taxpayer. For 
example, under 1935 Treasury Regulations interpreting the Revenue 
Act of 1934, the Treasury Department abandoned the unitary approach 
with regard to whether spouses could net the gains of one against the 
losses of the other. The regulations disallowed such interspousal 
nettings of gains and losses under the theory that the husband and wife 
were different taxpayers and that a taxpayer may offset gains only to the 
extent of his or her own losses. 79 If the government treated joint filers 
n.142, 1298 & nn.160-61. Alimony has also lost importance under no-fault property division regimes. See 
Starnes, Dolls, supra, at 85, 97. Not only has the support obligation lost importance over time, but it also 
is "not directly enforceable between the parties when married. The support obligation may be enforceable 
during a marriage only by third party creditors who may sue one spouse for certain very narrow categories 
of debts [such as necessities like food and shelter) undertaken by the other." Silbaugh, supra, at 34 (footnote 
omitted); su also McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W. 2d 336 (Neb. 1953) (holding that because husband and 
wife were not separated or living apart, the wife could not maintain an action against her husband for 
maintenance). 
76. See in.fra notes 254-59 and accompanying text. 
77. Cole v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 485,486 (9th Cir. 1935). 
78. I.T. 1575,11-1 C.B. 144 (1923). 
79. See Article 117-5, Regulations 86, quoUd in Cok, 81 F.2d at 487. "In the application of section 
117 (dealing with capital gains and losses), a husband and wife, regardless of whether a joint return or 
separate returns arc made, arc considered to be separate taxpayers." ld. The Supreme Court later held 
these regulations to be invalid as contrary to congressional intent and to settled law since 1921. See 
Hclvering v.Janncy, 311 U.S. 189, 194-95 (1940). 
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separately for some purposes, reasoned the Ninth Circuit, then it must 
also do so when collecting the liability. 
For further support, the Ninth Circuit in Cole also referred to other 
contexts in which married taxpayers flling joindy had been treated as 
separate taxpayers contrary to any theory of taxpayer unity. In Gummey 
v. Commissioner,80 spouses who had filed joint returns were treated as 
separate taxpayers for purposes of§ 118 of the Revenue Act of 1928, the 
statutory predecessor to I.R.C. § 1091. Under that provision, a taxpayer 
could not recognize a loss upon the disposition of property if that 
taxpayer acquired or reacquired substantially identical property within 
30 days before or after the disposition. In Gummey, one spouse had sold 
stock on the market at a loss, and within 30 days the other spouse 
purchased stock of the same company on the market. The 
Commissioner argued that by flling joindy the spouses had become one 
taxpayer, and thus, the stock had been disposed of and reacquired by 
the same taxpayer. Under the Commissioner's theory, §118 should 
apply to prevent the loss deduction. The Board of Tax Appeals ruled 
to the contrary. According to the Board, the fact that joint flling 
required tax to be computed on the spouses' aggregate net incomes did 
not render the spouses one taxpayer. Because the spouses remained 
separate taxpayers, the spouse incurring a loss did not reacquire the 
stock, and thus, § 118 did not prevent loss recognition. 
The Ninth Circuit in Cole also cited Van Vleck v. Commissio~ 1 to 
illustrate another context in which joint filers remained separate 
taxpayers despite having fLied joindy. In Van Vleck, it was the 
Commissioner who argued that joindy flling spouses remained separate 
taxpayers. In that case, the husband incurred a net operating loss for 
1929, a year in which he had fLied a separate return. He attempted to 
carry the loss forward to 1930, and he fLied joindy to use the loss to offset 
his wife's 1930 income. Under the loss carryforward provision in place 
at the time, the deduction for losses that had been carried forward was 
available only to the taxpayer who had sustained the loss. Thus, the 
only means by which the wife's 1930 income could be reduced by her 
husband's loss carryforward would be by treating the wife as having 
sustained the earlier loss, that is, by treating the wife and the husband 
as one unitary taxpayer. The Board, agreeing with the Commissioner, 
ruled against the taxpayers, holding that the couple was composed of 
two separate taxpayers despite having filed joindy, and that the 
husband's loss could not be carried forward to offset his wife's income. 
80. 26 B.T.A. 894, 895 (1932). 
81. 31 B.T.A. 433,435 (1934), qff'd, 80 F.2d 217,218 (2d Cir. 1935), em. dmied, 298 U.S. 656 
(1936). 
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Uilzlein v. Commissio'fl£112 also supported the Ninth Circuit's decision in 
Cole to reject the theory of taxpayer unity. In a reviewed decision, the 
Uilzlein court overturned the Commissioner's assessment of a tax 
deficiency against a couple in which the husband, having sold stock to 
his wife at a loss, had deducted the loss on their joint return.83 The 
Commissioner had disallowed the loss deduction on the basis that the 
joint return made the husband and wife one taxpayer and that the 
taxpayer could not realize a loss by selling property to himself. Ruling 
otherwise, the Board ofTax Appeals held that joint filing does not cause 
the spouses to become one taxpayer. Therefore, the husband's good 
faith sale of stock to his wife was not a sale to himself, and the resulting 
loss could be recognized. 
Because joint filing did not result in taxpayer unity in other contexts, 
and because the government's own position was contrary to taxpayer 
unity in both Van Vleck and Article 11 7-5 of Regulations 86, the Ninth 
Circuit rejected the Commissioner's theory of taxpayer unity in the 
context of who could be held liable for tax. The decision in Cole was 
consistent with numerous prior decisions in which taxpayer unity had 
been rejected.84 After Cole, other courts continued consistently to reject 
the theory of taxpayer unity. 85 
82. 30 B.T.A. 399,402 (1934), tifl'd, Commissionerv. Brumder, 82 F.2d 944 {7th Cir. 1936). 
83. Set id. at 403. Congress did not enact I.R.C. § 1041 until1984. That provision disallows the 
recognition of gains and losses for interspousal transfers of property. Set Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 421 (a), 98 
Stat. 494, 793-95 (1984). Unless otherwise noted, all cases mentioned in this Article involving interspousal 
transfers of property arose prior to the adoption of I.R.C. § I 041. The tax year at issue in Urhlein also 
preceded the enactment of§ 24(a)(6), Revenue Act of 1934, § 24(a)(6), 48 Stat. 680, 691, the predecessor 
ofi.R.C. § 267(a)(l) (1994), which disallows the recognition of losses sustained in connection with a sale of 
property to a related party. For purposes ofi.R.C. § 267, related parties include spouses. 
84. Set, e.g., Fawsett v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 139, 141 (1934) (same fact pattern, holding and 
reasoning as in ~); Brochon v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A 404, 406 (1934) (same fact pattern, holding 
and reasoning as in~); Fleitman v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 1291, 1294 (1931), acq., X-2 C.B. 24 
(1931) (allowing the husband a bad-debt deduction on a joint return for a loan previously made to his wife 
that she could no longer pay back. Had the husband and wife become one taxpayer by virtue of filing 
jointly, then a bad-debt deduction for the husband would have been inappropriate, the bad debt being 
owed by the husband to himselQ; Hill v. United States, 12 F. Supp. 798, 800 (Ct. Cl. 1935) (holding that 
losses from interspousal sales may be deducted even if spouses file jointly because joint filing does not cause 
the spouses to become one taxpayer). 
85. Set, ~og., Seder v. Commissioner, 38 B.T .A 874, 877 (1938) (rejecting the taxpayer-unity theory 
and joint and several liability for the 1933 tax year); Pierce v. Commissioner, 100 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1938) 
(spouses could not net one's losses against the gains of the other for 1933 despite filing jointly because joint 
filing did not cause the spouses to become one taxpayer); DeMuth v. Commissioner, I 00 F.2d I 012 (2d 
Cir. 1938) Qn accord with Fierce); Commissioner v. Rabenold, 108 F.2d 639, 640 (2d Cir. 1940) (rejecting 
the taxpayer-unity theory and joint and several liability for the 1933 tax year); Flaherty v. Commissioner, 
35 B.T .A 1131 (1937) (rejecting the taxpayer-unity theory and joint and several liability for the 1932 tax 
year); Janney v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A 240, 243 (1939) (spouses could not net losses of one against the 
gains of the other because joint filing did not make them one taxpayer), rev'd, 108 F.2d 564, 567 (3d Cir. 
1939), rrvmali!IJ'd, 311 U.S. 189 (1940); United States v. Hammerstein, 20 F. Supp. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1937). 
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In 1940, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of taxpayer unity for 
the first time. In Hewering v. ]anni[Y, 86 the Court invalidated Article 117-5 
of Regulations 86 and held that, under the Revenue Act of 1934, 
spouses filing joindy could use the capital losses of one to offset the 
capital gains of the other. The Court did not rule direcdy on the theory 
of taxpayer unity, per se. However, its reasoning implied acceptance of 
that theory. The Court noted that the taxing authorities, relying on the 
theory of taxpayer unity, had interpreted earlier revenue acts as allowing 
one spouse's capital losses to be netted against the capital gains of the 
other when they flied joindy. 87 The Treasury Department and the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue had consequendy treated joint filing as 
making the spouses one taxpayer for tax computation purposes. 
Because the Revenue Act of 1934 was identical in all relevant respects 
to the language of the earlier revenue ·acts, the Supreme Court 
concluded that in enacting the Revenue Act of 1934 without change, 
Congress could not have intended to adopt a different approach. 88 
However, regulations under the Revenue Act of 1934, promulgated in 
1935, changed the administrative interp,retation of the Code. The 
Supreme Court invalidated the changes as contrary to congressional 
intent, ruling that Congress had, under the doctrine of statutory 
reenactment, adopted the taxpayer-unity theory with respect to the 
netting of gains and losses. 
We are of the opinion that under the provision of the Act of 1934 as 
to joint returns of husband and wife, which embodied a policy set 
forth in substantially the same terms for many years, Congress 
intended to provide for a tax on the aggregate net income and that the 
losses of one spouse might be deducted from the gains of the other; 
and that this applied as well to deductions for capital losses as to other 
deductions. This, we think, was the meaning of the provision of the 
Revenue Act of 1934 when it was enacted, and it was subject to 
In Hammerstein, the court held that the assessment of a tax against a husband is not an assessment of a tax 
against a wife simply because the spouses filed jointly. Su id. at 745. The fact that the spouses filed jointly 
did not make the husband and wife one taxpayer for purposes of assessment. Su id. The statute of . 
limitations had run as to the wife, and, therefore, the suit against her was dismissed. Su id.; see alro 
Commissionerv. Brumder, 82 F.2d 944,945 (7th Cir. 1936) ~osses from intcrspousal sales may be deducted 
even if spouses file jointly because joint filing does not cause the spouses to become one taxpayer); 
Commissioner v. Thomas, 84 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1936) (In accord with BTII1TIIier); Sweet v. Commissioner, 
102 F.2d 103 (1st Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 627 (1939) (spouses could not net losses of one against 
the gains of the other because joint filing did not make them one taxpayer); Nelson v. Commissioner, I 04 
F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1939) (per curiam) (In accord with Swee~. 
86. 311 u.s. 189 (1940). 
87. See Janney, 311 U.S. at 192 (referring to Opinion Solicitor 90, 4 C.B. 236 (1921)). 
88. See id. at 194-95. 
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change only by Congress, and not by the Department [of the 
Treasury].89 
The same day the Supreme Court decidedJa~, it also ruled in T ajl 
v. Helveri:n/0 that Article 23(o)-1 91 was also invalid. Under this 
regulation, deductions for charitable contributions had been limited to 
fifteen percent of the donor-spouse's separate net income, regardless of 
filing status. In T ajl, the Court held that deductions for charitable 
contributions made by spouses filing jointly were limited to fifteen 
percent of combined net income, rather than fifteen percent of the 
donor-spouse's separate net income. Again, the Court did not rule on 
the theory of taxpayer unity itself. Rather, citing Solicitor Opinion 90, 
the Court held that the government had always interpreted the statute 
as treating joint fllers as one taxpayer for purposes of tax computation. 92 
Therefore, und~r previous revenue acts, a couple filing jointly could 
deduct charitable contributions to the extent of fifteen percent of their 
combined net incomes. In enacting the Revenue Act of 1934, identical 
in all relevant respects to the earlier statutory language, Congress must 
have intended to retain the earlier construction. Regulations changing 
that construction for the first time in 1935 were, therefore, invalid as 
contrary to congressional intent. 
The principle that the joint return is to be treated as the return of a 
"taxable unit" and as though it were made by a "single individual" 
would be violated if in making a joint return each spouse were 
compelled to calculate his or her charitable contributions as if he or 
she were making a separate return. The principle of a joint return 
permitted aggregation of income and deductions and thus overrode 
the limitations incident to separate returns [such as each spouse's 
entitlement to a deduction only to the extent of fifteen percent of his 
or her separate net income].93 
After the Supreme Court rulings in Janney and T ajl, some lower courts 
read those decisions as requiring spouses who had flied jointly to be 
treated as one taxpayer for all purposes, not merely for purposes of tax 
computation, but also for purposes of tax collection. Consequently, 
those courts imposed joint and several liability on jointly filing spouses 
for pre-1938 tax years. This was the view that the Court of Claims 
89. Id. 
90. 311 u.s. 195, 198 (1940). 
91. Article 23(o)-l, Regulations 86 (1935), quoted in Taft v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 229, 230 
(1939). 
92. See Tqfl, 311 U.S. at 197. 
93. ld. at 198. 
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accepted in Moore.94 The Board of Tax Appeals also adopted it in later 
cases.95 These courts ruled thatjoint filing made the spouses one 
taxpayer and, therefore, required joint and several liability. 
The extension of the taxpayer-unity concept from tax computation to 
tax collection was improper, however, as alogical matter. The basis for 
the Supreme Court's decisions in Janney and Taft related only to tax 
computation, not to the question of who should bear the burden of the 
tax liability.96 The statutory language the Court had relied on in both 
Janney and Taflwas found in§ 51(b): 
If a husband and wife living together have an aggregate net income 
for the taxable year of$2,500 or over, or an aggregate gross income 
for such year of$5,000 or over- (1) Each shall make such a return, or 
(2) The income of each shall be included in a single joint return, in 
which case the tax shall be computed on the aggregate income.97 
Basing its decisions on prior administrative practice, the Supreme Court 
had interpreted the requirement that tax be "computed on the 
aggregate income" as requiring a netting of total combined deductions 
against total aggregate income, rather than as requiring a separate 
determination of each spouse's net income and then an aggregation of 
those separate net incomes. The treatment of joint filers as one 
taxpaying entity under Janney and T ajt, therefore, arose from the 
interpretation of statutory language that was relevant only to the 
computation of tax liability. Janney and T afl indicated the Supreme 
Court's approval of the taxpayer-unity approach, but only for purposes 
of computing tax. Those cases provided no indication as to whether the 
Court would approve such an approach for purposes of collecting the 
liability, once computed, from the respective spouses.98 
Despite the Court of Claims approach previously taken in Moore, the 
Second Circuit in Commissioner v. Uniacke99 recognized the distinction 
between unity for purposes of computation and unity for purposes of 
collection. Referring to Janney and T ajt, the Second Circuit wrote: 
94. Moore v. United States, 37 F. Supp. 136, 140 (Ct. Cl. 1941). 
95. See, e.g., Schoenhutv. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 812,821-22 (1941) (construing]t111119 to require 
joint and several liability under the theory of taxpayer unity); Gillette v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 573, 
578 (1942) (following Sclwtnhu~; if. United States v. Rosebush, 45 F. Supp. 664 (E.D. Wise. 1942). In 
Rosebush, the court decided against joint and several liability even though it stated that approach to be 
correct under M=e. Su id. Sitting in the Seventh Circuit, the court felt constrained by Crowe v. 
Commissioner, 86 F.2d 796 (7th Cir. 1936), which had followed the Ninth Circuit in Cok. Su id. 
96. See Beck, supra note 3, at 338, 346 n.l21. 
97. Revenue Act of 1934, §51 (b), 48 Stat. 680, 697 (emphasis added). 
98. Su Beck, supra note 3, at 346 n.l21. 
99. 132 F.2d 781, 783 (2d Cir. 1942). 
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Obviously each case had to do only with computing the tax liability 
disclosed by a joint return. Neither case involved the question 
whether a husband and wife were jointly and severally liable for the 
tax so computed; the levy or incidence of the tax was not an issue nor 
considered. But the opinions did approve the principle expressed in 
an opinion of the Solicitor oflnternal Revenue that a joint return "is 
treated as the return of a taxable unit" and as though it were the 
return "of a single individual." These phrases are seized upon by the 
Commissioner as implying joint and several liability not only for the 
tax computed upon the aggregate net income reported in the joint 
return, but also for any deficiency determined by including 
unreported income belonging solely to one of the spouses and of 
which the other had no knowledge. We do not think they carry such 
an implication.100 
Because the Supreme Court denied certiorari in both Uniacke101 and 
Moore, 102 it is difficult to ascertain whether the Court would have 
extended unity to liability issues or whether the Court would merely 
have limited the unity concept to computation issues. 103 Based on the 
language and reasoning in Jannf!Y and T ajt, however, the more 
convincing view is that of Uniacke. It cannot be assumed that taxpayer 
unity would have been adopted for any purposes beyond tax 
computation because Jannf!Y and T afl dealt only with the construction of 
§ 51 (b )(2), a provision relating solely to tax computation.104 The 
Supreme Court ruled that joint filers were one taxpayer for purposes of 
tax computation. 105 However, that conclusion required no similar result 
for purposes of collecting the tax liability once computed. 106 Janney and 
T afl should not have been read to require taxpayer unity for purposes 
of determining who would have tq bear the tax. The taxpayer-unity 
theory should never have required joint and several liability for pre-
1938 tax years. 
The theory that jointly filing spouses become one taxpayer should not 
be viewed as a justification for joint and several liability. The use of that 
theory to support joint and several liability is a flawed application of the 
I 00. Uniacke, 132 F.2d at 782 (footnotes omitted). 
101. 318 u.s. 787 (1943). 
102. 314 u.s. 619 (1941). 
103. The Court, no doubt, denied certiorari in both cases because the new 1938law would soon 
render the issue obsolete as controversies regarding pre-1938 tax years eventually disappeared. 
104. See Beck, supra note 3, at 346 n.l21. 
105. See Janney v. Commissioner, 311 U.S. 189, 243 (1940); Taft v. Helvering, 311 U.S. 195, 197 
(1940). 
I 06. See Beck, supra note 3, at 338 (arguing that taxpayer unity refers to computation and carries no 
implications regarding the liability for tax). 
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Janni!Y and T afl doctrines and ignores the reality that a married couple 
consists of two different persons, persons whose economic interests often 
differ. 107 
I 07. That two spouses' economic interests and well-being may not be aligned is demonstrated by the 
pattern that spouses increasingly keep their resources segregated. See PHiliP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER 
SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY, WORK, SEX 101 fig. 9 (1983) (surveying whether or not 
couples believe in pooling money and finding that the belief is not universal: 69% of wives and 75% of 
husbands believed in pooling); ROSANNA HERTZ, MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS: WOMEN AND MEN IN 
DUAL CAREER MARRIAGES 90-91 (1986) (finding in her survey that only 48% of the couples surveyed 
claimed to pool their assets); SHERE HITE, THE HITE REPORT-WOMEN AND LOVE: A CULTURAL 
REVOLUTION IN PROGRESS 431-49 (1987); JAN PAHL, MONEY AND MARRIAGE 78 tbl.5.3 (1989) (only 
56% of couples claimed to share); Kornhauser, supra note 73, at 86 (discussing the results of her own 
empirical surveys: 30% of couples in one survey and 44.4% in the other survey claimed that at least some 
wages were not kept in joint accounts); id. at 81 ("[P]ooling is less monolithic in reality than it is in 
theory."); Meredith Edwards, IndWidual Equi!Y and Social Policy, in WOMEN, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PuBUC 
POUCY 95, 98-100 Oacqueline Goodnow & Carole Patemen eds., 1985) (observing that household 
members do not share income equally and, in fact, the standard of living of some wives may be lower than 
those of their husbands); Gann, supra note 26, at 26 (finding that data do "not generally substantiate the 
assumption that married persons equally share their income[s]," (citing HAROLD M. GROVES, FEDERAL 
TAX TREATMENT OF THE FAMILY 106 (1963))); Lily Kahng, Ft&tWns in Tax, in TAXING AMERICA 25-44 
(Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996) (questioning the assumption that spouses share their 
incomes and characterizing it as a fiction); Kornhauser, supra note 73, at 80 (stating that the premise "that 
married couples share resources ... is largely unsupported by empirical evidence") (footnote omitted); 
Daniel]. Lathrope, State-Defined MariJal Status: Its Futun as an Operative Tax FD£1Dr, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 
25 7, 259 (1983); Michael]. Mcintyre & Oliver Oldman, T OXIlliDn f!! the Farni.tJ in a ComprehmsWe and Simplifod 
Incorru Tax, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1573, 1594 n.76 (1977); Oliver Oldman & Ralph Temple, ComptD'atWe 
Ana!Jisis f![Taxalion f!! Ma17Ud Persons, 12 STAN. L. REV. 585, 597 (1960) (acknowledging that even spouses 
who supposedly share do not necessarily have "complete access to [each) ... other's income"); Silbaugh, 
supra note 75, at 49 (questioning the notion that husbands share their financial resources with their wives); 
Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing HuusmxJrlc., 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1592-94 (1996) (noting unequal sharing of income 
within the family); Diana Wong, 1k Limils f!! Using the Huuselwld as the UrUJ f!! AM9sis, in HOUSEHOLDS AND 
THE WORLD-ECONOMY 56-63 Ooan Smith et al. eds., 1984) (discussing studies of households in various 
countries and concluding that household members do not share resources equally and often do not even 
live similar class styles); Laura Ann Davis, Note, A Feminirt Justificatron jilT the AdoptWn f!! an IndWiduaJ Filing 
Syslml, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 197,216-18 (1988); Note, 1k Casef~~r MarulaiiJry SeptD'ate Ftling by Married Persons, 
91 YALELJ. 363,372-73 (1981); Kahng, supra note 75, at 18-19 (observing that married couples do not 
uniformly pool resources or make all their decisions about earning, consumption and savingjoindy); see 
alro SUSAN MOLLER OK.IN, jUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 31 (1989) (suggesting that "many social 
'goods,' such as time for paid work or for leisure, physical security, and access to financial resources, 
typically are unevenly distributed within families"); Viviana A Zelizer, 1k Social Meaning f!! Moru:y: "Special 
Mor!Us,"95 AM.J. Soc. 342, 352 (1989); Kahng, supra note 75, at 19. But see Anne L. Alstott, 1k Earned 
Income Tax CrtdiJ and Sorru FundammJal Institutronal Dilemmas f!!T ax-Transfer Integration, 4 7 NAT'L T AXJ. 609, 
611 (1994) (arguing that the family unit is the best choice for measuring income, asserting that one person's 
income alone does not reflect the other available resources or the financial responsibilities that accompany 
living in a household); Michael]. Mcintyre, IndWidual Ftling in the Personal Incorru Tax: Prolegomma to Future 
Discussion, 58 N.C. L. REV. 469, 470 (1980) [hereinafter Mcintyre, IndiuiduaiJ (agreeing); Richard A 
Epstein, 1k Gender Gap in Cumpensatron: Some &jlectrons on the Gender Gap in Emp~, 82 GEO. L.J. 75, 78-79 
(1993) (arguing that the family operates as one economic unit, positing that women share in the gains that 
men have generated through the division of take-home pay); Mcintyre, supra, at 469-70 (while noting that 
marital pooling is not universal, suggesting that couples probably pool some or all of their incomes); 
Douglas Y. Thorson, AnAna!Jisir f!!the Sourw f!!Continutd Controver.sy Over the Tax Treatment f!!Fami!J Incorru, 18 
NAT'L TAXJ. 113, 116 & n.ll (1965) (asserting that spouses normally pool their incomes, citing some 
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family sociologists who based this conclusion on observations from the 1950s and early 1960s). Of course, 
purported sharing of income four decades ago does not constitute evidence of current pooling. But see 
Zelenak, supra note 75, at 348-53. Zelenak reinterprets Kornhauser's data and suggests that "patterns of 
household income and expenditure indicate that most spouses have no choice but to share roughly equally 
in the consumption of their combined income." /d. at 353. Professor Zelenak concludes that spouses 
nominally pool their resources, but he does not examine empirical studies concerned with spouses' relative 
consumption patterns. See id. Professor Zelenak suggests that allocation of deductions between spouses is 
difficult "precisely because there is a great deal of marital pooling." /d. at 381. 
Furthermore, even spouses who do purport to share resources do not necessarily exercise equivalent 
control over them. The spouse who earns the bulk of the family income tends to control how resources will 
be used, and not infrequently uses them primarily for his or her own benefit. See BARBARA R. BERGMANN, 
THE EcONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 211-12 (1986) (noting that men, as primary wage earners, have 
retained control over consumption patterns); BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra, at 53-56; PAHL, supra, at 
146-51 (finding that women married to wealthy men often lack resources for leisure activities although their 
husbands do not), 143 (observing that women married to wealthy men may lack sufficient funds for 
necessities); Christine Delphy & Diana Leonard, Class Ana!Jisis, GeruJer Atza!ysis and tk Fami!J, in GENDER AND 
STRATIFICATION 57, 64-65 (Rosemary Crompton & Michael Mann eds., 1986) (arguing that unequal food 
distribution within the family undermines the assumption of equal sharing of resources and power); Jan 
Pahl, The Al/ocoJion of Money and tk SlruduTing of Inequal~ Wtlhin Maniage, 31 Soc. REV. 23 7, 251-58 (1983); 
Jan Pahl, TheAI/ocoJion of Money Wrlhin tk Houselwld, in THE STATE, TiiEI.AW, AND THE FAMILY: CRITICAL 
PERsPECTIVES 36 (Michael D.A Freeman ed., 1984); Diana Strassmann, Not a Fru MarkeL· The Rhetoric of 
Disciplinary Au~Jwri!y in EcoTWmi&s, in BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: FEMINIST THEORY AND ECONOMICS 54, 
58-59 (Marianne A Ferber &Julie A Nelson eds., 1993) (noting that economists often assume incorrectly 
that the husband shares power and resources so as to further the best interest of each individual within the 
household). Accord CHRISTINE OPPONG, MIDDLE CLASS AFRICAN MARRIAGE: A FAMILY STUDY OF 
GHANAIAN SENIOR CIVIL SERVANTS 86-88, 139 (1981); Carole B. Burgoyne, MotV:J in Maniage: How 
Pallmls of All.ocalion Both Reflect and Con&eal Power, 38 Soc. REV. 634 (1990); Heidi I. Hartmann, The Fami!J 
as tk Locus ofGeruler, Class, and PoliJical Strugg/4: The Examp/4 of Housework, 6 SIGNS 366, 366-76 (1981) (arguing 
that men more often than women control how income will be used and for whose benefit); Kornhauser, 
supra note 73, at 80, 90-91 (explaining that studies show "that individual incomes are not simply pooled and 
then spent to meet household needs in some unified fashion. Rather, they are spent at least in part 
according to the earner's own preference") (quoting Beatrice Lorge Rogers, The /nJemai Dynamics of 
Houselwlds: A Critical Factor in Dtvtlopmml Policy, in INTRA-HOUSEHOLD REsOURCE ALLoCATION: ISSUES 
AND METHODS FOR DEVELOPMENT POUCY AND PLANNING I (Beatrice Lorge Rogers & Nina P. 
Schlossman eds., 1990))); Kristin A Moore & Isabel V. Sawhill, Impli&alions of Women's Emp~tfor Home 
and Fami!J Life, in SOCIOLOGICAL PERsPECTIVES ON WOMEN WORKING: THEORIES AND FACTS IN 
PERSPECTIVE 201 (Ann H. Stromberg & Shirley Harkess eds., 1978); Staudt, supra, at 1594 n.91 (citing 
numerous studies which show that access to, and control of, resources is often tied to the gender hierarchy, 
often with the man controlling how money is used); Michael Young, Distribution of Income wiJhin tk Fami!J, 
3 BRIT.J. Soc. 305, 305 (1952) (stating that, historically, men disproportionately benefit from family 
resources: "the bread-winners are often the meat-eaters"); id. at 314 (describing the practice whereby 
husbands provide only limited access to their resources through an allowance system rather than by 
providing indiscriminate access); Kahng, supra note 75, at 21, 26 n.73 (citing evidence that the earner 
retains control over the family's resources and that, even in community property states where spouses are 
given equal management and control over community property earnings, the earner spouse often exerts 
de facto control over his earnings as the wife has little ability to prevent her husband from dissipating the 
couple's assets); WIWAM A REPPv,JR. & CYNTHIA A SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN TiiE UNITED 
STATES 14-3 (3d ed. 1991) (same). See general!y ROBERT 0. BLOOD & DONALD M. WOLFE, HUSBANDS AND 
WIVES: THE DYNAMICS OF MARRIED LiVING (1960); StephenJ. Bahr, Effe~:ts on Power and Division of Lahor 
in tk Fami!J, in WORKING MOTHERS 167 (Lois W. Hoffman & F. Ivan Nye eds., 1974); Randall Collins, 
A Confoct 17INry of Social SlroJifoalion, 19 Soc. PROBS. 3, 13, 16 (1971) (describing sexual stratification in the 
workplace and in the home). But su Michael J. Mcintyre, Tax Justice for Fami!J Members Ajler New r ork State 
Tax &form, 51 ALB. L. REv. 789,792 n.l7 (1987) [hereinafter Mcintyre, New rorkState] (claiming that the 
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B. Administrative Necessiry 
Another argument advanced in favor of joint and several liability is 
that of administrative necessity. This argument was first articulated in 
Anderson v. United States, 108 a case in which joint and several liability was 
not at issue. One of the disputes in Anderson was whether the taxpayer 
had filed a joint return on behalf of himself and his wife, or whether his 
return was, in fact, a separate return. Although it is unclear from the 
court's opinion why filing status was in controversy, 109 the Fifth Circuit 
nevertheless stated that when a joint return is made, "the Commissioner 
[i]s under no obligation to change it and divide it into two separate 
returns . . . [because there are no data] upon which to divide the 
return." 110 The Commissioner claimed that, as an administrative 
matter, it could not separate the income and losses of the two spouses. 111 
Administrative necessity was first invoked as a justification for joint 
and several liability in Cole. 112 The Commissioner had argued that 
because spouses' incomes and expenses, as entered on the joint return, 
were not identified separately, the government could not determine how 
much tax liability was attributable to each spouse. 113 In Cole, the 
taxpayer countered this assertion with two arguments. First, any 
examination that revealed a deficiency would also reveal the respective 
incomes and expenses of the spouses. 114 In such cases, calculating the 
proportionate deficiencies of each spouse should present no 
data in Jan Pahl, Pallt:ms '![Money Management within Marrioge, 9 J. Soc. POL. 313 (1980) are 
unrepresentative). Professor Mcintyre also cites data supportive of sharing that was gathered in the 1950s 
and early 1960s. Again, the possibility of sharing between spouses in those years does not prove that 
spouses continue to share four decades later. 
108. 48 F.2d 201,202 (5th Cir. 1931) (affirming an unreported decision from the N.D. Tex. (Judge 
William H. Atwell)). 
109. An article byJ. Timothy Philipps and L Bradford Braford asserts that joint and several liability 
was the issue in Antler.ron. Set J. Timothy Philipps & L Bradford Braford, Even a Tax Collator Should HtWI s~ 
HearL· Equitable &luffor the lnrwcmt Spouse Under LR.C. § 6013(e), 8 N. ILL. U. L REV. 33, 36 n.18 (1987). 
However, the Fifth Circuit opinion in that case does not disclose why filing status was at issue. Set Anderson, 
48 F.2d at 201-03. 
110. Anderson, 48 F.2d at 202. 
Ill. Set Nancie Quick &Joseph N. DuCanto,Joint Tax Liabi/4y and the "lnrwcmt Spouse" Doctrine in 
Common Law and CIJI1UTUIIIig JlrrJper!JI]urisdictions: A Review '![Code Section 6013(e) and Its Pro~, 17 FAM. L.Q 
65,68 (1983). 
112. 29 B.T.A. 602, 604-05 (1933), rev'd, 81 F.2d 485, 487-88 (9th Cir. 1935). 
113. See Cole, 29 B.T.A. at 604-05. 
114. See Cole, 81 F;2d at 487; see also Commissioner v. Uniacke, 132 F.2d 781, 783 (2d Cir. 1942) 
("[s)uch [administrative] difficulties appear to be more theoretical than real" because the audit which 
identifies the deficiency also identifies the spouse to whom the additional income belonged); Beck, supra 
note 3, at 343. 
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administrative difficulties. 115 Second, if a case arose in which the 
Commissioner could not apportion tax liability between the spouses, 
then the Commissioner could simply assess the entire deficiency against 
each spouse separately, thereby placing the burden of proof upon each 
of them to prove that a portion or all of the total tax deficiency was 
attributable to the other spouse. 116 In this instance, a non-delinquent 
spouse could escape liability by proving that the asserted deficiency was 
attributable to the other spouse. Under a regime of joint and several 
liability, such a showing would be legally irrelevant, and the non-
delinquent spouse would remain liable by virtue of having ftledjointly. 
The Ninth Circuit noted that this solution in which the Commissioner 
would simply assess the deficiency against both spouses separately would 
sufficiently address any administrative problems the Commissioner 
claimed would result under a regime of separate liability. 117 
Although the Ninth Circuit had soundly and thoughtfully rejected the 
theory of administrative necessity, Congress summarily invoked it again 
as the justification for the Revenue Act of 1938 when enactingjoint and 
severalliability.118 Without explaining or identifying any precise need 
for joint and several liability, the House Report stated: 
Section 51 (b) of the bill expressly provides that the spouses, who 
exercise the privilege of filing a joint return, are jointly and severally 
liable for the tax computed upon their aggregate income. It is 
necessary, for administrative reasons, that any doubt as to the 
existence of such liability should be set at rest, if the privilege of filing 
such joint returns is continued. 119 
More than three decades later, the legislative history of the innocent 
spouse rules also referred to administrative necessity as a justification for 
joint and severalliability. 120 That legislative history failed, however, to 
specify any specific reason why joint and several liability might 
purportedly be administratively necessary. 
Administrative necessity fails to pass muster as a justification for joint 
and several liability for a variety of reasons. First, current law requires 
both spouses to attach their W-2 forms to the joint tax return. 121 
115. See Cok, 81 F.2d at 487. In Cok, the spouses' respective net incomes were, in fact, stipulated with 
the government. See id. at 490. 
116. See id. at 487-88; Beck, supra note 3, at 343. 
117. See Cok; 81 F.2d at 488; Beck, supra note 3, at 344. 
118. See H.R. REP. NO. 75-1860, at 30 (1938}, reprinted in 1939-1 G.B. 728,749 (1939). 
119. ld. at 749. 
120. SeeS. REP. No. 91-1537, at 2 (1970); H.R. REP. No. 91-1734, at 2 (1970). 
121. See INfERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEP'T OF THE TREAsURY, FORM I 040 (1996) ~'Attach Copy 
B of your Forms W-2, W-2G, and 1099-R here."); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEP'T OF TifE 
TREASURY, I 040 FORMS AND INSTRUCTIONS 14 ( 1996) ("If a joint return, also include your spouse's 
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Consequendy, much of the information needed to apportion tax liability 
is already available to the government as a part of the joint return 
submission. Second, the Commissioner was already making the same 
allocations in other contexts which he had a,rgued in Cole were 
administratively impossible to make. 122 For example, at the time of the 
Ninth Circuit's ruling in Cole, Article 23(o)-1 ofRegulations 86limited 
the charitable deduction on a joint return to fifteen percent of the 
donor-spouse's separate net income. As noted by Professor Beck, 
"[d]etermining each spouse's separate net income on a joint return for 
purposes of limiting the charitable deduction necessarily involves 
precisely the same calculation as determining each spouse's net income 
for purposes of limiting the overall tax liability of each spouse." 123 
Furthermore in 1935, Article 117-5 of Regulations 86 prevented the 
deduction of one spouse's losses from the gains of the other. This rule 
could be enforced only by segregating the spouses' respective gains and 
losses on the joint return. The Commissioner managed to enforce that 
rule often enough to generate a substantial body of case law on the 
issue. 124 
Moreover, administrative concerns did not prevent the Commissioner 
from separating spouses' individual net incomes in Van Vleck v. 
Commis.sWner despite the fact that the spouses had filed joindy. 125 In Van 
Vleck, the husband attempted to deduct a net operating loss he had 
carried forward against the income of his wife. 126 The Commissioner 
disallowed the deduction, and the Second Circuit agreed. To disallow 
a loss carryforward, the Commissioner had to ascertain the spouses' 
respective net incomes in the year the joint return had been filed. 127 As 
Professor Beck has observed, ''[w]hat the government was willing to do 
for its own benefit, it also could do for taxpayers if it chose." 128 Despite 
the government's ability to disaggregate spouses' incomes and 
income. For most people, the amount to enteron this line should be shown in box I of their Forms W-2."); 
id. at 31 ("Attach the first copy or Copy B ofForm(s) W-2 to the front of Form 1040."); sa also Bar Ass'n 
of Erie County, ABA Section of Taxation and Section of Family Law, ABA Report ID Congress 3 (Summer 
1995) (unpublished report on file with the UniverJi!y f!!CincinnaJi lAw Review) [hereinafter ABA Report] (noting 
that "[t]here is ordinarily no difficulty in determining each spouse's gross income on a joint return"). 
122. See Beck, supra note 3, at 344. 
123. ld. 
124. See, e.g., Pierce v. Commissioner, 100 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1938); DeMuth v. Commissioner, 100 
F.2d 1012 (2d Cir. 1938); Janney v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 240,243 (1939), rev'd, 108 F.2d 564,567 
(3d Cir. 1939), reversal tifl'd, 311 U.S. 189 (1940); Sweet v. Commissioner, 102 F.2d 103 (1st Cir. 1939), 
cert. denied 307 U.S. 627 (1939); Nelson v. Commissioner, 104 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1939). 
125. &eVan Vleck v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 433 (1934), tifl'd, 80 F.2d 217,218 (2d Cir. 1935), 
cert. denied, 298 u.s. 656 ( 1936). 
126. See supra note 81 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion of Van Vleck. 
127. See Beck, supra note 3, at 344 n.113. 
128. ld. at 344. 
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deductions when the Treasury would benefit, the government argued 
that it could not do so for purposes of allocating liability between the 
spouses and, thus,.argued that a regime of joint and several liability was 
required as a matter of administrative necessity. 
Many other contexts have required the Commissioner to ascertain the 
individual incomes and deductions of the jointly filing spouses. For 
instance, cases involving bad-debt deductions taken by one spouse for 
an earlier loan to the other spouse have required the Commissioner to 
determine the spouses' separate deductions}29 In addition, cases 
involving losses from interspousal sales have also required the 
Commissioner to disaggregate spouses' respective gains and losses} 30 
Again, if the Commissioner has been able to separate the spouses' 
respective net incomes for purposes of assessing tax deficiencies, he 
should be able to do so for purposes of assigning tax liability. That is, 
if separation of information on the joint return is possible when it 
benefits the government, it must also be possible in other instances. 
Indeed, Congress has already contemplated such a result. In 1941, 
a proposal in Congress would have made joint returns mandatory for 
married couples. 131 Under this bill, spouses could have elected to 
apportion their joint tax liability between them on the basis of their 
respective liabilities had · they been able to file separately as 
individuals. 132 Given the fact that this bill permitted apportioned · 
liability, it is likely that joint and several liability was not, in fact, 
administratively necessary. 133 
Finally, as Professor Beck notes, the so-called administrative necessity 
problem could be solved easily by redesigning the joint return form 
so as to provide space for reporting the separate income and expenses 
of each spouse. Some states (Arkansas, Iowa, Maryland, Missouri, 
North Carolina, and Virginia) currently provide such space by using 
two-column returns for combined reporting. Such a redesigned form 
would have solved the purported administrative difficulty. The 
taxpayer [in Cole] might have argued that because the return forms 
were drafted by the Treasury, the taxpayer should not be penalized 
if the forms were poorly designed and did not provide space for the 
information reasonably required by the Treasury. The taxpayer 
129. See Fleitman v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 1291 (1931). 
130. See, e.g., Hill v. United States, 12 F. Supp. 798 (Ct. Cl. 1935); Commissioner v. Thomas, 84 F.2d 
562 (5th Cir. 1936); Uihlein v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 399 (1934), tiffd, Commissioner v. Brumder, 82 
F.2d 944 (7th Cir. 1936). 
131. See Revenue Bill of 1941, H.R. 5417, 77th Cong. (1941); see a!ro H.R. REP. No. 77-1040, at 
10-14 (1941), reprinJulin 1941-2 C.B. 413,420-24. 
132. See H.R. REP. No. 77-1040, at 10 (1941}, reprinted in 1941-2 C.B. 413,421. 
133. See Beck, supra note 3, at 345; Philipps & Braford, supra note I 09, at 38. 
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might have argued further that the government's position was 
tantamount to claiming that its return forms ought to determine the 
law, rather than that the law should dictate the return forms. 134 
563 
The government's long-standing position that joint and several 
liability is required as a matter of administrative necessity does not 
withstand scrutiny. Although joint and several liability might permit the 
government to collect tax deficiencies more frequently than would 
proportionate liability, the government has never used that fact in a 
reported decision to argue that joint and several liability should be 
justified as a policy matter. 135t Furthermore, a higher collection rate 
should not justify a practice that imposes tax liability without regard to 
the taxpayer's ability to pay. 136 
C. The Privilege of]oint Filing Comes at a Cost 
The Commissioner has also argued that joint and several liability is 
justified as the cost imposed for the "unusual privilege" of filing 
jointly. 137 The Commissioner has made this argument even at times 
when joint filing provided no financial benefit. 138 For example, in 1935 
at the time the Ninth Circuit ruled in Cole, income splitting had not yet 
been made available to joint filers. The primary benefits to be gained 
by filing jointly were the abilities to offset one spouse's gains with the 
other's excess losses and to increase allowable deductions that were 
134. Beck, supra note 3, at 344 n.lll; see also Domestic Relations Comm. ABA Sec. ofTax'n, supra 
note 21, at 398 (noting that tax forms could be redesigned without making filing more burdensome by 
including "separate columns for reporting, but not [for] computing''). Note that Internal Revenue forms 
"are not a substitution for [Treasury] Regulations and are not authoritative." jACOB MERTENS,jR., [Main 
Volume] MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION§ 3.80 (November 1991). Consequently, the 
design of tax forms should not determine the law, but rather the law should govern how tax forms are 
designed. See Beck, supra note 3, at 344 n.lll. Prior to 1938, when the law, as established in Cole, was that 
joint filers were not jointly and severally liable, the Treasury Department simply should have redesigned 
the form of the tax return. See id. When a tax form conflicts with the law, it is the administrative material, 
the form, that should be deemed invalid and redesigned, not the law that should be overturned. 
135. In a. recent Newsday article, a staff member of the House Ways and Means Committee 
acknowledged that Congress has avoided eliminating joint and several liability precisely because of the 
potential for revenue loss. Governmental personnel virtually never acknowledge openly that Congress has 
retained joint and several liability for this reason. In fact, the staff member in the Newsday article who 
acknowledged this rationale for retaining current law asked not to be identified. HJ. Cummins, Calt:h I 040: 
Joint Rtturns Mtan]oint liabili9r-And In S111T14 CastS, ThaJ Means Trouble, NEWSDAY,jan. 30, 1994, at 76, 
tll!ailable in 1994 WL 7442627. 
136. See ir!JTa note 206 and accompanying text. 
137. See Cole v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d at 487 (9th Cir. 1935); see also Peseh v. Commissioner, 78 
T.C. 100, 129 (1982); Sonnenborn v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 373, 380-81 (1971); Edison-Smith, supra 
note 4, at 125. 
138. See Beck, supra note 3, at 337, 342 & n.I03. 
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limited by net income. 139 However, new regulations promulgated in 
1935, and not yet deemed invalid, had eliminated these benefits. 140 
Thtis, in 1935, jointly filing spouses were prohibited from using the 
losses of one to offset the gains of the other. They were also prohibited 
from combining their net incomes to maximize the allowable charitable 
deduction. 141 Consequently, in 1935, filing jointly provided no 
appreciable financial benefit, but merely enabled spouses to comply with 
the filing requirements more conveniently by allowing them to submit 
one joint retum. 142 If it were true that financial benefits justified the 
imposition of joint and several liability, then the absence of financial 
benefits should have thrown the propriety of joint and several liability 
into doubt. 
Even before 1935, when joint filing did sometimes confer a financial 
benefit, no language in the tax code conditioned such benefits on the 
imposition of joint and several liability. 
All that the statute provides is that "the tax shall be computed on the 
aggregate income." The privilege is granted unconditional!J!, without 
declaration that they [the spouses] shall be jointly liable for the tax so 
computed. Only by implication can an intention be inferred to make 
them a taxable entity or to impose joint and several liability on both 
spouses. Taxing statutes are not to be extended by implication; doubts must be 
resolved against tlze government. 143 
Another line of cases clarified the conclusion that nothing in the pre-
1938 statute required jointly filing spouses to forgo their other rights. 144 
Sections II and 12 of the Revenue Act of 1928, the [tax-]imposing 
provisions of the statute, impose a tax upon the taxable income of 
each individual. Each is defined as a taxpayer and the fact that the 
Congress, having regard to the marital status and in order to 
139. See Pierce v. Commissioner, 100 F.2d 397, 397 (2d Cir. 1938) ("[I]t is only when the allowable 
deductions of one spouse exceed his or her income, that any advantage can be derived from filing a joint 
return."). 
140. See Article 117·5, Regulations 86 (1935), quoted in Levy v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 1145, 1147 
(1942); Article 23(o)-l, Regulations 86 (1935), quoted in Taft v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 229, 230 (1939); 
Beck, supra note 3, at 337, 342 n.I03. 
141. See supra note 35. 
142. Convenience for married taxpayers and for the Treasury was the apparent impetus behind 
Congress's original adoption of the joint return in 1918. See, e.g., ABA Report, supra note 121, at 3; Edison-
Smith, supra note 4, at 105; C. Ian McLachlan, Spousalliabili!JI and Federallm:DTTII TaxM, IOJ. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIM. LAW. 65, 66 (1993); Beck, supra note 3, at 333. 
143. Commissioner v. Rabenold, 108 F.2d 639, 640 (2d Cir. 1940) (emphasis added); see also 
Commissionerv. Uniacke,I32 F.2d 781,781 (2d Cir. 1942). 
144. Su, e.g., Cole v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 485,486 (9th Cir. 1935); Fawsett v. Commissioner, 31 
B.T.A. 139, 142 (1934); Gummey v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 894, 895 (1932); Seder v. Commissioner, 
38 B.T.A. 874,876 (1938). 
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eliminate a large number of returns, sees fit to permit the inclusion in 
the one return of the income of husband and wife, does not serve to 
deny to these individual taxpayers the other benefits of the taxing 
statutes. . .. [W]hile the Federal taxing acts have ... permitted 
married people to file joint returns, we feel that this privilege is not bought 
by the sacrifice of their other rights under the statutes. * * * The acceptance of the 
prWilege of filing a joint return by a married couple carries with it no denial of their 
indWidual rights under the statute. Congress has exacted no pena~ for the privilege 
it has granted and the Commissioner mqy not exact one. 145 
565 
Mter the 1940 Supreme Court decisions in Janney and T ajt, joint filing 
required taxpayers to sacrifice individuality for computation purposes, 
but as discussed above, spouses filing jointly in tax years before 1938 
should not have been treated as having sacrificed their individual 
taxpaying identities for purposes of determining which spouse was liable 
for the tax once computed. 146 
Congress first imposed joint and several liability as a cost for filing 
jointly by statute in 1938. Since 1948, joint filing has also conferred a 
financial benefit in the form of income splitting. The availability of 
income splitting for jointly filing spouses provides a financial benefit to 
the couple as a unit because it allows tax liability to be computed as if 
each spouse had earned half of the combined income. Because of the 
progressive U.S. tax rates, the ability to shift income from the higher 
earner to the lower earner permits some of the higher earner's income 
to be taxed in a lower bracket and, thus, effects a tax savings. The net 
effect is that some of the income of the higher-earning spouse would be 
treated as if the other spouse had earned it and would be shifted into 
that other spouse's lower marginal tax bracket. 147 Because joint return 
rates contain this benefit of income splitting, the argument that joint and 
several liability is the cost for the benefits provided by the joint return 
has renewed vigor. Many scholars have acknowledged the widespread 
belief that the benefit of income splitting justifies joint and several 
liability. 148 It should be noted, however, that the income-splitting 
145. Cok, 81 F.2d at 487 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Fawsett v. Commissioner, 
31 B.T.A. 139, 141-42 (1934)). 
146. See supra notes 86-107 and accompanying text. 
14 7. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 3, at 369 (explaining that income splitting benefits couples by moving 
some of the higher earner's income into a lower bracket). 
148. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 21, at 58; Borison, supra note 3, at 819 n.3, 824; Edison-Smith, supra 
note 4, at 107, 125; Beck, supra note 3, at 322, 342 n.I03, 369; Michael W. Kalcheim, I>Warce and Uncle 
Sam: TN Tax Consequences ofMariJal Breakup, 84 IlL. BJ. 466,471 (1996); Natalie Hoyer Keller, Note, Do 
r ou Ekahelh, /tumise 1D Pf!Y John~ T r=s? I Do: A &view of the lruwcmJ Spouse Provisions and a Proposal for Change, 
1996 UTAH L. REV. 1065, 1068; see alro Pesch v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 100, 129 (1982); Sonnenbom 
v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 373,380-81 (1971); Bokum v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 126, 152 (1990), tdfd, 
992 F.2d 1132 (lith Cir. 1993). ButseeABA Report, supra note 121, at 3 (stating thatjointand several 
HeinOnline -- 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 566 1997-1998
566 UNIVERS!Tr OF CINCINNATI !.A W REVIEW [Vol. 66 
benefit of joint flling is not always great; indeed, some married couples 
minimize their taxes by flling separately. 149 They enjoy what is, for 
them, the benefit of flling separately without having to pay any cost for 
that benefit, that is, without having to bear the burden of joint and 
severalliability. 150 Indeed, some married couples, particularly those in 
low tax brackets 151 or those with equal incomes, 152 obtain no financial 
liability was not imposed as a cost for any benefit of joint filing). Income splitting was not enacted for the 
purpose ofjustifyingjoint and several liability, but rather "for the entirely different purpose of equalizing 
the tax burden between the common law states and the community property states, where income-splitting 
was already allowed on separate returns under the doctrine of PrM v. Stahom." ABA Report, supra note 121, 
at II n.l6 {citation omitted). 
149. Although most couples file jointly, some choose to file separately. SN Christian, Joint RaJ.e 
S/:tucture, supra note 20, at 271-72. Separate returns are often advantageous "with respect to such matters 
as the limit on the capital loss deduction, medical expenses, charitable contributions, and the matching of 
long-term and short-term capital gains and losses." Murray, supra note 21, at 57; see also Druker v. 
Commissioner, 697 F.2d 46, 49 n.l (2d Cir. 1982); Bittker, supra note 25, at 1414 n.73; Mcintyre & 
Oldman, supra note 107, at 1585 n.46; Davis, supra note 107, at 208-09. Separate filing of federal returns 
may also be advantageous in case of a sta.te tax benefit from filing separately where states require couples 
to usc the same filing status as that used for federal purposes. SN Beck, supra note 3, at 374 n.265. 
Filing separately can also be beneficial when the couple has generated significant allocable deductions. 
In such a case, separate filing often allows the spouses to allocate each deduction to the spouse who can 
most readily derive a tax benefit from the item. For example, if a deduction is allocable to either spouse 
and the deduction may be used to the extent it exceeds a floor, a percentage of adjusted gross income, the 
deduction is more valuable if allocated to the lower-income spouse. It may have no value at all if the 
couple files jointly, generating a large combined adjusted gross income. SN, e.g., Beck, supra note 3, at 373 
n.265; Robinson & Wenig, supra note 23, at 839 n.289, 846; Zelenak, supra note 75, at 339 n.l. Among 
deductions subject to such floors are deductions for medical expenses under I.R.C. § 213 (1994) and 
miscellaneous itemized deductions under I.R.C. § 67 (1994). Deductions not subject to a floor are generally 
more valuable if allocated to the higher-income taxpayer because they are used to reduce income that is 
subject to a higher marginal tax rate. SN, e.g., STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE 
CONCEPT OFT AX EXPENDITURES 22 (1973) (referring to this pattern as the "upside-down deduction" 
because of its regressive effect); JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POUCY 97 (5th ed. 1987) {the tax 
benefit associated with a deduction depends on the tax rate). But see Thomas D. Griffith, Themie.r I![ Pmorull 
Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HAsTINGS LJ. 343, 352-60 (1989) (criticizing the widespread belief that 
deductions are more valuable to high-bracket taxpayers than to low-bracket taxpayers). The spouse for 
whom a given deduction is most valuable generally may arrange to entitle him or herself to it by incurring 
and paying the expense. SN STAFF OF jOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG., THE INCOME TAX 
TREATMENT OF MARRIED COUPLES AND SINGLE PERsONS 3-7 (Comm. Print 1980); Zelenak, supra note 
75, at 391 n.245. The spouses cannot make such allocations if they elect to file jointly. In these relatively 
rare instances in which the benefit from allocating deductions in a certain manner exceeds the normal 
advantages of joint filing, these married couples benefit from filing separately rather than jointly. 
Spouses also file separately on occasion to avoid the regime of joint and several liability, of course. SN 
I.R.C. § 60 13(d)(3) (1994). 
150. SN Beck, supra note 3, at 370. 
151. Seeid.at375. 
152. SN Christian,Joint R.a/4 Slru&ture, supra note 20, at 265, 269-70; Mapes v. United States, 5 76 F.2d 
896, 898 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Johnson v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 958, 965 (N.D. Ind. 1976); Beck, supra 
note 75, at 369; Borison, supra note 3, at 824 n.36; see also Beck, supra note 3, at 369, 374 n.267, 375 
(implying that similar-income couples do not experience savings from income splitting by stating that 
spouses with substantially disproportionate incomes benefit from it); if. Zelenak, supra note 75, at 340 
(noting that equal-income couples experience a marriage penalty because of the fact that income splitting 
confers no value on them). 
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benefit whatsoever from income splitting. Why should those couples 
have to pay a price, joint and several liability, for a so-called benefit 
which for them is valueless? For such couples, no benefit accompanies 
the price of joint and several liability. 
Despite the logic in the view that benefits carry burdens, the historical 
evidence contradicts the notion that joint and several liability was 
justified as being the price for the benefit of income splitting. 153 
Although joint and several liability has existed by statute since 1938, it 
was not until 1948 that Congress made income splitting available to 
joint filers residing in common-law marital property jurisdictions.154 
During the intervening ten years, married couples living in common-law 
jurisdictions who filedjoindy paid the cost ofjoint and several liability 
without receiving any benefit of income splitting. 155 Clearly, income 
splitting did not justify joint and several liability because income splitting 
did not exist during that period. If joint and several liability was 
justifiable because of the income-splitting benefits from joint filing, then 
it was not justified for the quarter of a century from 1923, when the 
Treasury first imposed it, through 1948, when Congress finally provided 
income splitting to joindy filing couples residing in common-law states. 
Moreover, if income-splitting does justify joint and several liability, 
then married couples residing in community property states and filing 
separately should be subject to joint and several liability because they 
153. See Beck, supra note 3, at 369. 
154. Under Poe v. Seaborn, income splitting was available beginning in 1930 for couples living in 
community property jurisdictions in which the nonearning spouse had an immediate, vested property right 
in the earner's income. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). As of 1938, when Congress enacted joint 
and several liability for joint filers, only eight states were community property states. See Gann, supra note 
26, at 17 (discussing the impact of the 1930 Poe v. Seaborn decision and noting that traditionally only eight 
states had been community property states}; Douglas Blount Maggs, ~ Property and the Federal Incume 
Tax, 14 CAL. L. REV. 351, 353 (1926) (stating that currendy, in 1926, community property systems exist 
in eight states); Gann supra note 26, at 15-16 (noting that in response to Poe v. Seaborn and LJcas v. Earl, 
which gave residents of community property states the benefit of income splitting, but denied that benefit 
to residents of common-law states, that many common-law states started converting to community property 
regimes and noting that the first such state to attempt that conversion was Oklahoma in 1939); su also 
Bittker, supra note 25, at 1411 (noting that among common-law states, Oklahoma took the lead in 1939 in 
converting to a community property system). The remaining states had common-law marital property 
regimes. Thus, for the vast majority of Americans, as residents of common-law states, joint filing imposed 
the burden of joint and several liability in 1938 without conferring any concomitant benefit of income 
splitting. The income splitting available to community property residents under Seaborn did not rely on 
joint filing status, however. As a result, married couples living in community property states received the 
benefit of income splitting under Seaborn even if they filed individual returns and thereby avoided joint and 
several liability. 
155. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. Ill (1930) (prohibiting income splitting to married couples living 
in common-law marital property states); Edison-Smith, supra note 4, at I 06 n.25, I 07; McLachlan, supra 
note 142, at 66; Cummins, supra note 135; ABA &port, supra note 121, at 3. 
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receive the benefit of income splitting under Poe v. Seabom. 156 However, 
for joint and several liability to apply, the couple must file a joint income 
tax retum. 157 Thus, couples in community property jurisdictions who 
file separately benefit from income splitting without incurring joint and 
several liability as a cost for that benefit. 158 The so-called benefit of 
156. 282 U.S. 101 (1930). In Poe v. Seahum, the Supreme Court permitted income splitting to a couple 
that had filed separate, individual tax returns. ld. at 118. The effects of state law vesting the earnings of 
one spouse in the marital community were not dependent on the filing status chosen for federal income tax 
purposes. Consequently, income splitting is mandatory in community property states for spouses regardless 
of filing status. See Beck, supra note 3, at 324 & n.l9; Murray, supra note 21, at 21, 53, 57, 61; ABA Repurt, 
supra note 121 at 2, 5; s~ also PuBUCATION 555, supra note 75, at 3-4 (stating that if spouses in community 
property states file separate federal returns, then each spouse must report half of the other spouse's 
earnings). In Harrold v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 625, 627 (1954), rev'd on other grounds, 232 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 
1956), the Tax Court held that when spouses come under the jurisdiction of a community property state, 
that community property system is "not a means of splitting income which may be voluntarily chosen or 
elected to minimize taxes." Id. at 627-28 (quoting Hunt v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 228 (1954)). Rather, 
each separately filing spouse is required to report half of the community earnings as income. See id.; set also 
United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971) (involving a taxpayer who was a resident of a community 
property state and who owed tax on half of the earnings of her spouse for tax years in which the spouses 
had filed separately); Galliher v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 760 (1974), qff~ 512 F.2d 1404 (5th Cir. 1975) 
(same); Quick & DuCanto, supra note 57, at 78; cj Murray, supra note 21, at 53 (stating that income 
splitting was not optional, but required, in community property states as a result of Seaborn). Income 
splitting was, therefore, required in community property states even if couples filed separately. 
157. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) states in pertinent part: "[I]fajoint return is made, ... the liability with 
respect to the tax shall be joint and several." I.R.C. § 60 13(d)(3) (1994). No analogous provision exists 
imposing joint and several liability on separate filers. See Richard C.E. Beck, TM lMDcent Spouse Rules, 15 
FAM. ADVOC., Falll992, at 30, 32; Borison, supra note 3, at 823. 
158. See ABA Report, supra note 121, at 5. Although spouses in community property states enjoy the 
benefits of income splitting without filing jointly and without submitting to joint and several liability, each 
spouse is subject to limited exposure for the other's tax liability because the other's liability may be satisfied 
out of the community property, property in which the non-liable spouse has a one-half interest. See United 
States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 700-02 (1983) (noting that I.R.C. provisions allow the government to 
enforce a lien upon any property owned by a delinquent taxpayer, including homestead property in which 
the taxpayer's spouse shares an ownership interest); Susan R. Klein, TM Discriminatory ApplicaJion tif 
SubstaniWeDueProcess: A Takf!!Two Vehicles, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 453,468 n.83-(stating that "[f)ederal tax 
liabilities also may be imposed against community property"); JamesJ. Hall, IRS Requests Comments on Tax 
Treatment tif Divorced Taxp19ers, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Mar. 27, 1996, available in 1996 WL 259303. 
Furthermore, each separately filing spouse is liable for the tax on half the other's community property 
earnings by virtue of his or her one-half interest in those eamings. See, e.g., MiJchell, 403 U.S. at 191-92; 
Gallilrer, 62 T.C. at 760; Williams v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 718 (1979); Fehland v. 
Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1312 (1975); Coffman v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1416 (1974); 
Ramos v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 781 (1969); Quinn v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 453 
(1972); Beck, supra note 157, at 30, 33; Murray, supra note 21, at 21, 53, 57, 61; Quick & DuCanto, supra 
note Ill, at 78; ABA Repurt, supra note 121, at 2, 5. 
In 1980 Congress enacted I.R.C. § 66, a statutory provision similar to § 60 13(e), for community property 
situations. See Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, § IOI(a), 94 Stat. 3521, 3521-22; 
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 424(b), 98 Stat. 494, 802-03 (1986). Congress 
enacted I.R.C. § 66 so that separately filing taxpayers in community property states would, in certain 
limited circumstances, be relieved from liability for the tax on half of the others' community earnings. See 
Blaine D. Beckstead, Comment, Underslllnding and ApplYing LR.C. § 66, 33 IDAHO L. REV. 567, 580-83 
(1997). Innocent spouse relief under§ 60 13(e) had been denied to separately filing community property 
residents because that provision was available only for couples who had filed jointly. See I.R.C. § 6013 
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income splitting may be called into question also because it is frequendy 
less valuable than is the benefit obtained by avoiding the marriage 
penalty through delaying marriage or through divorce. 159 
Consequendy, income splitting can hardly be viewed as a benefit at all 
when compared to the even more beneficial tax rates that apply to 
single, unmarried taxpayers. 160 
Makingjoint and several liability the price for the benefit of income 
splitting is unjust in another respect. The price paid through joint and 
several liability bears no relation to the value of the benefit received 
(e)(I)(A) (providing that a joint return must have been filed to make spouse eligible for innocent-spouse 
relieQ. 
159. See Beck, rupra note 3, at 372; Edison-Smith, rupra note 4, at 125; Zorn, rupra note 21, at 435. 
The benefit of income splitting is frequently too small to counter the penalty imposed upon marrying that 
exists for many couples under the current rate structure. See Christian, Joint RaU StTu&ture, rupra note 20, at 
276-77. The marriage penalty is the phenomenon by which a married couple's tax liability is greater than 
the combined tax liabilities of two single people each earning the same incomes. The couple is essentially 
penalized for marrying. For excellent explanations and descriptions of the marriage penalty, see generally 
Bittker, rupra note 25; Kornhauser, rupra note 73; McCaffery, rupra note 26; Zelenak, rupra note 75. See 
also Tax TrealmenJ I![ Married, Head I![ House/wid, and Single T axpf!Jers: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Wt!Js 
and Means, 96th Cong. I (1980); Ecorwmic Problems I![ Women: Hearings Before the Joint Ecorwmic Comm., 93d 
Cong., 221-87, 604-09 (1973-74) [hereinafter Economic Problems I![ Women]; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, 9611i CONG., THE lNCOMET AX TREATMENT OF MARRIED COUI'LFS AND SINGLE PERSONS 
3-7 (Comm. Print 1980); U.S. DEP'T OF TREAsURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM, I 02-07, 172-
76 (1977); Z.l. GIRALDO, CENTER FOR THESTIJDYOFTHEFAMILY AND THE STATE, TAXPOUCY AND 
THE DUAirlNCOME FAMILY: THE "MARRIAGE TAX" AND OTHER INEQUITIES (1978). By marrying, the 
taxpayers forgo two separate starts up the progressive rate schedule for unmarried individuals and, instead, 
subject their combined incomes to the progressive rates for married couples. Marriage penalties are worst 
for couples in which spouses' incomes are similar. See Christian, ]oint RaU Stnu:ture, supra note 20, at 272-76. 
160. Another reason why joint and several liability should not be viewed as the price imposed for the 
benefit of income splitting is that the government is permitting the public to remain unaware that any such 
price is being charged. That is, the government has failed to publicize adequately that spouses will be 
subject to joint and several liability if they file jointly. See Beck, supra note 3, at 325 & n.22 (noting based 
on his informal survey, that it is unlikely that many women are aware that, by filing jointly, they assume 
joint and several liability for any deficiency that is later assessed). Accord Edison-Smith, supra note 4, at 128. 
The tax return itself contains no warning that filing jointly triggers joint and several liability. See INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FORM I 040 (1996); Beck, supra note 3, at 325; Jerome 
Borison, Alice Ihrough a Very Dark and COf!fosing Looking Glass: Getting Equig from the Tax Court in lnrwcml Spouse 
Cases, 30 FAM. L.Q 123, 126 (1996). A short warning appears in the Instructions to Form 1040: 
A husband and wife may file a joint return even if only one had income or if they did not 
live together all year. However, both must sign the return and both are responsible. This 
means that if one spouse does not pay the tax due, the other may have to. 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 1040 FORMS AND INSTRUCTIONS II (1996). 
However, as Professor Beck has noted, the spouse who does not prepare the return has no occasion to 
review the instructions, and consequently, may not see that warning. See Beck, supra note 3, at 325-26. 
Furthermore, as written, the warning may not apprise the reader of the full extent of his or her potential 
liability by "fail~ng] ... to mention that ... liability extends to items [which] ... are later disallowed ... 
[or] to items that do not appear on the return at all." Id. at 326; see also id; at 326 & n.24. The inadequate 
notice that the income-splitting benefit comes at the cost of joint and several liability encourages people to 
undertake burdens without meaning to and without knowing that they have. It is my position, however, 
that even if the public in general, as well as joint filers in particular, were adequately informed of the 
existence of joint and several liability, that regime would still be unjustified. 
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through income splitting. 161 Income splitting may save a couple a few 
hundred dollars in taxes, or even less. 162 The price charged e~ch spouse 
for this benefit is the potential for virtually unlimited liability, one that 
is limited only by the amount of deficiency the other spouse causes. If 
joint and several liability were the price charged for the benefit of 
income splitting, that price should bear some reasonable relation to the 
benefit received. 163 
If joint and several liability is the cost imposed for the benefit of 
income splitting, then any tax reform movement that proposed to 
eliminate income splitting should be justified in eliminating joint and 
several liability as well. If income splitting should be eliminated because 
of its unfair gendered effects, 164 then repealingjoint and several liability, 
the quid pro quo for income splitting, would also be appropriate. Later, 
this Article will explain that income splitting should nevertheless not be 
viewed as a justification for joint and several liability because of systemic 
gender bias caused by the interaction of those two elements of the tax 
code. 165 If income splitting should not be viewed as justifYing joint and 
several liability, then one fewer reason exists for retaining joint and 
several liability. 
D. Unjust Enrichment 
Perhaps the most compelling argument in favor of joint and several 
liability is that the non-delinquent spouse may enjoy the benefit of 
money that the other spouse improperly withheld from the Treasury 
and, therefore, ought to be responsible for that other spouse's 
underpayment. 166 Of course, the law-abiding spouse often receives no 
161. See Beck, supra note 3, at 322, 376; Edison-Smith, supra note 4, at 125-26. 
162. For sample calculations of joint versus separate return liability, see Christian, Joint RaJ.e Structure, 
supra note 20, at 269, tbl.2. For example, a couple in which one spouse has taxable income of $80,000 and 
the other has taxable income of S40,000 would save S637 by filing jointly rather than separately. This 
example assumes that tax liabilities are computed using tax rate tables that are unadjusted for inflation. 
See I.R.C. §§ l(a), (d) (1994); Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13201, 1993 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 416,458. 
163. See Beck, supra note 3, at 370; Borison supra note 3, at 824 n.36; ABA Repurt, supra note 121, at 
3. 
164. See Christian, Joint RaJ.e Structun, supra note 20, at 279-87, 355-63 (describing numerous features 
of income splitting that tend to harm wives more than husbands, including the disincentive against paid 
workforce participation of the secondary earner, the transfer of wealth from wives to husbands that joint 
rates most likely effect vis-a-vis separate rates, and the fact that automatic income splitting removes any tax 
incentive for husbands to transfer income-generating assets to their wives). 
165. See in.fra, notes 326-36 and accompanying text. 
166. In fact, under the statutory exception to joint and several liability-the innocent spouse rules 
adopted in 1971-the unjust enrichment of a non-delinquent spouse has become grounds for denying her 
relief from joint and several liability. See I.R.C. § 6013(e)(l)(C)-(D) (providing that innocent spouse relief 
HeinOnline -- 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 571 1997-1998
1998] ]OLNT REWRN TAX IJABIIJTY 571 
financial benefit from the other spouse's underpayment. Many instances 
have arisen in which joint and several liability applied even when the 
non-delinquent spouse had not actually been enriched by the other's 
underpayment. For example, iri Scudder v. Commissioner, 167 Mr. Scudder 
deserted his wife, the taxpayer, and absconded with the income omitted 
from their joint return. Nevertheless, the Tax Court ruled that because 
the Scudders had flledjoindy,joint and several liability required the wife 
to pay tax on the omitted income. The court reached this result despite 
the fact that the wife had not been enriched by any tax savings and had, 
in fact, been economically harmed by her husband's actions. The 
income that had been omitted arose when the husband embezzled 
money from a business his wife owned. 168 Accordingly, under joint and 
several liability, the Tax Court ordered Mrs. Scudder to pay tax on 
capital she already owned because her husband had embezzled it, 
thereby converting it into his income. 
Although the Sixth Circuit reversed, it did not do so on the ground 
that joint and several liability was improper as a policy matter. Rather, 
the Sixth Circuit granted the wife relief under the theory that no valid 
joint return had been flled. The circuit court reasoned that the joint 
return must have been procured by the husband's fraud because he did 
not inform his wife of his embezzlement and that, therefore, the return 
was invalid. 169 The Sixth Circuit seemed to be influenced by a desire to 
grant relief in this egregious case despite the fact that Congress had not 
enacted any exceptions to joint and severalliability. 170 Even though the 
Sixth Circuit reversed Scudder, the Tax Court did not at that time view 
itself as bound in other cases by the Sixth Circuit's reasoning. Only 
after Golsen v. Commissioner, 171 which was decided three years after Scudder, 
would the Tax Court view itself as bound by a contrary circuit court 
view, and even then, it would be bound only in cases appealable to 
circuits explicidy holding that contrary view. As a result, despite the 
Sixth Circuit's reversal in Scudder, the Tax Court could continue to 
decide cases like Scudder against the aggrieved taxpayer. 
is unavailable if the party seeking relief had reason to know of the tax understatement, because of 
excessively lavish living, for example, or if it would not be inequitable to collect that understatement from 
the party seeking relief, because, for example, she has benefited financially from the other's underpayment). 
167. 48 T.C. 36 (1967), rev'dandmn'd, 405 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1968), rth'gdenied, 410 F.2d 686 (6th 
Cir. 1969}, cert. dmied, 396 U.S. 886 (1969). 
168. See James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961) (establishing that embezzlement proceeds 
constitute income and are taxable). 
169. See Scudder, 405 F.2d at 222, 226. 
170. See Philipps & Braford, supra note I 09, at 38. 
17 I. 54 T.C. 742, 756-58 (1970}, qffd, 445 F.2d 985 (lOth Cir. 1971), em. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971). 
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Joint and several liability may apply even though the aggrieved 
spouse receives no benefit in other cases as well. For instance, an 
aggrieved spouse is subject to joint and several liability even when the 
delinquent spouse uses the improper tax savings to fund an affair with 
a paramour. 172 
Even when the non-delinquent spouse enjoys the benefit of the 
unpaid tax liability, joint and several liability is not needed to prevent 
the unjust enrichment. In instances of unjust enrichment, the 
alternative doctrine of transferee liability provides an adequate means 
by which the government may collect the deficiency from the unjusdy 
enriched spouse. 173 Finally, joint and several liability is not a 
comprehensive solution to the problem of unjust enrichment because 
the potential for unjust enrichment exists even when spouses file 
separately and when joint and several liability does not apply. 174 Thus, 
the joint-and-several-liability solution to unjust enrichment does not 
apply in all situations in which the problem arises and, thus, is not well 
suited to address the problem of unjust enrichment. 175 It is overbroad 
in some instance~hen the non-delinquent spouse does not enjoy the 
unpaid taxes--and is too narrow in other instances-failing to apply at 
all when spouses file separately. 
The solution of transferee liability, which already exists in I.R.C. 
§ 690 1,176 is much better tailored than joint and several liability to 
172. See, e.g., Allee v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 3088, 3089 (1992) (holding wife jointly and 
severally liable for deficiency created by her husband even though she lived modestly and even though 
during the years at issue, he had spent money on a mistress while telling his wife that they had no money). 
173. See Beck, supra note 3, at 323, 400-08; Edison-Smith, supra note 4, at 127-28; if. ABA Repurt, 
supra note 121, at 5 (noting the alternative doctrine of transferee liability but not studying the details of 
using it as a substitute for joint and several liability). See in.fra notes 176-203 and accompanying text. 
174. Of course, in cases in which joint and several liability does not apply because spouses filed 
separately, the IRS may asscn transferee liability against the unjustly enriched spouse. See, e.g., Edelson v. 
Commissioner, 829 F.2d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1987) (the government successfully assened transferee liability 
against a wife for a year in which the spouses had filed separate returns). 
!d. 
175. See Beck, supra note 3, at 323. 
176. I.R.C. § 6901 (1994). 
(a) Method of Collection.-The amounts of the following liabilities shall, except as 
hereinafter in this section provided, be assessed, paid, and collected in the same manner and 
subject to the same provisions and limitations as in the case of the taxes with respect to 
which the: liabilities wc:re incurred: 
(I) Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes.-
(A) Transferees.-The liability, at law or in equity, of a transferee ofpropeny-
(i) of a taxpayer in the case of a tax imposed by subtitle A (relating to 
income taxes), 
in respect of the tax imposed by subtitle A or B. 
(h) Definition of Transferee. -As used in this section, the term "transferee" includes donee, 
heir, legatee, devisee, and distributee, .... 
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address the problem of unjust enrichment. In fact, the government has 
occasionally asserted transferee liability successfully against the spouse 
of the delinquent taxpayer in situations in which joint and several 
liability was unavailable. 177 
Congress first introduced transferee liability into the Internal Revenue 
Code in 1926178 in response to taxpayers' efforts to render their tax 
liabilities uncollectible by transferring their assets to others. Prior to the 
adoption of transferee liability, the government's only remedy had been 
to sue in equity to set aside the conveyance as fraudulent. Whenever the 
transferor-taxpayer remained alive, the government first had to obtain 
a judgment against the transferor in an action at law before initiating the 
suit in equity. 179 The advent of transferee liability in 1926 facilitated the 
government's collection efforts by streamlining the procedure. "Section 
6901 does not create a separate liability for the transferee; instead, it 
merely provides for a secondary method of enforcing the liability of the 
transferor." 180 
To invoke I.R.C. § 6901 transferee liability against a spouse, the 
government must show that the spouse generating the tax deficiency 
transferred property181 to the other spouse without receiving adequate 
177. See, e.g., Edelson v. Commissioner, 829 F.2d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1987) (the government 
successfully asserted transferee liability against a wife for a year in which the spouses had filed separate 
returns); Mysse v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 680, 692, 696 (1972) (the government successfully asserted 
transferee liability against a wife who could not be held jointly and severally liable because she qualified as 
an innocent spouse under I.R.C. § 6013(e)); United States v. F1oersch, 276 F.2d 714, 718 (lOth Cir. 1960), 
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 816 (1960) (the government could proceed against the spouse of a delinquent taxpayer 
where the statute of limitations had expired as to the theory of joint and several liability but not as to the 
theory of transferee liability). 
The government has asserted transferee liability to collect one spouse's deficiency from the other in 
numerous instances. See, e.g., Eyler v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d 1129 {lith Cir. 1985); Bowlin v. 
Commissioner, 273 F.2d 610 (6th Cir. 1960); Reinecke v. Commissioner, 220 F.2d 406 (8th Cir. 1955), 
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 829 (1955); Wiener v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 701 (1949); Stockes v. Commissioner, 
22 T.C. 415 (1954), acq., 1954-2 C,B. 5; United States v. Gilmore, 222 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. deniM, 
350 U.S. 843 (1955); Pearlman v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 560 (3d Cir. 1946), qff'g, 4 T.C. 34 (1944); 
United States v. Goddard, Ill F. Supp. 607 (W.D.N.Y. 1952); Davis v. Birdsong, 275 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 
1960); Leary v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 139 (1952); Muller v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 678 (1948); Gatto 
v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 830 (1953), acq., 1954-1 C.B. 4; United States v. Goldsmith, 272 F. Supp. 924 
(E.D.N.Y. 1967). 
178. See Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 20, ch. 27, § 280, 44 Stat. 9, 61; Revenue Act of 1938, 
Pub. L. No. 554, ch. 289, § 311,52 Stat. 447,543-44. 
179. See ALVIN L. STORRS, TRANSFEREE LiABlliiY A-I (fax Management Portfolios, No. !58-4th, 
1992). 
180. ld. at iii; see aLro Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931), qjfg, 42 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1930), 
qff'g, 15 B.T.A. 1218 (1929); Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958), qff'g, 242 F.2d 322 (6th Cir. 
1957), rev~, 15 T.C.M. (CCH) 114 (1956). 
181. See l.R.C. § 690l(a)(l) (1994). For example, in Uniled Sillies v. A/Jmark, the court found that no 
transfer had occurred and, thus, that the alleged transferee could not be held liable. 331 F. Supp. 1346, 
1347 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); seeaLro Gordon v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 377 (1932), acq., XII-I C.B. 5 (1933). 
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consideration182 and that the transferor-spouse was liable for tax both at 
the time of the transfer183 and also at the time transferee liability was 
asserted against the transferee-spouse. 184 If the courts were to decide 
that the sharing ofliving expenses over and above normal support does 
not rise to the level of a property "transfer," Congress could amend 
§ 6901 to specify that such sharing does constitute a transfer. 185 
Additionally, for transferee liability to apply, the transferor-spouse 
must generally be insolvent at the time of the transfer either before, or 
as a result of, the transfer. 186 Income tax liability is considered in deter-
mining whether or not the transferor is insolvent. 187 The transferor must 
also be insolvent at the time the IRS asserts transferee liability against 
the transferee spouse. 188 Thus, if the transferor-spouse remains solvent 
despite the property transfer, the IRS cannot use transferee liability as 
a procedure to collect from the non-delinquent spouse. Appropriately, 
182. See, e.g., Goemans v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 12 (7th,Cir. 1960); Estate of Miller v. 
Commissioner, 42 T.C. 593 (1964); First Nat'! Bank of Chicago v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 759 (7th Cir. 
1958); Reinecke v. Commissioner, 220 F.2d 406 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 829 (1955); Beck, 
supra note 3, at 402. Unfortunately, transfers made pursuant to a divorce under state equitable distribution 
laws are probably considered transfers unsupported by adequate consideration, see id., at 405-06, and thus, 
probably constitute transfers that could subject the wife to § 690 I transferee liability. Holding such 
transfers to be unsupported by consideration is contrary to the intent of equitable distribution laws which 
treat the wife as though she owns some of the marital assets, even when title is not in her name. 
183. See, e.g., Papineau v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 54 (1957); Rosenthal v. Allen, 75 F. Supp. 879 
(M.D. Ga. 1948). 
184. See, e.g., Januschke v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 496 (1967), acq., 1967-2 C.B. 2. 
185. Ordinarily one would treat the sharing ofliving expenses as transfers by the earning spouse that 
are in satisfaction of that spouse's legal obligation to support his mate. As such, these transfers would 
ordinarily be viewed as being supported by consideration-the discharge of the support obligation. See Rev. 
Rul. 68-379, 1968-2 C.B. 414 (holding that a release of support rights constitutes "consideration in money 
or money's worth" for gift tax purpoo;es). However, in Marine Midland Bank v. BaJson, 70 Misc. 2d 8, 11-12, 
332 N.Y.S.2d 714, 718-19 (Sup. Ct. ·1972), the court ruled that satisfaction of the obligation to support a 
spouse would constitute consideration for purposes of determining a fraudulent conveyance only in cases 
of bona fide matrimonial disputes. Thus, sharing of living expenses in intact marriages, though in 
satisfaction of a support obligation, would be treated as a transfer unsupported by consideration under 
Midland Bank. The sharing of resources in a non-divorce situation would be consequently viewed as a 
transfer that is subject to I.R.C. § 690 I despite legally imposed spousal-support obligations. 
186. See, e.g., Kreps v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d I, 9-10 (2d Cir. 1965), '!lf'g, 42 T.C. 660,669 (1964); 
Stockes v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 415,415, 429 (1954), acq., 1954-2 C.B. 5; Reinecke v. Commissioner, 
220 F.2d 406,407 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 829 (1955); Beck, supra note 3, at 323,402. The 
element of insolvency arises under the law of the state in which the transfer occurred. Most state fraudulent 
conveyance statutes require the transfer to be set aside if the transferor was or became insolvent at the time 
of or as a result of the transfer. The applicability of state law relates to the use of transferee liability in 
equity, but not to transferee liability at law. Transferee liability at equity arises much more frequently 
because liability at law is based on the transferee's express agreement to pay the transferor's federal income 
tax liability. See ALVIN L. STORRS, TRANSFEREE LiABIUIY A-9 (fax Management Portfolios, No. I 58-4th, 
1992). 
187. See, e.g., Scott v. Commissioner, 117 F.2d 36, 37 (8th Cir. 1941); Kreps v. Commissioner, 351 
F.2d I, 9 (2d Cir. 1965), '!IJ'g, 42 T.C. 660 (1964). 
188. See Beck, supra note 3, at 402. 
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the IRS would be forced to seek payment from the spouse who gene-
rated the deficiency before proceeding against the other spouse. 
Furthermore, because the transferee is merely secondarily liable for the 
tax, and the transferor remains primarily liable, the IRS generally must 
exhaust all of its legal remedies against the transferor before proceeding 
against the transferee. 189 Consequendy, liability may not generally be 
asserted against a transferee if the transferor-spouse is financially able to 
pay or if the IRS has not attempted to collect the deficiency from the 
transferor. This treatment is appropriate. Where the delinquent spouse 
has assets, the IRS should proceed against him or her before attempting 
to collect from the other spouse. By contrast, the IRS may assert joint 
and several liability against a non-delinquent spouse even if the guilty 
spouse has the resources to pay the deficiency190 and even if the IRS has 
not instituted any proceedings against the guilty spouse. 191 In these 
regards, transferee liability is significandy fairer than joint and several 
liability, insulating the law-abiding spouse whenever the true earner can 
be found and whenever he has assets enabling him to pay. 192 
The instances in which transferee liability would fail to prevent unjust 
enrichment seem to be limited to those in which shifting liability to the 
non-delinquent spouse would be unfair. Thus, as a policy matter, 
transferee liability, more often than joint and several liability, should 
lead to the correct result. For example, transferee liability would not 
always prevent unjust enrichment because it is not available if the 
transferor-spouse remains solvent. Of course, if the transferor spouse 
remains solvent, the IRS should appropriately seek payment from that 
transferor spouse. 
In addition, transferee liability may not prevent unjust enrichment if 
the transfer is deemed to be supported by adequate consideration. A 
wife's right to support has been held to constitute adequate 
consideration for these purposes. 193 However, the matrimonial dispute 
189. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 241 F.2d 879,880-82 (1st Cir. 1957); Gatto v. Commissioner, 
20 T.C. 830 (1953), acq., 1954-1 C.B. 4; Beck, supra note 3, at 323,402-03,407. 
190. See, e.g., Gordon v. United States, 757 F.2d 1157 (lith Cir. 1985) (holding that wife was liable 
for joint return deficiency resulting from excessive tax refund to husband even though husband had, in fact, 
received that excessive refund); Kline v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 425 (1994) (holding wife liable 
for joint tax deficiency attributable to husband even though husband had significant earning power and 
a successful business). 
191. See, e.g., Edison-Smith, supra note 4, at 123 (describing the Internal Revenue Service's 
"preference for pursuing wives in joint liability actions"). 
192. See Beck, supra note 3·, at 323. 
193. See, e.g., Marine Midland Bank v. Batson, 70 Misc. 2d 8, 8-11, 332 N.Y.S.2d 714, 714-18 (Sup. 
Ct. 1972) (a wife's right to alimony constituted "fair consideration" under New York's debtor and creditor 
law); if. Rev. Rul. 68-379, 1968-2 C.B. 414 (holding that a release of support rights constitutes 
"consideration in money or money's worth for gift tax purposes). 
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must be real to render her right to support adequate consideration. 194 
Transfers between spouses living together in harmony, therefore, would 
not be treated as being supported by consideration, and transferee 
liability could, under current law, be imposed on the wife in such 
instances. 195 Transfers pursuant to divorce generally would be 
supported by adequate consideration if made in exchange for the wife's 
release of her support rights. Consequently, I.R.C. § 6901 would not 
generally render an ex-wife liable for tax attributable to her former 
husband. 196 Under joint and several liability, by contrast, a wife can be 
held liable for the tax of her former husband for tax years in which they 
filed jointly even if the couple has since divorced and executed a final 
property settlement agreement. As a policy matter, shifting the tax 
liability of one spouse to the other is especially undesirable in divorce 
situations because the spouses have already finalized their financial 
obligations to each other and because reopening a closed divorce 
proceeding to make an offsetting adjustment to the property settlement 
is rarely permitted. 197 The post-divorce imposition of liability on one 
spouse for taxes on the other's income effectively changes the division 
of property contained in the property settlement agreement. 198 Given 
the financial hardship divorce imposes on many women, 199 any rule that 
194. SeeMari.neMidland, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 718-19. 
195. See Davis v. Birdsong, 275 F.2d 113, 115 (5th Cir. 1960). The court noted that the widow was 
responsible under the doctrine of transferee liability for her deceased husband's tax deficiency because after 
his death, some of his assets had been transferred to her to satisfy his state-created obligation to support her. 
Su id. The transfer was, therefore, not considered to be supported by adequate consideration even though 
it discharged a support obligation. See id. at 116. Note that the transfer did not arise in the context of a 
divorce. 
196. Harper v. United S~LJJN is not to the contrary. 769 F. Supp. 362 (M.D. Fla. 1991 ). In Harper, an 
ex-wife was held liable as a transferee for her ex-husband's income tax liability where he transferred 
property to her as part of an alleged property settlement. See id. at 364, 367. The court noted that the ex-
husband was aware of potential tax liability at the time of the transfer, su id. at 367, that the purported 
property settlement was never put in writing, su id. at 364, and that the wife's subsequent sale of transferred 
assets appeared to be part of an effort to place the property beyond the government's reach. See id. at 367. 
The court addressed the issue of whether the transfers were supported by adequate consideration by noting 
that the "deeds conveying the property reflect(ed] that . . . [the ex-wife had] paid no monetary 
consideration ... [and that those deeds] were prepared by [the ex-wife's] ... daughter over two months 
after the divorce was final." /d. The implication was, therefore, that the property was not transferred 
pursuant to a property settlement upon divorce, and that consequently, the transfers were not supported 
by adequate consideration. Presumably, therefore, a property transfer pursuant to divorce would normally 
be treated as being supported by adequate consideration. BuJ su Beck, supra note 3, at 405-06 (asserting that 
transfers made pursuant to divorce under state equitable distribution laws are probably considered to be 
transfers unsupported by adequate consideration for § 690 I purposes). 
197. See Beck, supra note 3, at 328; Edison-Smith, supra note 4, at 124. 
198. See Beck, supra note 3, at 320, 328; Edison-Smith, supra note 4, at 124. 
199. Su, e.g., Beck, supra note 3, at 330, 384 (noting the insecure economic position of divorced 
women in the United States); WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION, supra note 7 5, at 323-56 (asserting 
that in 1985 women on average experienced a 73% decline in their standards of living in the year after 
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could require wives to pay their ex-husband's tax liabilities is unjust and 
may foreseeably lead to harsh consequences. 200 
Under I.R.C. § 6901, the transferee's liability is limited to the amount 
transferred from the delinquent spouse, thereby preventing unjust 
enrichment without saddling the transferee with liability in excess of that 
enrichment.201 By contrast, joint and several liability imposes liability 
on the non-delinquent spouse for the entire tax deficiency, potentially 
far beyond any unjust enrichment. Joint and several liability has, in fact, 
been upheld even when the delinquent spouse's deficiency exceeded the 
other taxpayer's assets altogether.202 Transferee liability could prevent 
unjust enrichment of the non-delinquent spouse more effectively than 
does joint and several liability without the unfair and harsh results that 
joint and several liability often produces. 
Transferee liability functions to prevent spouses from evading tax 
liability by arranging for all property ownership to be transferred to the 
non-earner. Without either transferee liability or joint and several 
liability, spouses could conspire to place property beyond the reach of 
the taxing authorities by putting it in the name of the non-earner, the 
spouse not liable for tax. Transferee liability addresses this problem by 
allowing the government to proceed after that transferee spouse. 203 
E. Properry Interest in the Earnings: A Spouse Should Not Be Required to Bear 
Tax Liabiliry Arising From Income that the Spouse Neither Owns Nor Controls 
In other countries, the spouse with an ownership interest in the 
earnings has historically been the party governments have chosen to tax 
divorce, while men enjoyed a 42% improvement in their standards of living); McCaffery, supra note 26, 
at 1051-52 (referring to economic disaster for women upon divorce); McGraw, supra note 75; McLindon, 
supra note 75, at 351-52, 404; Seal, supra note 75, at 10; Starnes, Dolls, supra note 75, at 70-73, 78-85; 
Weitzman, Tlu Ec01W111ics '!fDWorce, supra note 75, at 1252; Joan C. Williams, Married Womm and Profm!Y, 
I VA.J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 383 (1994) (discussing how family law contributes to women's poverty upon 
divorce); Wishik, supra note 75. 
200. See Beck, supra note 3, at 329; cf Quick & DuCanto, supra note Ill, at 67 (noting that when 
divorce is imminent, the tax savings from joint filing must be weighed against the risks of joint and several 
liability). 
20 I. See, e.g., Harrison v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1949); Wiener v. Commissioner, 12 
T.C. 701 (1949); Reinecke v. Commissioner, 220 F.2d 406 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 829 (1955); 
Beck, supra note 3, at 323, 406-07. 
202. See Beck, supra note 3, at 323-24 (discussing facts of a case in which ex-wife was assessed more 
than Sl2,000 in back taxes attributable to her ex-husband. The assessment exceeded her annual income. 
The husband, by contrast, had significant earnings and a savings account); see also LaBelle v. 
Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1078 (1984), mruuuJuJ by an unpublished order, (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd by 52 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1256 (1986). 
203. See Cummins, supra note 135. 
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on those earnings.204 In fact, the U.S. rule of joint and several liability 
is unique in the developed world: no other country forces a wife to pay 
the taxes of her ex-husband.205 The reason for the principle that tax 
should be imposed on the income owner is that the owner of the 
earnings is considered to have the best financial ability to bear a tax on 
them. Taxing the earnings to someone with no ownership interest in 
them would violate the fundamental principle that tax should be 
imposed in accordance with ability to pay.206 
The United States followed this tradition of imposing tax liability on 
the income owneil07 until 1938 when Congress enacted joint and several 
liability. Prior to that congressional action, the United States Supreme 
Court, in Poe v. Seaborn, 208 ruled that the owner of the earnings under 
204. Set general9, Louise Dulude, Taxation of the Spouses: A Comparison ofConmiian, Ammcan, .BriJish, French 
and Swedish Law, 23 0SGOODE HALL LJ. 67, 71, 73, 76, 79 (1985); Beck, supra note 3, at 332. 
205. See Beck, supra note 3, at 382-83; Cummins, supra note 135; HJ. Cummins, Pf!Jingfor the Sins 
of a Spouse, PHilADELPHIA INQUIRER, Feb., 14, 1994, at DIO; ABA Report, supra note 121, at 2, 9 n.5; see 
also id. at 9-10 nn.8-10 (discussing liability rules employed in Spain, France, Germany, and Holland). 
206. Ste Christian, Joint Rale Structure, supra note 20, at 282-84; Schneider, supra note 23, at 106 
(noting that it is unusual for income to be taxed to someone other than the person who received it); Edison-
Smith, supra note 4, at 126; Davis, supra note 107, at 222; WalterJ. Blum & Harry K.alven,Jr., The Uneasy 
Case for ProgressiJJe Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 417, 451-55 (1952) (discussing ability to pay as an 
appropriate goal for the tax system in connection with progressivity); Kornhauser, supra note 73, at 74, 92 
(stating that tax burdens ought to be distributed according to ability to pay); Staudt, supra note I 07, at 
1641-42; Zelenak, supra note 75, at 357; cf Robinson & Wenig, supra note 23, at 777 (noting that the tax 
system was designed to take ability to pay into account). Set gmeraily Blum & K.alven, supra, at 480-84 
(discussing theories of what constitutes ability to pay); M. Slade Kendrick, The AhiJi!y-to·Pt!J Theory of 
Taxation, 29 AM. ECON. REV. 92, 92-101 (1939). That tax should be imposed in accordance with the 
taxpayer's ability to pay is so highly ingrained in the U.S. tax system that it appears in a variety of contexts. 
For example, a taxpayer does not owe tax on the appreciation of property until he or she sells or otherwise 
disposes of the property obtaining the cash from which the tax can be paid. Set Cottage Savings Ass'n v. 
Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554,566-67 (1991); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189,207-19 (1920) (Imposing 
a realization requirement). Similarly, a taxpayer need not recognize gain upon giving away appreciated 
property. Set I.R.C. § 1015(a) (1994) (requiring donor's gain eventually to be taxed to the donee instead 
of the donor by requiring donee to take a carryover basis); see also Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470 (1929). 
By making a gift, the taxpayer would have received no value in exchange from which he or she could satisfy 
a tax obligation. Of course, some situations exist in which a taxpayer incurs a tax obligation despite a lack 
of liquidity. Set, e.g., Treas. Reg.§ 1.451-l(a)(l) (as amended in 1995); Treas. Reg.§ 1.446-l(c)(l)(li) (as 
amended in 1995) (providing that an accrual-basis taxpayer must pay tax on income that has not yet been 
received). For a list of examples in which Congress has taxed according to ability to pay and other 
examples in which Congress has taxed without regard to ability to pay, see Staudt, supra note 107, at 1628-
29. Generally, Congress departs from ability-to-pay principles only in instances in which some other 
compelling policy justifies a departure from that general rule. Set, e.g., it/. at 1629 n.255. 
207. Set Christian, Joint .Rate Structure, supra note 20, at 282-87; Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. lll, ll4-15 
(1930); Helveringv. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331,335-37 (1940); Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 
83-591, §§ 671-78, 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. (68A Stat. 226), 262-69 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 671-79 
(1994)); see also Mcintyre & Oldman, supra note 107, at 1578 ("In answering that question [who is the 
taxpayer?], current law looks principally at property rules."); it/. at 1582-83, 1592; Staudt, supra note 107, 
at 1641-42; Zelenak, supra note 75, at 382, 384. 
208. 282 u.s. 101, 113 (1930). 
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state law is the person properly liable for tax on those earnings.209 In 
Seaborn, the Court held that state community property laws permitted a 
husband and wife to split their incomes for federal income tax purposes. 
Under the community property regime in question, the non-earning 
spouse had an immediate, vested one-half ownership interest in the 
earnings of the other spouse.210 As a result, the Court held that the 
income was properly taxed half to each owner: half to the earner and 
half to the nonearner. The rationale underlying Seaborn indicated that 
state-created property rights in the earnings governed the selection of 
the taxpayer for federal income tax purposes. 
[T]he wife has, in Washington [state], a vested property right in the 
community property, equal with that of her husband; and in the 
income of the community, including salaries or wages of either 
husband or wife, or both.211 
The law's investiture of the husband with broad [management] 
powers, by no means negatives the wife's present interest as a co-
owner. 
We are of the opinion that under the law ofWashington the entire 
property and income of the community can no more be said to be 
that of the husband, than it could rightly be termed that of the wife. 
We should be content to rest our decision on these 
considerations. 212 
The Court then approved the taxpayer's arguments on statutory-
construction and legislative-history grounds and refuted the Commis-
sioner's arguments before ruling that "[t]he District Court was right in 
holding that the husband and wife were entitled to file separate returns, 
each treating one-half of the community income as his or her respective 
income."213 Furthermore, eight months earlier, the Supreme Court 
established in Lucas v. Earl that a wife may not be taxed on the income 
of her husband if she has no present ownership interest in that income 
under state law.214 · 
209. This doctrine has, in fact, also become law as to the issue of assignment of income derived from 
property. See, e.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 114 (1940). Whoever owns the income-producing 
property is the proper person to be taxed on that income. See id. at 116-17. The owner of the income, the 
party with control over the income, is also the party taxed on it. See id. 
210. See Seaborn, 282 U.S. at 113. 
211. /d. at Ill. 
212. /d.at113. 
213. /d. at 118. 
214. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. Ill, 114-15 (1930). 
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Income splitting, as required under Poe v. Seaborn, affected not only 
how the tax liability was computed, but also who would bear its burden 
because the taxpayers in Seaborn had filed separate tax returns. 215 
Because half of the income was taxed to the wife, she was Hable for half 
of the total tax liability. Even if the husband had voluntarily paid both 
tax liabilities, technically the wife was the party liable for tax on half of 
the combined earnings.216 A husband's voluntary payment of both tax 
liabilities out of his separate property would be deemed a gift to his wife 
of his separate property.217 If a husband were to pay both liabilities 
using community property, then each spouse would essentially bear his 
or her own half of the total tax liability. In either situation, income was 
attributed to the wife for purposes of tax computation and for purposes 
of determining who was liable for the tax. Because the spouses had filed 
separately, the Court did not need to address the question of who was 
liable for each half of the total tax liability. Nevertheless, it is unlikely 
that the Supreme Court would, for the separately filing wife, base her 
tax computation on her ownership interest in earnings without requiring 
her to bear the burden of that tax. As the owner of the income, she 
would properly be treated as bearing the tax on that income under 
ability-to-pay principles. Because Seaborn not only involved tax 
computation, but also affected who would be liable for tax, that case can 
be read as requiring that taxation follows ownership not only for 
computation purposes, but also for purposes of determining who should 
bear liability. 
The Seaborn Court's connection of ownership with tax liability is not 
unusual in American tax jurisprudence. The Supreme Court used the 
same theory in Hewering v. Horst?- 18 to require income from property to be 
taxed to the property owner. Similarly, the grantor of a trust is taxed on 
the trust income if the grantor retains sufficient control over trust 
property to be considered the corpus owner.219 
215. See&abom,282U.S.atl08. 
216. Set, e.g., Galliherv. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 760,760,763 (1974), tifl'd, 512 F.2d 1404 (5th Cir. 
1975), cerl. timid, 423 U.S. 988 (1975); United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 190, 192 (1971); Williams 
v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 718 (1979); Fehland v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1312 
(1975); Coffman v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1416 (1974); Ramos v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 781 (1969); Quinn v. Commissioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 453 (1972); Beck, rupra note 3, at 324 n.l9. 
217. See ABA Report, rupra note 121, at I 0 n.l4. 
218. 311 u.s. ll2, 114 (1940). 
219. See, e.g., Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, lJ (1937); see alro Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 
331, 335 (1940) (prohibiting the shifting of income arising from trust assets because the "short duration of 
the trust, the fact that. ... [his] wife was the beneficiary, and the retention of control over the corpus by 
... [him] all ... Ved) irresistibly to the conclusion that ... [the grantor] continued to be the owner'') 
(emphasis added); Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, §§ 671-678, 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
(68A Stat. 226), 262-69 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 671-679 (1994)). 
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The Supreme Court has also indicated that control over earnings, not 
only ownership, justifies the imposition of tax. Again, having control 
over earnings renders the controller financially able to bear the burden 
of the tax on the earnings. An individual lacking control over income 
may be unable to pay the tax on it.220 In United States v. Robbins/21 a 
California taxpayer attempted to split his income with his wife. The 
wife's lack of a present property interest in her husband's earnings under 
state law in force at the time led the Court to rule against the taxpayer 
and to prevent income splitting. At that time California property law 
conferred on the non-earning wife neither a present ownership interest 
in her spouse's earnings nor any right to control them. In important 
dicta, the Supreme Court noted: 
Even if we are wrong as to the law of California and assume that the 
wife had an interest in the community income that Congress could tax 
if so minded, ... [the husband] alone has the disposition of the fund. 
He may spend it substantially as he chooses, and if he wastes it in 
debauchery the wife has no redress. . . . That he may be taxed for 
such a fund seems to us to need no argument. . . . For not on!Y should 
he who has all the power bear the burden, and not only is the husband the 
most obvious target for the shaft, but the fund taxed, while liable to be 
taken for his debts, is not liable to be taken for the wife's.222 
Clearly the Court, consistent with the ability-to-pay principle, viewed 
the issue of who controls the earnings as highly relevant to determining 
who should be taxed on them. Lack of both legal ownership and the 
right to control income would substantially impair an individual's 
financial ability to pay tax on that income. 
In numerous contexts, Congress has also expressed the notion that 
fairness requires the person with control of, power over, and access to 
income to be taxed on it, rather than someone else. For example, 
I.R.C. § 66223 exempts the non-earning spouse from tax on her share of 
community income under certain circumstances that prevent her from 
controlling or enjoying that income.224 This ability-to-pay rationale was 
220. &e supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
221. 269 u.s. 315 (1926). 
222. /d. at 327-28 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
223. Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, § IOI(a), 94 Stat. 3521, 3521-22; 
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 424(b)-(c), 98 Stat. 494, 802-03 (1986). 
224. I.R.C. § 66(a) states: 
Treatment of Community Income Where Spouses Live Apart.-If-
( I) 2 individuals arc married to each other at any time during a calendar year; 
(2) such individuals-
(A) live apart at all times during the calendar year, and 
(B) do not file a joint return under section 6013 with each other for a taxable 
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also used to justify the 1941 change in the tax treatment of alimony.225 
Prior to 1942, alimony had been excluded from the recipient's gross 
income and had been nondeductible by the payor.226 Consequendy, the 
alimony payor had borne the burden of the income tax as to that 
payment even though he had no legal right to keep the payment. In 
1941, Congress reversed this treatment227 so that tax on the alimony 
transferred would be imposed on the recipient-the spouse with the 
purported better ability to pay tax. 228 The alimony payor would receive 
a deduction,229 and the payee would include alimony received in gross 
income.230 Taxing the payor on income he was required to pay as 
alimony had, in fact, resulted in "substantial hardship" in a number of 
cases.231 Therefore, of the two taxpayers eligible for taxation, Congress 
chose to tax the earnings to the recipient because she had a property 
interest in and control over them. The recipient was viewed as better 
able to meet the tax burden by virtue of her possession and control of 
the alimony payment. In changing the tax treatment of alimony, 
Congress "was expressing its concern that the incidence of the tax 
. should follow the control of the income or be taxable to the spouse who 
had the use and benefit of that income."232 
Congress has uniformly applied the principle of taxing based on the 
ability to pay, that is, based on ownership and control over the earnings, 
year beginning or ending in the calendar year; 
(3) one or both of such individuals have earned income for the calendar year 
which is community income; and 
(4) no portion of such earned income is transferred (directly or indirectly) 
between such individuals before the close of the calendar year, then, for purposes of this 
title, any community income of such individuals for the calendar year shall be treated in 
accordance with the rules provided by section 879(a). 
I.R.C. § 66(a) (1994). Under I.R.C. § 879(a), earned income other than trade or business income is treated 
as "the income of the spouse who rendered the personal services" generating the income. Id. § 879(a)(1); 
see alro id. § 66(b)-(c). 
225. See Murray, supra note 21, at 55. 
226. See Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917); see C. Garrison Lepow,Nohorfy Cdr Married for IN First 
TuneA~mort: A Primer on IN Tax ImplicillWns '![Support P'!}mmts inDWoru, 25 DUQ, L. REV. 43,44 (1986); 
see also Murray, supra note 21, at 55. 
!d. 
227. See Rev. Act of 1941, § 120, 56 Stat. 816-17 (1942). 
228. S. REP. NO. 673, Part I, 77th Cong. (1941) at 11-12. 
Under existing law ... a husband is taxed upon his entire income even though a 
considerable amount thereof may be going periodically to his spouse or to his former spouse 
under a court decree or under a written instrument incident to a divorce or separation. This 
situation has resulted in substantial hardship in certain cases. 
229. See I.R.C. § 215. 
230. See id. § 71. 
231. S. REP. NO. 673, Part I, 77th Cong. (1941) at 11-12. 
232. Murray, supra note 21, at 55. 
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except for one vast group: the grouE of joint fllers233 who reside in the 
forty-two common-law jurisdictions. 34 Since 1938 joint fllers have been 
jointly and severally liable for the tax liability on their aggregate net 
incomes.235 Consequently, one spouse may be held liable for tax 
attributable to the income of the other.236 This liability rule has been 
adopted even though common-law states vest only the earning spouse 
with immediate and automatic property and control rights in the 
233. See Beck, supra note 3, at 320 & n.4 Qoint and several liability is contrary to notions of ability to 
pay); Zelenak, supra note 75, at 355 (noting that tax is imposed on the person who controls the income 
except for joint filers). . 
234. Presently, forty-one states and the District of Columbia are common-law marital property 
jurisdictions. The nine community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New 
Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. See PuBUCATION 555, supra note 75, at I. In fact, residents 
of these community property states who file jointly are also subject to joint and several liability, and, 
therefore, they also face potential tax liability being imposed on them without regard to their ability to pay. 
For example, under joint and several liability a wife residing in a community propt:rty state could find 
herselfliable for a tax deficiency caused by earnings of her husband that he omitted from the joint return. 
This wife could be held responsible for I 00% of the tax deficiency, even though her vested property interest 
in his omitted earnings extends only to half of them. In this manner, joint and several liability can result 
in the imposition of tax without regard to ownership of the underlying earnings, that is, without regard to 
ability to pay, even for residents of community property states. The situation is worse for residents of 
common-law marital property states in which the non-earning spouse has no ownership right during the 
marriage in lU!J of the earnings of the other spouse. See supra note 7 5, and accompanying text. Because the 
situation is worse for residents of common-law states, I focus my discussion on those geographic regions. 
235. See Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 554, ch. 289, §51 (b), 52 Stat. 447,476. 
236. The only means by which married residents of common-law states may avoid joint and several 
liability is to file separately, but by doing so, they lose the sometimes substantial benefits of income splitting. 
The current system, through income splitting, financially compels the vast majority of couples to file jointly, 
thereby requiring joint and several liability as a practical matter. See Bittker, supra note 25, at 1409 n.55; 
Beck, supra note 3, at 372 ("The tax system is designed almost to force married persons to file jointly rather 
than separately."); Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896,898 (Ct. Cl. 1978); McCaffery, supra note 26, 
at 989 n.l7 (noting that the rate schedules make filing separately disadvantageous); Cummins, supra note 
135 (noting that up to 99% of American couples file jointly). BuJ su supra note 149 and in.fra note 308 and 
accompanying text (explaining the rare circumstances in which spouses may prefer to file separately). 
In 1993, an estimated 95.2% of all returns filed by married taxpayers were joint returns, and an 
estimated 97.5% of all married couples filed jointly. These figures were derived from IRS statistics on the 
number of joint returns filed and the number of separate returns filed. In 1993, 48,298,687 returns in 
which spouses filed jointly were submitted to the IRS. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S .. DEP'T OF 
TREASURY, PuBUCATION 1304, STATISTICS OF INCOME-1993 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 35 
tbl.l.3 (1996). Only 2,437,311 separate returns were filed by married taxpayers. See id. Consequently, the 
total number of returns filed by married taxpayers can be estimated to be 50,735,998. Of these, 48,298,687 
or 95.2% were joint returns. When one spouse files separately, the other may also file separately or not at 
all depending on whether that other spouse has sufficient income to trigger the filing requirement. An 
estimate of the number of such couples would be half of the number of separate returns filed in 1993 or half 
of2,437 ,311. This is not a precise estimate, however, because undoubtedly some spouses of separate filers 
did not file separately or at all on their own behalf. Nevertheless, assuming I ,218,656 couples filed 
separately, the total number of married couples who filed returns would amount to 49,517,343 and the 
percentage of couples who chose to file jointly could be estimated as 48,298,687 divided by the total 
number of couples who filed, or 49,517,343. In this manner the percentage of couples who filed jointly 
could be estimated at 97 .5%. 
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earnings.237 Under joint and several tax liability, one spouse may 
consequendy be held liable for tax attributable to the other's income 
even though the first spouse has no property interest in or legal control 
over that income.238 
In enactingjoint and several liability, Congress disregarded ability-to-
pay principles and ignored the Ninth Circuit decision in Cole in which 
the court ruled explicidy that ability-to-pay concerns ought to trump 
administrative necessity arguments.239 In Cote240 and Uniacke,241 the 
Ninth and Second Circuits respectively had ruled against joint and 
several liability, explicidy stating that the non-earning spouse had no 
property interest in the income that resulted in the deficiency.242 The 
rule of joint and several liability direcdy contradicts the principle 
previously set forth in Seaborn in which a spouse may be taxed only to the 
extent he or she has a recognized legal ownership interest in the 
eamings.243 If the wife in a common-law state has no present property 
right in her husband's earnings, then under the rationale of.Seabom, she 
should not be taxed on them. 244 Yet taxing her on income in which she 
has no property or control rights is entirely possible under the rule of 
joint and several liability. In this manner joint and several liability 
subverts the purpose underlying the rule in which ownership and control 
identify the taxpayer. It subverts the princ~le that tax should be 
imposed in accordance with the ability to pay. 45 
In fact, the whole purpose underlying joint and several liability is to 
separate tax liability from ownership of the income being taxed so that 
if the owner does not pay the tax, the IRS can proceed against someone 
/d. 
237. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
238. See, e.g., Hedrick v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 395,403-04 (1974). 
239. See Cole v Commissioner, 81 F.2d 485,488 (9th Cir. 1935). 
Nor can the plea of administrative difficulty prevail against the fundamental requirement 
that a tax should be assessed according to the ability to pay. As was observed by the court 
in Mcintosh v. Wilkinson (D.C.) 36 F. (2d) 807,812, "Matters urged to defeat a liberal view 
of the statute(,] for example, that 'great additional labor would be required,' etc., arc (in 
varying degree) potent against the whole theory of revision, or against any comprehensive 
'system of corrective justice."' 
240. See id. at 487, 489. 
241. See Commissioner v. Uniacke, 132 F.2d 781, 783 (2d Cir. 1942). 
242. See Cole, 81 F.2d at 490; Uniacke, 132 F.2d at 782-83. 
243. See Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 113 (1930). 
244. See Kornhauser, supra note 73, at 74; see also supra note 206 and accompanying text; Lucas v. 
Earl, 281 U.S. Ill, 114-15 (1930) (Income earned by the husband was not taxed to the wife because state 
law did not give her a present vested ownership interest in his earnings). 
245. It is noteworthy that ability-to-pay notions were respected when beneficial to husbands, the 
usual alimony payors, but that the principle was ignored when it would have helped wives-the spouse 
more disadvantaged under the regime of joint and several liability. See supra notes 225-32 and in.fra notes 
280-349 and accompanying text. 
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else-the owner's spouse-to collect the asserted tax deficiency. This 
purpose is completely at odds with ability-to-pay principles and with the 
Supreme Court's analysis of the law as enunciated in Poe v. Seaborn and 
United States v. Robbins. Once Poe v. Seaborn became law in 1930, the 
Treasury Department should have been foreclosed from continuing any 
administrative practice ofimposingjoint and several liability on couples, 
a practice it first insisted on in 1923246 and continued through 1935 even 
after losing in Cole. The joint and several liability regime was 
unauthorized until Congress enacted it in 1938. Congress had the 
power legally to enact joint and several liability despite Poe v. Seaborn 
because that case was decided merely on statutory-interpretation 
grounds ratherthan on constitutional grounds. Because Congress has 
the power to modify legislation, Seaborn did not prevent Congress from 
enacting joint and several liability. At the same time, however, 
Congress's purported reason for enacting joint and several liability was 
to "clarify existing law," and under the existing law of Poe v. Seaborn, 
taxing earnings to a taxpayer who did not own those earnings was 
prohibited. 247 
Joint and several liability was enacted to clarify existing law, for 
administrative necessity, and to impose a cost on the so-called benefits 
of joint filing,248 even though financial benefits from joint filing were 
essentially unavailable at the time.249 Although Congress had the power 
to enact joint and several liability, it should not have done so as a policy 
matter. The goal of imposing tax according to the ability to pay far 
outweighed the reasons cited in favor of joint and several liability. To 
ensure that taxes were imposed in accordance with the ability to pay, a 
long line of doctrine had established that the individual with ownership 
in or control over earnings should be chosen as the taxpayer.250 With 
the enactment of joint and several liability, Congress selectively 
obliterated the ability-to-pay principle for married couples filing jointly 
without offering coherent reasonsfor its sacrifice. 
Where the system of taxation is generally based on ownership of or 
control over earnings, a liability scheme that imposes the tax on 
someone other than the owner or controller is not only unfair but also 
246. See I.T. 1575, II-I C.B. 144 (1923). 
247. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. Ill (1930). 
248. See H.R. REP. No. 75-1860, (1938), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B., pt. 2, 728, 749. 
249. No financial benefits were available through joint and several liability in 1938 because income 
splitting had not yet been enacted for joint filers and because the 1935 regulations prohibiting the use of 
losses from one spouse to offset the gains of the other and limiting the charitable deduction to fifteen 
percent of the donor-spouse's separate net income had not yet been invalidated in the Supreme Court's 
1940 ]aru'lt!Y and T <ifl decisions. 
250. See supra, notes 208-32 and accompanying text. 
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unjustified in the absence of compelling reasons to depart from the 
general rule. The government has offered no forceful justification for 
joint and several liability. In common-law juri,sdictions, solely the 
earner owns and controls the earnings during marriage. 251 
By taxing the non-earner, the current tax system, through the 
combination of income splitting and joint and several liability, gives the 
earner the best of all possible worlds. Income is shifted to the non-
earner for tax computation, or income splitting, purposes, even though 
the earner keeps and enjoys the shifted earnings.252 Furthermore, 
because ofjoint and several liability, the earner may be able to transfer 
to the non-earner the tax liability on the entire income, both shifted and 
non-shifted portions. Filing jointly does not effect a conveyance of the 
earnings from one spouse to the other for ownership purposes, 253 but it 
251. See supra note 7 5 and accompanying text. 
252. See Christian, ]oint Rail Sttu&llm, supra note 20, at 282-87. Several tax theorists have argued that 
the current regime ofincome splitting has permitted husbands to retain legal tide to all their property, while 
transferring half their property to their wives for beneficial tax computation purposes. Providing the benefit 
of income splitting to married couples regardless of which spouse has legal ownership of the property 
eliminates any incentive for actual sharing of the property between spouses. See Gann, supra note 26, at 4 7 
("By solidifying separate ownership ... the irrelevancy of source of income [as between the spouses for tax 
purposes] may also have contributed to the economic dependence of women."); Winn & Winn, supra note 
75, at 878; Robinson & Wenig, supra note 23, at 774-75 n.4; Bea Ann Smith, "'7u Partners/Up ThetJry of 
Marriage: A Borrowed SolutWn Fails, 68 TEX. L. REV. 689 (1990); Zelenak, supra note 75, at 380 & n.l99 
("(T]he tax laws should not reward spouses for sharing that does not exist."); Bittker, supra note 25, at 1395; 
Gann, supra note 26, at 27; cf. Bittker, supra note 25, at 1402. 
(T]he income-splittingjoint return authorized by Congress in 1948, which with only mir10r 
changes is still in effect, achieves the tax result that Mr. and Mrs. Earl were seeking [In Lucas 
v. Ear~. It does so, however, without requiring husband and wife to equalize their 
ownership inJer se; in this respect, the Earl agreement might be regarded as an improvement 
over the 1948 statutory reform (because it shifted actual ownership of income rather than 
attempting to shift income for tax-computation purposes only]. 
I d. (footnote omitted}; McCaffery, supra note 26, at 990 n.21 (noting the incongruity of shifting income for 
tax purposes when it is not shifted for ownership purposes); Zelenak, supra note 75, at 378-79, 386 (noting 
that by abolishing joint returns and by overruling Lucas v. Earl, that is, by permitting income to be split only 
if property is actually transferred to the nonearning spouse, an incentive would arise for husbands to share 
legal ownership of earnings with their wives); Kahng, supra note 75, at 3, 34, 50 (arguing that a similar 
feature within the estate tax removes the incentive for property to be transferred outright to wives). 
253. See In re Illingworth, 51 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1512 (D. Or. 1956). Although jointly filing spouses 
would have been jointly and severally liable for any deficiency, the wife in IUingwtn1h was entitled only to 
that portion of a refund attributable to her own net income. S« id. at 1513-14. Because no income or taxes 
were attributable to the wife, the court ordered her to endorse the refund check to her husband's 
bankruptcy trustee. S« id. at 1514. The filing of a joint return dOes not change ownership interests between 
those filing the joint return. See In re Wetteroff, 453 F.2d 544, 547 (8th Cir. 1972); Glaubke v. United 
States, 41 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 78-759,78-760 (E.D. Va. 1978); Pettengill v. United States, 253 F. Supp. 321 
(N.D. Ill. 1966); Dunn v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 915 (1963); In re Estate of Carson, 199 A.2d 
407,409 (NJ. Camden County Ct. 1964); In re Estate ofTrecker, 215 N.W.2d 450,454 (Wis. 1974); Beck, 
supra note 3, at 334, 394 & n.383. In these cases, when a joint return generated a refund and only the 
husband had income and deductions for the year, the husband, the husband's estate, or the husband's 
bankruptcy trustee, but never the wife, was entitled to the federal income tax refund. The filing of a joint 
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does change the amount of tax and the spouse from whom the IRS may 
collect that tax. 
F. Joint and Seueral Liabilig for Deficiencies is Inconsistent with the 
Administrative Approach to Tax Refonds 
Another criticism ofjoint and several liability is that it is inconsistent 
with the IRS's approach to tax refunds. On the one hand, if spouses 
owe a one dollar tax deficiency, the IRS is entitled to collect it from 
either spouse under the rule of joint and severalliability.254 On the 
other hand, had the same couple originally paid an additional two 
dollars with its tax return submission, then the couple would be entitled 
to a one dollar refund. Unlike joint and several liability where a 
deficiency can be collected from either spouse, this refund would not 
necessarily be made available to either or both spouses. Spouses have 
federally recognized rights to proportionate parts of a refund check . 
. That is, each spouse's property interest is determined on the basis of 
what their respective tax liabilities would have been if computed 
separately and on the basis of the respective amounts withheld from 
their earnings. 255 Thus, if one spouse owed an outstanding separate tax 
liability from a previous year, then the IRS would issue a refund check 
for the current joint return only to the extent that the other, non-
return had not effected a conveyance of post-tax earnings from husband to wife. 
Only a few Pennsylvania lower court decisions are to the contrary. Two lower court Pennsylvania 
decisions allowing the nonearning wives, rather than the husbands' estates, to keep the joint return refund 
reflected the views of those courts that, under Pennsylvania property law, the filing of a joint federal tax 
return evidenced the spouses' intention to hold the refund as tenants by the entireties during their lives. 
Upon the death of either spouse, the right of survivorship operated to vest total ownership in the surviving 
spouse rather than in the decedent's estate. See In re Estate of MacNeill, 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 480 (1959); In 
re Estate of Green, 14 Pa. D. & C.2d 595 (1958). Bul see In re Estate of jackson, 33 Pa. D. & C.2d 402 (1964) 
(holding that, by filing jointly, parties did no.t intend to hold a tax refund as tenants by the entireties). Only 
under Pennsylvania law has filing a joint return been interpreted as giving the nonearning spouse a property 
interest in a portion of the other's after-tax earnings, and then it was only in the tax refund portion of those 
after-tax earnings. See Christian, Joinl Rau Structure, supra note 20, at 324 n.299. The wives' property 
interests did not extend to the husband's other afu:r-tax earnings. See id. Furthermore, Pennsylvania courts 
take a minority view. All other reported cases dealing with this issue hold that the refund belongs to the 
spouse whose income and tax payments generated it. See In re Wetteroff, 453 F.2d at 547; Glaubk, 41 
A.F.T.R.2d at 78-760; PeUengill, 253 F. Supp. at 321; Dunn, 22 T.C.M: (CCH) at 915; In re Estate of 
Carson, 199 A.2d at 409; In re Estate ofTrecker, 215 N.W.2d at 454; Beck, supra note 3, at 334, 394 & 
n.383. In the vast majority of jurisdictions, filing a joint return does not effect a conveyance of any kind 
between the spouses. In the 40 common-law jurisdictions other than Pennsylvania, joint filing has never 
been treated as conferring property rights on the non-earner. 
254. See I.R.C. § 60 13(d)(3) (1994). 
255. See Rev. Rul. 80-6, 1980-1 C.B. 296; Rev. Rul. 80-7, 1980-1 C.B. 296; Rev. Rul. 80-8, 1980-1 
C.B. 298. 
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delinquent spouse had a property interest in that refund.256 
Consequently, in Matter of Illingwort/z,257 the taxpayer's argument that she 
would have been jointly and severally liable in the case of a tax 
deficiency did not, according to the court, entitle her to the joint return 
tax refund where no income or taxes had been attributable to her.258 
Although jointly filing spouses would be jointly and severally liable for 
any tax deficiency, as to a refund, each spouse was entitled only to that 
portion of a refund attributable to his or her own net income.259 
If the government recognizes an apportionment of a federal tax 
refund, then it should also recognize spouses' relative contributions to 
tax deficiencies as well and assess tax deficiencies to the appropriate . 
spouse, rather than to both on the basis of joint and several liability. 
The government's inconsistency in apportioning refunds but not 
deficiencies is another feature illustrating the one-sided nature of current 
law and the unfairness of joint and several liability. 
G. State Actions for Contribution 
It must be acknowledged, of course, that a remedy is available to a 
spouse who is forced to pay a tax liability attributable to the other 
spouse. The aggrieved spouse may institute an action in state court, 
arguing a right of contribution from the delinquent spouse. 260 
Unfortunately, this remedy is often ineffective as a practical matter, 
inefficient for the legal system, and patently unfair in a variety of 
respects. A system whereby the IRS would be required to collect tax 
deficiencies from the spouses who generated them would be 
demonstrably superior. 
. First, the remedy of suing the delinquent spouse in state court is 
ineffective as a practical matter. For example, the legal fees an 
aggrieved spouse would have to incur to institute such an action may far 
exceed the amount of contribution to which she might be entitled.261 
Furthermore, she may not have the financial resources to retain a lawyer 
256. Sa Rev. Rul. 80-6, 1980-1 C.B. 296. 
257. 51 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1512 (D. Or. 1956). 
258. Said. at 1513-14. 
259. Sa Inn: Wetteroff, 453 F.2d 544, 547 (8th Cir. 1972); Glaubke v. United States, 41 A.F.T.R. 
2d (P-H) 759 (E.D. Va. 1978); Pettengill v. United States, 253 F. Supp. 321,325 (N.D. Ill. 1966); Dunn 
v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 915 (1963); In re Estate of Carson, 199 A.2d 407,409 (NJ. Camden 
County Ct. 1964); In re Estate ofTrecker, 215 N.W.2d 450, 454 (Wis. 1974). 
260. Sa Beck, JUpra note 157, at 31; Beck, JUpra note 3, at 331; Borison, JUpra note 3, at 824; Edison-
Smith, JUpra note 4, at 124-25. 
261. Sa Beck, JUpra note 3, at 331; Beck, JUpra note 157, at 32. 
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to undertake the suit. 262 In such cases, the aggrieved spouse would be 
discouraged, or foreclosed as a practical matter, from using this remedy. 
She could very well be better off financially to pay her ex-spouse's tax 
deficiency and to forgo any type of recovery action against him. 263 
Second, even when the remedy of suing for contribution in state court 
is pursued, it often leads to inadequate ·relief. For example, the 
aggrieved spouse must locate her ex-spouse to institute a legal action 
against him. Doing so is not always easy in cases where the spouses 
have divorced. In addition, even if the action against the delinquent ex-
spouse is successfully instituted, the aggrieved spouse may receive 
inadequate relief even when the state court renders a favorable 
judgment. State courts are not as well versed in federal tax laws as are 
federal· courts.264 As a result, it is more difficult for a state court to 
determine how much of the tax deficiency was attributable to the 
defendant spouse and, thus, how much he should reimburse to the 
aggrieved spouse. Federal courts would be better equipped to answer 
the salient questions: How did the deficiency arise? How much of it 
should the defendant-spouse bear? In fact, state court opinions 
examining one spouse's right to contribution from the other uniformly 
gloss over the issue of which spouse generated the deficiency.265 For 
example, except when an agreement or stipulation sets the spouses' 
relative contributions, these courts have commonly divided the tax 
deficiencies in half 266 or on the. basis of the spouses' respective net 
incomes267 without even discussing how much of the deficiency was 
generated by each spouse. Awarding contribution for only a portion of 
the tax deficiency paid would be completely inadequate if the deficiency 
arose entirety from the understated income of the defendant spouse. In 
262. See Beck, supra note 15 7, at 32. 
263. This incentive not to sue may exist even if the amount of the deficiency is significant to the 
aggrieved spouse because attorneys' fees may be even more significant. 
264. This fact suggests that resolving spouses' relative responsibilities for tax deficiencies would be 
more efficiently carried out in one federal court proceeding in which the IRS and both spouses are all 
parties. 
265. See, e.g., Hanson v. Hanson, 350 P.2d 859,860-62 (Wash. 1960); Strange v. Rubin, 456 S.W.2d 
416, 416-19 (rex. Civ. App. 1970); Miller v. Miller, 310 N.Y.S.2d 18, 20-21 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970); 
Chappell v. Chappell, 253 So. 2d 281, 287 (F1a. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Rocha v. Rocha, 297 P.2d 505, 507 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1956); Bormaster v. Bormaster, 274 P.2d 75 7, 758-60 (Kan. 1954); Rude v. Commissioner, 
48 T.C. 165, 166-67, 172-75 (1967); Gillman v. O'Connell, 574 N.Y.S.2d 573 (App. Div. 1991); Gooden 
v. Wright, No. 14823, 1991 WL 57230, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 18, 1991). 
266. Su Rocha, 297 P.2d at 506-07; Burmaster, 274 P.2d at 759; R.utk, 48 T.C. at 174 (discussing 
whether wife could deduct as a non-business bad debt the amount her husband owed her pursuant to an 
earlier right of contribution judgment from a California state court); Hanson, 350 P.2d at 861. 
267. See Chappell, 253 So. 2d at 285, 287 (party divided tax obligation in half, and had it not been for 
policy against withholding alimony, court seemingly would have allowed contribution on the basis of 
respective earned incomes); Miller, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 21. 
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such an instance, a ruling awarding contribution for the entire 
deficiency would be the only appropriate outcome. State courts' failures 
to examine the sources of the deficiencies indicate that even "successful" 
contribution actions may result in inadequate relief. 
Third, state court contribution actions unfairly shift the government's 
costs of tax enforcement to the aggrieved spouse and shift the burden of 
proof from the presumed delinquent spouse to the aggrieved spouse. 
Both patterns contribute to grotesque inefficiencies in pursuing justice. 
Requiring a state contribution action instead of requiring the IRS to 
assert liability in the first instance against the delinquent spouse shifts the 
government's cost of tax enforcement to the aggrieved spouse. It 
becomes the aggrieved spouse, rather than the government, who must 
find the delinquent spouse and who must bear the cost of instituting the 
action to recover. Furthermore, the aggrieved spouse, rather than the 
government, must bear the costs of enforcing a favorable judgment 
when the delinquent spouse fails to comply with that judgment. 268 This 
shifting of enforcement burden is not only unfair, but also inefficient 
because powerful statutory enforcement mechanisms are available to the 
IRS when a taxpayer fails to comply with an adverse judgment but are 
not available to private individual plaintiffs.269 Consequendy, an unpaid 
judgment is manifesdy more easily collected by the IRS than by an ex-
spouse. Efficiency concerns suggest that the entity better able to collect 
the debt, the government, not the private aggrieved spouse, should be 
the party who pursues the delinquent spouse. Moreover, it is arguable 
268. See Edison-Smith, supra note 4, at 125. 
269. See Beck, supra note 3, at 362 n.228, 401-02. When contesting a deficiency, a taxpayer may 
either pay the tax deficiency and sue for a refund in district court or the Court of Claims, in which case the 
taxpayer will have already complied in the case of an adverse judgment, or petition the Tax Court for a 
redetermination of the unpaid deficiency. 
In the case of a judgment adverse to the taxpayer in this latter scenario, the government enjoys more 
or less summary procedures for collecting the assessed amount in the face of taxpayer noncompliance. The 
IRS has the authority under I.R.C. § 6303 to give notice to the taxpayer demanding payment of the unpaid 
tax. See I.R.C. § 6303(a) (1994). Mter an unsuccessful notice and demand, the unpaid tax automatically 
becomes a lien in favor of the government on all of the taxpayer's property. See id. § 6321. Such a lien has 
priority over the claims of many other creditors. See J. MARTIN BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION 
OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME 57 (4th ed. 1997). Furthermore, the IRS is authorized under I.R.C. § 6331 to 
collect the assessed tax by levying on most property on which a lien has been placed, including wages and 
bank accounts, if the taxpayer fails to pay th,e assessed tax within I 0 days of notice and demand. The 
government's right to levy in this context "includes the power of distraint and seizure by any means." 
I.R.C. § 6331(b). Generally, the government must notify the taxpayer before levying on the taxpayer's 
propeny. See id. § 6331(d)(l). The levy remedy is available to the government without regard to the 10-day 
waiting period and without regard to the notice requirement, set id. § 6331 (d)(3), if the IRS determines that 
the collection of the tax is in jeopardy. See id. § 6331 (a); see also id. § 6861. Finally, the government is 
authorized to sell the seized property under I.R.C. § 6335 after notifying the taxpayer and the public of the 
forthcoming sale. See id. § 6335(b). These statutory remedies make the government far more able than a 
private plaintiff to enforce a judgment against a delinquent taxpayer. 
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that because of the government's powerful collection procedures and 
greater ability to damage the taxpayer's credit rating, a delinquent 
spouse would be more likely and willing to satisfy an adverse judgment 
in favor of the IRS than he would be to satisfy one in favor of his ex-
spouse. Fewer instances of unpaid judgments should result from 
requiring the IRS to pursue the delinquent spouse rather than in the 
current situation in which it is the aggrieved spouse who is left to sue. 
If the IRS were forced to seek tax direcdy from the delinquent spouse, 
then additional suits to enforce favorable judgments should be 
minimized. By shifting the burden of enforcement from the IRS to the 
aggrieved ex-spouse, the efficiency of achieving justice is impaired. 
Another effect of the current approach is to shift the burden of proof 
from the delinquent spouse to the aggrieved spouse. If the government 
sues the delinquent spouse direcdy, rather than using the rule of joint 
and several liability to collect from the other spouse, then the delinquent 
spouse has the burden of proving that the tax deficiency was incorrect. 270 
Under the. rule of joint and several liability, however, the non-
delinquent spouse defends herself from the government, thereby acquiring 
the burden of proof, often when she lacks the information271 needed to 
satisfy that burden. Furthermore, when that aggrieved spouse later 
seeks contribution from the delinquent spouse in state court, she, as 
plaintiff, again has the burden of proof. She must prove that she is 
entided to contribution, and she may still lack the information necessary 
to satisfy that burden.272 Under the current system in which one spouse 
pays the other's tax deficiency and sues him in state court for 
contribution, the delinquent taxpayer never bears the burden of proof. 
270. See TAX CT. R. 142(a); Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281,283 (1932) ("The action to recover 
on a claim for refund is in the nature of an action for money had and received and it is incumbent upon 
the claimant to show that the United States has money which belongs to him."). 
A recent proposal would shift the burden of proof from the taxpayer to the IRS in some cirumstances. 
See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Bill of 1997, H.R. 2676, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1997). If this provision becomes law, then the IRS's pursuit of the non-delinquent spouse may not have 
the effect of shifting the burden of proof from the delinquent to the non-delinquent spouse. Rather, the 
IRS would have and retain the burden of proof under most circumstances. Most commentators oppose 
the proposed change in law, however, and it seems unlikely that it will survive in the Senate version of the 
bill. See CCH Tax Day: Federal, ABA Addresses Shijling tht Burden of Proofw IRS in Court Proceedings, jan. 28, 
1998, f11k1ilabk in Westlaw, F-98-028-024. The Treasury Department has noted that "it is appropriate for 
a person in control of the facts, such as the taxpayer, to have the burden of proof and that the [proposed) 
provision would 'eventually lead to more intrusive audits."' Id. Even if the proposed change becomes law, 
it is, therefore, unlikely to remain the law in the long run. It should be noted that joint and several liability, 
itself, violates the Treasurey Department's own argument that the party in control of the facts, the 
delinquent spouse, should be the party with the burden of proof, because the rule of joint and several 
liability shifts that burden to a party often lacking access to the relevant facts, the n~n-delinquent spouse. 
See accompanying text. 
271. See Beck, supra note 3, at 363. 
272. Seeid. 
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Thus, the current system essentially shifts the burden of proof from the 
wrongdoer to the innocent spouse and makes the attainment of justice 
substantially less likely. 
The remedy of suing one's spouse or ex-spouse in state court is also 
harmful to the justice system because it requires the controversy to be 
resolved through two cases rather than one. Indeed, rather than 
resolving the question of who should pay the tax deficiency in one 
federal action, the federal action and a subsequent state action are 
required.273 Plainly, a more efficient use of judicial resources would 
permit the resolution of responsibility in the initial court action. The 
rule of joint and several liability and its remedy of a state contribution 
action thus contribute to judicial inefficiency. 
IV. THE IMPUCATIONS FOR WOMEN OF THE REGIME OF jOINT 
AND SEVERAL LIABIU1Y 
The tax law, as embodied in the regime of joint and several liability, 
is not neutral. It not only reflects long-standing social inequalities, but 
may also exacerbate them. Legal scholars have identified many respects 
. in which the law is "male."274 That is, the hidden norm in the law is 
consistent with male experiences and treats those experiences as neutral. 
To the extent that women's experiences differ from those of men, those 
experiences are often not accounted for within prevailing legal doctrines 
and discourses. 
From the IRS's point of view, joint and several liability is justified as 
a means of facilitating the collection.of tax deficiencies: if r generates 
a tax deficiency, then under joint and several liability, the IRS has the 
option to collect from either r or X. Nevertheless, joint and several 
273. &e Beck, supra note 15 7, at 30 (stating that the wife has no right to require that her husband be 
joined in the IRS's case against her); Beck, supra note 3, at 328. 
Procedural difficulties seem to prevent the wife from joining the husband as a party to any 
tax litigation itself. No procedure is available for impleading the husband in the Tax Court, 
nor is there any way to force the IRS at the appeals level to assess or collect the tax from the 
husband. 
/d. With regard to cases in the district courts, there seems to exist no bar to making the husband a co-
defendant for contribution in a refund suit against the government, or to making him an involuntary 
plaintiff. However, no cases seem to exist in which either of these procedures has. been pursued. &e id. at 
328 n.37. Of course, for federal district court procedures to be available, the aggrieved taxpayer must be 
able to gain access to the district court by first paying the tax assessment. &e id. Almost all innocent-spouse 
cases, cases in which the application of joint and several liability is contested, are tried in the Tax Court. 
See Borison, supra note 160, at 124 & n.7. Consequently, the procedures that exist in district courts for 
joining the delinquent spouse to the suit are largely unavailable as a practical matter. 
274. Set, e.g., Symposium, Is the Law Male?, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 293 (1993) (containing articles in 
which hidden gender bias is uncovered in the areas of tort law, family law, rape law, and the law of expert 
witnesses). 
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liability is objectionable not only on the gt:ound that one person should 
never be held responsible for another's tax liability, but also because it 
disproportionately and systemically burdens women. Scholars have 
made compelling arguments that the joint and several liability scheme 
disproportionately harms women in its application. 275 This Article 
establishes that joint and several liability harms women systemically as 
well. The cost to women of joint and several liability is so great that the 
regime cannot be justified by any extra revenue that is potentially 
collected under it. 276 
A. Women's Objections to Joint and Severalliahili9' as Applied 
Although neutral on their face, the joint and several liability 
provisions in the tax code have a substantially biased effect against 
women in their application. For a variety of reasons, seemingly neutral 
tax principles consistently disadvantage women more than men and, 
therefore, lack real neutrality. Although the code may not have been 
intended to discriminate against women, it has that effect because of its 
application to larger, preexisting social patterns. Such patterns include 
the tendency for husbands to be self-employed more often than their 
wives, to take more aggressive reporting positions than their wives, and 
to earn more than their wives. The tax laws did not cause these social 
patterns; however, they act upon these patterns through the system of 
joint and several liability to reinforce and exacerbate the economic 
inequality between men and women. 277 
Examining the social context in which law functions is a long-
. accepted method for analyzing whether the law is biased as applied. 278 
275. Su Beck, supra note 3, at 320 & n.4, 327-28 n.34 (estimating that approximately 90% of the 
collections from the spouse who did not generate the deficiency penalized women and that only I 0% 
penalized men); Cummins, supra note 135 (noting that researchers estimate that "95 percent of the 
[Innocent spouse] cases are brought by women, and two-thirds of them lose"); Edison-Smith, supra note 
4, at 119, 123-24; Zorn, supra note 21, at 424-25. 
276. Su Beck, supra note 3, at 407. 
277. q: Edward]. McCaffery, SIDuching Towards Equalify: Gender Discrimination, Mar/at E.ifo:imcy, and 
Social Change, 103 YALE LJ. 595, 602-03 (1993) [hereinafter McCaffery, SIDuching Towards Equalify] 
(presenting a model illustrating how the tax system as a whole contributes to and compounds preexisting 
discrimination); McCaffery, supra note 26, at 988, 1035-46 (arguing that structural "aspects [of the tax 
laws] persist to this day, serving as an anchor against the emergence of more modem and flexible family 
models"). 
278. Su Leslie Bender, Is Tort Law Male? ForesettJhiliJy Aruzbisis and~ MIJ1III{!rs' LinbiliJy for 17rird 
Party Rapes of Residmls, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 313 (1993); Martha Chamallas, Qyestioning the Use of Race-
Specific and Gnuler-Speciji& Economic Data in Tort Litigalion: A Constilutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L REV. 73, 
79-84 (1994); Deborah W. Denno, Gender, Crime, and the Criminal Law Defenses, 85 J. CRIM. L. & 
, CRIMINOLOGY 80, 142-51 (1994); Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort /Uform: Gender 
Irgustia in Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REv. I, 8-13 (1995); Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: The Meaning of Gender 
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Similarly, the social reality in which the tax laws operate must be 
scrutinized to determine whether those tax laws function in a biased 
fashion. 279 
Professor Beck has demonstrated that joint and several liability, as 
applied, has been used to collect husbands' deficiencies from wives and 
ex-wives much more frequently than to collect wives' tax bills from 
husbands and ex-husbands.280 
The statute is of course gender-neutral, but the vast majority of the 
reported innocent spouse cases (over 90% in 1987) involve wives who 
are forced to pay their husbands' taxes. One may suppose that the 
innumerable instances in which such deficiencies are paid rather than 
contested involve a similarly high proportion ofwomen.281 
Joint and several liability has not necessarily been applied against 
women more than men because of discriminatory intent on the part of 
IRS agents.262 Rather, as enumerated by Professor Beck, other 
economic factors present in U.S. society contribute to the pattern. First, 
Equa/i9 in Crimina/Law, 85J. CRIM. L &CRIMINOLOGY I (1994); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Is lh4 Law Male?: 
ut Me CllUntlh4 Wtgs, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 397 (1993); Stephen]. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challmge in 
Crimina/Law, 143 U. PA. L REV. 2151, 2155-57 (1995); Mary Coombs, Pulling Women Ftrsl, 93 MICH. L. 
REV. 1686 (1995) (reviewing KATHLEEN DALY, GENDER, CRIME, AND PuNISHMENT (1994)). Cj Griggs 
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (taking social disparities into account for purposes of determining 
the existence of employment discrimination by conferring acceptance on disparate impact analysis). 
279. Set Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penaf!y in Black and While, in TAXING AMERICA 45, 
49-54 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996) (using sociological data regarding spouses' 
relative incomes to argue that black couples are more likely to experience marriage tax penalties and white 
couples are more likely to experience marriage tax bonuses); Jones, supra note 23, at 261-62 (arguing that 
one must understand social patterns to understand tax laws); William A. Klein, Tax Effects I![ Nonpf9"'1Dll 
I![ Child Suppurt, 45 TAX L REV. 259, 259 n.4 (1990) ("[W)hile the tax rules are on their face gender neutral, 
in their practical application they are not."); McCaffery, supra note 26, at 897,993, 1009-10, 1023, 1034, 
1054, 1059 (noting, in various contexts, that even if tax rules are neutral on their face, it is appropriate to 
examine how they apply in the social context, and that in evaluating tax laws, considering social context 
is crucial); McCaffery, Sloucking T (]IJ}(lT(is Equaii9, supra note 277, at 617, 619, 644 (noting that tax laws must 
be considered in the context of how they interact with real-world wage structures to determine their real 
impact); john a. powell, How Govmunml Tax and Housing Policies HOIM RaciaJ!y Segregaled America, in TAXING 
AMERICA 80, 83-92 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996) (discussing the impact of tax 
subsidies to homeowners in a country in which home ownership is highly correlated with race). 
280. Su also Edison-Smith, supra note 4, at 119, 123 (noting that in over 90% of the cases from 1971 
through 1990 in which taxpayers sought relief from joint and several liability, that taxpayer was a wife or 
ex-wife rather than a husband or ex-husband); Cummins, supra note 135 (claiming that 95% of joint 
liability cases involve wives seeking relief from their husbands' or ex-husbands' tax liabilities); Borison, supra 
note 160, at 125; Beck, supra note 15 7, at 30; Zorn, supra note 21, at 424-25 (noting that in 90% of 
innocent spouse cases the spouse seeking relief from joint and several liability is the wife or ex-wife). 
281. Beck, supra note 3, at 320 n.4 (citations omitted). 
282. Consequently, joint and several liability is probably not unconstitutional. Su Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that recruiting procedures used by the District of Columbia police 
department were not unconstitutional even though they had a racially disproportionate impact because 
they were not used purposefully to discriminate on the basis of race). 
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men are more likely than women to be self-employed,283 and self-
employment accords much greater opportunity to conceal income than 
a salary- or wage-earner would have.284 As a result, men are more likely 
than women to be able to conceal income and to assert improper 
deductions, thereby generating tax deficiencies. Second, psychological 
data suggest that, on average, men more than women tend to take 
aggressive reporting positions, and, therefore, .men are again more likely 
than women to generate tax deficiencies.285 If true, a system in which 
deficiencies may be collected from the spouse who did not generate the 
· deficiency would tend to inure to the benefit of the spouse more likely 
to create such deficiencies-the husband. Third, because women who 
work are less likely than men to be self employed,286 that is, they are 
more likely to be employed by someone else, it is often easier for the IRS 
to institute collection procedures against these women for a husband's 
deficiency by garnishing her wages than it would be to collect the 
deficiency from the self-employed delinquent husbands. 287 For this same 
reason it is more likely that the IRS would try to collect a wife's tax 
deficiency from her than from her husband or ex-husband. Finally, the 
IRS may institute collection procedures more frequendy against wives 
than against their husbands because after divorce or separation, wives 
are more easily located, being more likely to have remained in the 
marital home whose address was reported on the original return.288 
Joint and several liability, as applied, is not only more likely to cause 
wives to pay the deficiencies of their husbands than the converse, but it 
is also more likely to shift larger burdens from husbands to wives and 
smaller burdens from wives to their husbands. Because wives have 
283. Su BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABsTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1989, at 380 tbl.627 (1989) (In 1987 there were 6,617,000 self-employed men and only 
3,007,000 self-employed women); su also Beck, supra note 3, at 320 n.4, 377. 
284. Su, e.g., Michael C. Durst, ABA Section of Tax'n & Am. Bar Found., Report f!!the Second 
Invitahorwl Coriference on Income Tax Complinnce (1988), reprinl.ed in 42 TAX LAW. 705, 716-21 (1989). 
"Compliance rates among the self-employed ... are far lower'' than compliance rates for wages, salaries, 
interest, dividends, and capital gains. ld. at 716; see also Beck, supra note 3, at 320 n.4, 376-77. 
285. See Karyl A Kinsey, SIJTVI!Y DaJa on Tax Compliance: A Compendium and Review, in AMERICAN BAR 
FOUNDATION TAXPAYER COMPUANCE PROJECT WORKING PAPER 8716, at 29 (1987) (suggesting that, 
psychologically, men are more likely to take aggressive reporting positions than are women and that, in fact, 
they do so); Beck, supra note 3, at 376. 
286. See Beck, supra note 3, at 377; su also supra note 283, and accompanying text. 
287. See Beck, supra note 3, at 320. 
288. See Cummins, supra note 135; Edison-Smith, supra note 4, at 123; Cummins, supra note 205, 
at D 10; Borison, supra note 160, at 125-26; if. Rankin, supra note 21 (noting that collection efforts often 
proceed against the non-delinquent spouse because she remains in the collection region in which the return 
was originally filed and because the spouse responsible for the deficiency has moved to a different IRS 
region). 
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lower average earnings than husbands,289 the joint return deficiencies 
289. See Edison-Smith, supra note 4, at 120; Beck, supra note 3, at 320 n.4. Historically, men have 
earned significantly more than women. Although the wage gap between men and women diminished 
between 1979 and 1993, women on average still earned significantly less than men did. See Tamar Lewin, 
Wage Differenu Between Women and Men Wuims, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1997, at AI. In 1993, women's 
median earnings were 77% of men's. See iJ. Alarmingly, however, the most recent data indicate that the 
wage gap between men and women is again widening. See iJ. Thus, the median weekly earnings of full-time 
working women are approximately 75% of men's median earnings, down from 77% in 1993. See id. Data 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the fourth quarter of 1995 show that "[w]omen who usually worked 
full time had median earnings ofS407 per week, 74.3 percent of the $548 median for men." BUREAU OF 
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, USUAL WEEKLY EARNINGS OF WAGE AND SALARY 
WORKERS: FOURTii QUARTER 1995 (1996). Even for men and women in managerial and professional 
specialty occupations and for college graduates with advanced degrees, men who usually worked full time 
earned significantly more than women who usually worked full time. See iJ. Men in those occupations 
earned S825 per week while such women earned $604 per week. See id. "Among college graduates with 
advanced degrees ... the highest 10 percent of male workers earned S I ,916 or more [per week], while the 
highest I 0 percent of their female counter-parts made [only] S I ,403 or more." /d. Data from the Bureau 
of the Census also demonstrate that men entering the full-time work force earned significantly more than 
full-time female entrants. From 1991 through 1993, those men earned an average of S459 per week, while 
their female counterparts earned only $306 per week. See PAUL RYSCAVAGE, BUREAU OF TiiE CENSUS, 
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, HOUSEHOlD ECONOMIC STUDIES, 
DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC WELL-BEING: LABOR FORCE, 1991 TO 1993, P70-48, at 2 tbi.B (1995). 
Assuming fifty weeks of work per year, the difference of S 153 per week amounted to S7 ,650 less income for 
women than for otherwise similarly situated men. This disparity constituted half of the women's annual 
income. Women entering the full-time work force were earning only two-thirds of what full-time male 
entrants to the work force were making. Data from 1994 indicate that the median annual earnings of all 
full-time workers were S30,854 for men and S22,205 for women. See BUREAU OF 1liE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T 
OF COMMERCE, HOUSEHOlD EcONOMIC STUDIES, INCOME AND POVERTY: 1994 INCOME SUMMARY, 
tbi.A (1996). 
The above data compare earnings of full-time working men and women without regard to their marital 
status. Data comparing earnings of husbands and wives show an even greater disparity because many wives 
work only part time and others do not participate at all in the paid work-force. In 1992, only 59.2% of all 
married women were in the waged labor force. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 
STATISTICAL ABsTRACT OF TiiE UNITED STATES 1995, at 405 tbl.636 ( 1995). In that same year, married 
women, on average, contributed approximately 32% of their household's income. See LAWRENCE MISHEL 
&JARED BERNSTEIN, THE STATE OF WORKJNG AMERICA 1994-95, at 61 (1994). Census data from 1994 
indicate that many more women than men work part-time or not at all. Full-time male workers numbered 
51,580,000 while full-time female workers numbered only 34,155,000. See BUREAU OF TiiE CENSUS, U.S. 
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HOUSEHOlD ECONOMIC STUDIES, INCOME AND POVERTY: 1994 INCOME 
SUMMARY, tbi.A (1996). Assuming a population with at least as many women as men, at least 17,000,000 
more women than men worked either part time or not at all. Census data from 1994 indicate that the 
median income for married rrien whose wives were present substantially exceeded the median income for 
married women whose husbands were present. The median income for married men was $28,377, while 
the median income for married women was only $11,859. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF 
COMMERCE, CURRENT PoPULATION REPORTS, P60-165, tbi.P-11 (1997). These median incomes include 
incomes not only from full-time workers, but also the incomes of spouses who work part time and the 
incomes from those who do not participate at all in the labor force. See iJ. Professor McCaffery reports 
that, on average, married women earn approximately 46% of what their husbands earn. See McCaffery, 
supra note 26, at 994 & n.35 (citing Nancy E. Dowd, Work and FamiJy: Restructuring lk Workplace, 32 ARIZ. 
L. REv. 431,445 n.86 (1990)). 
In 1994, the percentage of wives who earned more than their husbands was only 18.9%. This figure 
was arrived at by adding together the number of couples in which wives with earnings earned more than 
their husbands who had earnings (7 ,218,000) and the number of couples in which the wife worked while 
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caused by the husband are likely to be greater than those caused by the 
wife. "A deficiency caused by the husband will, on average, be more 
onerous for the wife to pay than the other way around because the 
deficiency is likely to be larger, and because her earnings and ability to 
pay it are less."29° For this reason, the burden of joint and several 
liability tends to be more onerous for women than for men. For 
example, in LaBelle v. Commissioner/91 the Tax Court held that Mrs. 
LaBelle, a public school teacher of learning-disabled children, was 
responsible for $380,000 in taxes and penalties that had arisen from a 
joint return her husband had filed for 1973, a year in which the LaBelles 
had been separated. Although she had neither income nor assets with 
which to pay even a fraction of the huge deficiency,292 joint and several 
liability required her to pay it in any event.293 Considering the poverty 
the husband did not (2,958,000) and dividing that sum by the total number of married couples 
(53,865,000). See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT PoPUlATION 
REPoRTS, tbi.F-19 (1997) (providing 7,218,000 and 53,865,000 figures); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. 
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPoRTS, P60-165, tbi.F-13 (1997) (providing the 
2,958,000 and 53,865,000 figures). In 1989, wives earned more than their husbands in only 18% of 
marriages. See Diane Crispell, More Bacon, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Dec. 1989, at 9 (citing BUREAU OF THE 
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPoRTS, EARNINGS OF MARRIED-
COUPLE FAMIUES: 1987 (1989)); see also Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, SocWJ Welfare and tk RaJe 
SfnJcture: ANewLookatProgressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1926-27 (1987) (stating that wives have 
been the marginal workers historically); Gann, supra note 26, at 42 n.l3 7 (asserting that wives stay out of 
the labor force becoming, in effect, secondary earners in part because husbands are paid more); McCaffery, 
supra note 26, at 993-94, 1004-05 (describing societal tendency to marginalize the lesser-earning spouse, 
usually the wife, and describing wives as being viewed historically as the marginal earners); Kahng, supra 
note 75, at 22. Wives also tend to earn less than their husbands because the realities of childbirth require 
them to leave their jobs at least temporarily, see McCaffery, supra note 26, at 994, and because of pervasive 
gender bias in society, see id. at I 05 7-5 8. 
290. Beck, supra note 3, at 320 n.4. 
291. 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1078 (1984), remanded by an unpublished orrkr, (9th Cir. 1984), reo'd by 52 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1256 (1986). 
292. Mrs. LaBelle had received only a modest marriage settlement, consisting of S7 ,000 in cash, 
furniture, a SIO,OOO insurance policy, and the use of a car. See 47 T.C.M. at 1079. Because of the 
separation, she had received no economic benefit from Mr. LaBelle's business in 1973. See 52 T.C.M. at 
1258. In fact, even during the marriage, Mrs. LaBelle had not received much financial benefit from her 
husband's business because he insisted that she use her own teaching salary to pay for the bulk of the 
household expenses. See id.; see also Philipps & Braford, supra note 109, at 33-35. 
293. The deficiency had arisen originally when Mr. LaBelle, a used car dealer, had overstated the 
cost of goods sold from his automobile business, thereby understating gross profit on the 1973 tax return. 
See 4 7 T. C.M. at I 080, I 081. The court, at that time, viewed this overstatement of cost of goods sold as 
an overstatement of a deduction rather than as an omission from gross income. ~ id. A recent decision, 
however, interprets an overstatement of cost of goods sold as an omission from gross income, rather than 
as an overstated deduction. See In re Lilly, 76 F.3d 568, 77 A.F.T.R. 2d 96-915 (4th Cir. 1996). Prior to 
1984 amendments in the innocent-spouse rules, see LR.C. § 6013(e) (1994), relief from joint and several 
liability was unavailable to innocent spouses for deficiencies resulting from overstated deductions. At that 
time, such relief was available only for deficiencies resulting from omissions from gross income. Mr. 
LaBelle's overstatement of expenses, therefore, precluded his wife from any type of innocent-spouse relief. 
See 4 7 T.C.M. at I 081. The Tax Court ordered Mrs. LaBelle to pay a deficiency far beyond her ability to 
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with which many American women are faced upon divorce,294 a rule 
which tends to impose liability on divorced women for the taxes of 
someone else should be viewed with particular suspicion.295 
As it applies in a social context in which husbands are self-employed 
more often than wives, take reporting positions that are more aggressive 
than those of their wives, and earn more than their wives, the regime of 
joint and several liability tends to be more harmful to women than to 
men. 
B. Women's Objections to Joint and Several Liabiliry on Systemic Grounds: 
The Tax Code Is Structural!J Biased 
Joint and several liability harms women not only as applied in the 
social context, but also systemically. This Article uses the terms 
"systemic" or "structural" gender-based objections to refer to means by 
which the tax system itself is designed internally to favor men over 
women. 296 That is, systemic gender-based problems in the tax code are 
means by which two or more features of that code interact in a way that 
predictably harms women more, or more often, than men. Thus, a 
structural gender-based objection results fi·om the internal design of the 
tax code rather than growing out of how one code provision interacts 
with, or applies to, a set of social patterns. 
1. Patterns Inherent in the Joint Return Rate Structure 
Joint and several liability interacts with other tax code provisions to 
create systemic bias in a variety of ways. To understand how joint and 
several liability interacts with other provisions to create systemic bias, it 
is necessary to understand the effects of those other provisions. 
pay. ~ id. Fortunately for Mrs. LaBelle, Congress expanded the innocent spouse rules retroactively during 
her appeal to grant relief for deficiencies arising from improper deductions. See 52 T.C.M. at 125 7. 
Accordingly, Mrs. LaBelle ultimately achieved relief from joint and several liability under the innocent 
spouse rules. See id. at 1258-59. 
294. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
295. See Beck, supra note 3, at 384; Edison-Smith, supra note 4, at 124. 
296. q. Susan Girardo Roy, Note, &storing H~ or Tolerating Abwe? &sfxmses Ill Domestic Vwlence Against 
Immigrant Women, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 263, 275-76 (1995) (providing a clear example of systemic or 
structural bias in the context of cases involving domestic violence against immigrant women). Elected state 
judges are familiar with domestic violence issues but may hold the electorate's hostility against immigrants, 
while federal judges understand immigration issues but tend to have little experience with domestic violence 
issues. ~ id. at 276. Thus, the required dichotomy between federal and state courts tends to impede the 
fair and correct resolution of both issues for domestically abused immigrant women. See id. 
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Specifically, .an understanding of the joint return rate structure is 
necessary. 
Joint and separate return rates are related to each other by the 
concepts of income splitting and aggregation. Those two features are 
present in the joint return rates and cause a couple to be taxed under 
joint rates as if each spouse had earned separately half of the aggregate 
or combined net income. Income splitting permits income from the 
higher-bracket earner to be shifted into the other spouse's lower bracket 
for purposes of tax computation and effects a tax savings for the couple 
as a unit when the couple flles joindy. Under aggregation, when spouses 
flle joindy, their incomes are added together prior to the application of 
the tax rates. Because U.S. tax rates are progressive, aggregation causes 
some of the spouses' combined income to be taxed at higher marginal 
rates than would have applied to their incomes separately, thereby 
imposing additional tax on couples who flle joindy rather than 
separately. 
Income splitting and aggregation are both components 9f, and are 
built into, the joint return rates. 297 That is, under joint flling, spouses are 
treated as one taxpayer for tax computation purposes, and that one 
taxpayer reports both sources of income, moving into a higher tax 
bracket. However, the tax rates rise half as quickly, that is, tax brackets 
are twice as wide, relative to the rate schedule for married couples who 
file separately, to allow for what is, in effect, income splitting.298 Joint 
return rates are related to separate return rates in that a joint return tax 
liability may be derived by applying the separate return tax rates to half 
of the spouses' combined net income and multiplying the resulting tax 
by two.299 
The existence of both income splitting and aggregation in joint return 
rates has a number of consequences that have been described in 
previous legal and economic literature. First, income splitting and 
aggregation each operate independendy to favor couples in which only 
one spouse works and to disfavor those in which spousal incomes are 
similar, that is, in which both spouses undertake paid labor. Not 
surprisingly, both features, operating through the joint return rates, 
297. The aggregation feature of joint rates was adopted in 1921. Su Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. 
No. 98, ch. 136, § 223(b)(2), 42 Stat. 227, 250. Income splitting was not incorporated into those rates until 
1948. Su Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 471, § 301, 1948 U.S.C.C.AN. (62 Stat. 110, 114) 85, 92-93. 
298. Compare the brackets contained in I.R.C. § l(a) (West Supp. 1997) for married taxpayers filing 
jointly with those of I.R.C. § I (d) (West Supp. 1997) for married taxpayers filing separately. 
299. Assuming a husband earned SIOO,OOO and his wife earned S40,000, their joint return liability 
could be derived by applying the separate return rates to $70,000 and then by doubling the resulting tax. 
Essentially, each spouse would be treated as if he or she earned half of his or her own income plus half of. 
the income earned by his or her spouse. 
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combine to exacerbate this privileging of single-earner couples over two-
earner couples and are thought to affect behavior. By penalizing two-
earner couples relative to single-earner couples, the joint rates probably 
encourage conventional marriage roles in which the husband works and 
the wife does not, thereby discouraging actual labor-force participation 
among wives. Many tax scholars have described how aggregation 
probably discourages wives from participating in the paid labor force by 
subjecting their first dollars earned to the highest marginal rates of their 
husbands, rather than to the lower tax rate of the lowest tax bracket. 300 
Essentially, the tax rate on the secondary earner's first dollar of income 
is determined by her husband's income rather than by the lowest tax 
rate. The income-splitting feature of the joint return rate structure is 
also likely to discourage married women from participating in the paid 
work force. 301 Because income splitting benefits most those couples in 
which spouses' incomes differ significantly, it provides a tax benefit 
primarily to couples who fit traditional roles in which the husband earns 
most or all of the income and in which the wife does not work. 302 
300. &e, e.g., Grace Blumberg, Sexism in tm Cod~: A ComparaiWe Sfut!y oflncDTM Taxation of Working WW&r 
and Molhers, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 49 (1971); Gann, supra note 26, at 41; McCaffery, supra note 26, at 993; 
Zelenak, supra note 75, at 365; Davis, supra note 107, at 210. These patterns have been described in Jones, 
supra note 23, at 261 (discussing impact of automatic income splitting on spouses' roles); see also Gann, supra 
note 26, at 35 {stating that the split-income structure is designed to benefit the group of taxpaying couples 
in which only one spouse works); Edward]. McCaffery, Equal~, oftm Right Sort, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S LJ. 
289, 308-09 (1996); McCaffery, supra note 26, at 987, 992 & n.29 (noting that the tax laws encourage 
single-earner families); Robinson & Wenig, supra note 23, at 793 n.92 (noting that the tax laws, as 
reflections of social judgments about lifestyles, reward conformity to traditional roles and penalize 
departures from them); Zelenak, supra note 7 5, at 340-41 (noting that the single-earner couple benefits from 
income splitting). lJul sa Michael Mcintyre, Economic Muluaiitf and tm Need for Joinl Filing, CAN. TAX., Winter 
1979, at 13; Mcintyre, Individual, supra note I 07, at 469; Mcintyre, New r urk State, supra note I 07, at 792 
n.l7 (questioning economic studies that have been interpreted to say that wives' labor supply is more 
.discouraged under the current rate structure than is that of husbands, assuming that spouses share their 
resources to a large extent, and arguing that tax rates are blind as to which spouse's income is assigned to 
the lower versus the higher tax brackets). However, Professor Mcintyre ignores the social realities that 
wives tend to earn substantially less than their husbands, that wives generally have more household and 
child care responsibilities than do husbands, and that, consequently, most couples view the wife's paid work 
effort as being more discretionary than that of the husband. 
30 I. &e Christian,Joinl Rok Slructurt, supra note 20, at 265, 279-82; see also Jane H. Leuthold, lncDTM 
Spli#ing and Women's l.Ahur-Furce Participation, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 98, 103 (1984). 
302. &e Gann, supra note 26, at 35 {stating that the split-income structure is designed to benefit the 
group of taxpaying couples in which only one spouse works); Jones, supra note 23, at 261 (discussing impact 
of automatic income splitting on spouses' roles); Zelenak, supra note 75, at 340-41 (noting that the one-
earner couple benefits from income splitting); see also McCaffery, supra note 26, at 987, 992 & n.29 {noting 
that the tax laws encourage one-earner families); Robinson & Wenig, supra note 23, at 793 n.92 (noting 
that the tax laws, as reflections of social judgments about lifestyles, reward conformity to traditional roles 
and penalize departures from them); Conlract wiJhAmerica: Hearings &fim tm Hause Comm. on Wf9>s and Means, 
104th Cong. 85,85 (1995) {statement of Anne L. Alstott, Professor of Law, Columbia University School 
of Law), ~in 66 TAX NOTES 1343, 1344 (1995) [hereinafter Contract wilhAmerica Hearings]; cf. Mapes 
v. United States, 576 F.2d 896,898 {Ct. Ct. 1978) ("[T]he Code adds to the attractiveness of a prospective 
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Income splitting discourages married women from undertaking paid 
labor because it allows spouses to compute their taxes as if their incomes 
were equal without requiring that the spouses equalize their incomes by 
actually arranging to earn similar amounts.303 Joint return rates, which 
incorporate both income splitting and aggregation, most likely 
discourage many married women from entering the work force or from 
remaining in it when they marry.304 
A second consequence of income splitting and aggregation is that they 
create an economic incentive for couples to file joindy rather than 
separately whenever spouses' incomes differ, that is, whenever one 
spouse earns more than the other.305 Writing when disparate incomes 
were virtually universal, Professor Boris Bittker acknowledged this 
incentive in the rate structure, noting that joint returns, although 
elective as a technical matter, are "mandatory in fact."306 As long as one 
spouse earns more than the other, a financial incentive will induce 
spouses to elect joint return status. Even when incomes are equal, 
couples have no financial incentive relating to the rate structure to file 
separately. Indeed, the vast majority of married couples files joindy 
rather than separately.307 The incentive to filejoindy is strongest when 
spouses' incomes differ substantially. The greater the income difference 
between husband and wife, the more valuable is the benefit from 
income splitting and the smaller is the harm from income aggregation, 
spouse without taxable income, and detracts from one with it."). 
303. See Christian, Joint Rate Structure, supra note 20, at 279-82. Prior to the incorporation of 
automatic income splitting into the joint rates in 1948, spouses often tried to equalize their incomes by 
having the wife participate in family partnerships. See id. at 281 n.l32. These plans succeeded when the 
wife could show that she participated in good faith in operating the business. See id. Therefore: 
These activities by wives demonstrated that the unavailability of automatic income splitting 
encouraged couples to move towards the income splitting result by arranging for both 
spouses to work, to earn income. The absence of automatic income splitting did indeed 
encourage women to work in an effort to reduce the family's tax liability. 
/d. By contrast, the presence of automatic income splitting removes the tax incentive for wives to earn as 
much as their husbands. See id. at 279-82. 
304. Empirical studies support the proposition that higher taxes on wives discourage their labor force 
participation by demonstrating that a married woman's earnings are more tax sensitive than are those of 
a married man. See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96TII CONG., THE INCOME TAX 
TREATMENT OF MARRIED COUPLES AND SINGLE PERSONS 5, 64 (Comm. Print 1980) ("Virtually all 
statistical studies of the issue conclude that a wife's work effort is more responsive to reduced taxes than her 
husband's."); Jerry A Hausman, l.nhor Supp!J, in HOW TAXES AFFECT EcONOMIC BEHAVIOR 27, 28, 55-
58 (Henry]. Aaron &Joseph A. Pechman eds., !981); Leuthold, supra note 301, at 98, 103-04; Thomas 
MaCurdy, Work Disincentive E.ffictr l![T axes: A Reexamination l![Some Evidence, 82 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS 
AND PROC. OF TilE I 04TII ANNuAL MEETING OF TilE AM. ECON. AsS'N 243 (1992); Harvey S. Rosen, 
Tax /llusinn and tk l.nhorSupp!J l![Mmrud Women, 58 REV. ECON. & STAT. 167 (1976). 
305. See, e.g., Harvey S. Rosen, Is It TI11U toAbandonJointFiling?, 30 NAT'L TAXJ. 423,425 (1977). 
306. Bittker, supra note 25, at 1409 n.55; see also Beck, supra note 3, at 372 (explaining that "[t]he tax 
system is designed almost to force married persons to file jointly rather than separately"). 
307. See supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
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and thus, the greater is the couple's financial benefit from filing jointly 
rather than separately. Because the value of income splitting diminishes 
and because the harm from aggregation increases as spouses~ incomes 
converge, spouses with similar incomes experience only a minimal 
financial incentive to file jointly. For spouses with equal incomes, the 
benefit of income splitting is exactly offset by the harm from 
aggregation, so the couple is indifferent between filing jointly and filing 
separately. 
Because the rate structure never affirmatively encourages separate 
filing, it may be difficult to understand why any married couple would 
ever elect to file separately. Occasionally, separate returns are 
advantageous for reasons unrelated to the rate structure. 308 In instances 
in which the rate structure's incentive to file jointly is weak, that is, when 
spouses have similar or equal incomes, other factors that favor separate 
filing occasionally operate to outweigh the small benefit that filing 
jointly would afford through the rate structure. In these instances, 
spouses would most likely file separately rather than jointly. The 
couples who are most likely to do so are those who would obtain little 
benefit under the rate structure from filing jointly, similar-income 
couples. By contrast, disparate-income couples obtain large benefits 
under the rate structure from filing jointly and are unlikely to obtain any 
benefit from filing separately that is large enough to outweigh that 
relatively large joint return benefit. Consequently, disparate-income 
couples are highly likely to file jointly. Furthermore, although few 
couples file separately, those who do are most likely similar- or equal-
income spouses. 
Finally, a third consequence of income splitting and aggregation is 
that they operate together relative to separate return rates to effect a 
transfer of wealth from the lower-income to the higher-income spouse, 
usually from the wife to her husband. Upon filing jointly, income 
splitting and aggregation combine to reduce the tax attributable to the 
higher-earning spouse and to increase the tax attributable to the lower-
earning spouse. Income splitting and aggregation combine to give the 
higher-earning spouse an income-splitting benefit which is only partially 
offset by the harm from aggregation. The higher-earning spouse adds 
half the income of the other spouse to half of his or her own income, and 
308. See supra note 149 and accompanying text; Christian, ]oint Rau Slnu:trm, supra note 20, at 271-72 
& nn.113-14. For example, in the case of medical expenses, a deduction is allowed only to the extent 
expenses exceed 7.5% of adjusted gross income. See I.R.C. § 213(a) (1994). Filing separately allows the 
spouses' respective adjusted gross incomes to be reported separately, thereby minimizing the floor under 
which one spouse's medical expense deductions are disallowed. When one spouse has significant medical 
expenses, separate filing may, therefore, be advantageous. 
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thereby moves into a tax bracket that is lower than the one that would 
have applied had his or her own income been taxed separately. In this 
manner, the combination of income splitting and aggregation benefits 
the higher-earning spouse. That higher-earning spouse bears a smaller 
tax burden by filing joindy than he or she would by filing separately. 
By contrast, the tax attributable to the lower-earning spouse is greater 
under the joint return than it would be under separate filing. Income 
splitting and aggregation combine to cause this result. Income splitting 
alone could place the lower-earning spouse in a lower tax bracket, but 
when applied in combination with aggregation, half of that spouse's 
lower income would be increased by half of the other's higher income. 
The combination of income splitting and aggregation acts to push the 
lower-earning spouse into a higher bracket than would have applied had 
his or her own income been taxed separately. For the lower-earning 
spouse, the harm from aggregation exceeds the benefit that income 
splitting confers. Consequendy, the lower-earning spouse pays more tax 
by filing joindy than he or she would by filing separately. Relative to 
separate return filing, the joint return rates increase the tax attributable 
to the lower-income spouse and reduce the tax attributable to the 
higher-income spouse. 
Because this pattern operates in a social context in which husbands 
tend to earn more than their wives/09 it tends to redound to the benefit 
of husbands and to the detriment of wives. To the extent the higher-
earning husband pays less upon filing joindy and the lower-earning wife 
pays more, joint filing in effect results in a transfer of wealth from the 
lower-earning wife to her higher-income husband. While part of the 
reduction in tax attributable to the husband's income comes at the 
expense of the U.S. Treasury in the form of a smaller overall tax bill, 
part of his reduction comes at his wife's expense. It is this amount-the 
amount by which the wife's tax increases-which she effectively 
transfers to her husband by filingjoindy rather than separately. Joint 
returns reduce the tax on the family overall, but as between the spouses, 
they tend to increase the tax on the wife and to grant an economic 
benefit to the husband. I first exposed this pattern in a previous 
article,310 and in that article I dealt with such issues as how to determine 
the magnitude of the wealth transfer from wife to husband; whether 
spouses share their resources and whether or not such interspousal 
sharing can mitigate this transfer-of-wealth problem; as well as other 
issues relating to the incidence of tax burden between the two spouses. 
309. See supra note 289. 
310. See Christian, ]oint Role StnJcture, supra note 20, at 305-48; see also Christian, Complici!Y, supra note 
20, at 448-65. 
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I do not repeat any discussion of those issues here, but rather, I now 
extend the implications of this new insight into an analysis of joint and 
several liability. 
2. Joint and Several Liability Interacts with theJoint Return Rate 
Structure to Create Systemic Bias 
Joint and several liability interacts with the joint return rate structure 
to create systemic bias in three different ways. 
a. The Internal Revenue Code is Designed to Cause Joint and Several Liabili!J 
to App!J to the Very Couples for W7zom That System Creates the Greatest 
Hardship, Disparate-Income Couples 
First, joint and several liability interacts with the incentive within the 
joint return rate structure311 that causes many couples to file joindy 
rather than separately. These two features of joint filing function 
together to cause joint and several liability to apply most frequendy to 
the very couples for whom shifting liability from one spouse' to the other 
most contradicts ability-to-pay notions. They function together to cause 
joint and several liability to aJ?ply most frequendy to disparate-income 
couples. As described above, 1 joint rates relative to separate rates are 
structured to create a powerful financial incentive for most couples to 
file joindy. This inducement is strongest when one spouse's income 
differs substantially from that of the other spouse.313 When the two 
spouses have similar incomes, the incentive to file joindy that is found 
in the rate structure is still present but 'is much weaker.314 Finally, when 
spouses have equal incomes, no incentive within the rate structure 
encourages them to prefer either filing status over the other. The 
greater the income disparity between the two spouses, the greater is the 
couple's incentive to file joindy rather than separately. Consequendy, 
the greater the disparity in spousal incomes, the more likely it is that a 
couple will file joindy rather than separately. This incentive for couples 
to file jointly, an incentive which strengthens the more spousal incomes 
diverge, predictably causes the ranks of joint filers to be highly 
populated by couples in which one spouse earns significantly more than 
the other. 
311. See I.R.C. §§ I (a), (d). 
312. See supra notes 305-07 and accompanying text. 
313. See supra note 307 and accompanying text; see also Christian,Joinl Rt& Structure, supra note 20, 
at 269-70; Christian, Complici9, supra note 20, at 447. 
314. See Christian,Joinl Rt& Structure, supra note 20, at 269, tbl.2. 
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Of course, when a couple flies joindy, it triggers the joint and several 
liability regime.315 The incentive in the rate structure that causes 
disparate-income spouses to be those most likely to file joindy results in 
those same couples being the ones most likely to be subjected to joint 
and several liability. Joint and several liability is least fair in instances 
in which one spouse earns substantially more than the other. Couples 
in which spouses' incomes differ significandy are precisely those couples 
for whom making the lower-earning spouse potentially responsible for 
deficiencies caused by the higher-earning spouse is least fair. Yet, 
because spouses are induced to file joindy when their incomes differ 
substantially, those are the very couples most likely to face joint and 
several liability. 
This systemic problem is of particular concern to women because in 
U.S. society, the husband is usually the higher-earning spouse and the 
wife is usually the lower-earning spouse whenever spouses' incomes 
diverge.316 Therefore, joint and several liability applies most frequendy 
in situations in which the husband earns more than his wife, often when 
he earns substantially more than his wife.317 This situation allows tax 
liability to be shifted from a husband to his wife precisely when her 
earnings are significandy lower than his and her consequent ability to 
pay his deficiency is most impaired.318 
Because joint and several liability applies only when couples file 
joindy, and because couples have the most incentive to fllejoindy when 
spousal incomes are disparate, joint and several liability is designed to 
apply with the greatest frequency when one spouse, usually the husband, 
earns significandy more than the other, usually the wife. This situation 
of unequal resources is precisely when it is least fair to impose a joint 
and several liability regime, a liability system which shifts one spouse's 
liability to the other. It is, in fact, quite common for joint and several 
liability to be asserted against wives whose earnings are significandy 
lower than those of the husband or ex-husband who generated the 
deficiency.319 For these reasons, joint and several liability, both in its 
315. See I.R.C. § 60 13(d)(3). No analog to I.R.C. § 60 13(d)(3), which imposes joint and several 
liability on joint filers, exists with regard to separate returns. See Beck, supra note 157, at 32; Borison, supra 
note 3, at 823. 
316. See supra note 289 and accompanying text. 
317. Seeid. 
318. While joint and several liability is also likely to apply when wives earn more than their husbands, 
it is extremely unusual for wives to out-earn their husbands. See supra note 289 and accompanying text. 
319. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 3, at 323-24 (discussing facts of a case in which ex-wife was assessed 
more than Sl2,000 in back taxes attributable to her ex-husband. The assessment exceeded her annual 
income. The husband, by contrast, had significant earnings and a savings account); LaBelle v. 
Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1078 (1984), rmuuuJed by an unpublished order, (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd by 52 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1256 (1986). 
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application and with regard to the systemic incentives that lead to its 
application, harms women more often than men. 
Because of the economic incentive for spouses with disparate incomes 
to file joindy rather than separately, joint and several liability applies 
most often to those couples for whom that liability system is least fair. 
By imposing joint and several tax liability on such spouses, society has 
approved of a transfer of wealth from women to men. 320 Because of how 
joint and several liability operates in society, when wealth is transferred, 
that is, when one spouse pays a deficiency caused by the other spouse, 
that wealth is most often transferred from the lower-earning wife to her 
higher-earning husband.321 Joint and several liability effectively operates 
in a biased fashion to promote transfers of wealth from women to men. 
That joint and several liability is designed to apply precisely when 
spouses' incomes are disparate is reminiscent of the notion that gender 
bias is often self-reinforcing. 322 Disparate incomes tend to induce joint 
320. See Beck, supra note 3, at 330. 
321. This is but one example of wealth transfer from women to men. Others have described the 
cultural traditions that perpetuate wealth transfers occurring in other contexts. For example, large numbers 
of women provide uncompensated house-cleaning and child-rearing services to their families. This practice 
also transfers economic value from women to their families because of the unpaid nature of the work. See 
EVELYN NAKANO GLENN, ISSEI, NISEI, WAR BRIDE: THREE GENERATIONS OF JAPANESE AMERICAN 
WOMEN IN DOMESTIC SERVICE 192 (1986) (stating that women "perform a disproportionate share of work 
in the household, while men receive disproportionate advantages in the form of services and access to 
income"); Staudt, supra note 107, at 1584 n.54 (arguing that women's responsibility for housework has the 
effect of transferring wealth from women to men). Staudt argues: "It is not the ethic of care ... that is 
problematic. Rather it is the assumption that goes along with it-that women should provide free 
caretaking services for the family, enabling independence for the family while remaining dependent, 
herself." ld; see also Christian, Joint Rau Structure, supra note 20, at 328 ("The domestic services that a wife 
renders often make it more difficult for her to contribute financially, and furthermore, her services 
'contribute[) indirectly to the [family's economic] acquisitions by making it possible for the ... (husband) 
to be employed."') (footnotes omitted) (quoting Greene, supra note 75, at 85); De Armond, supra note 75, 
at 240-41; Cheadle, supra note 75, at 1271 & n.ll, 1310-11; Greene, supm note 75, at 83 ("Even if she did 
not contribute directly to the acquisition of property, her services enabled or hastened her husband's ability 
to acquire property.") (footnote omitted); Id. at 85; Throne, supm note 75, at 196-97; Acker, supra note 75, 
at 474 (arguing that, without women's unpaid labor, the capitalist system could not function as beneficially 
for men); Law, supra note 75, at 1771 {reviewing ZilLAH R. EISENSTEIN, FEMINISM AND SEXUAL 
EQUAU1Y (1984)) ("[O]ur liberal society depends upon the unpaid work performed by women in the 
home."); if. Gann, supra note 26, at 42 n.l37 (asserting that wives stay out of the labor force becoming, in 
effect, secondary earners in part because husbands are paid more). In addition, women often receive less 
compensation than men do for equivalent work. See RliTH SIDEL, WOMEN AND CHilDREN I...AST: THE 
PuGHT OF POOR WOMEN IN AffLUENT AMERICA 66 {1986); Sylvia A. Law, Women, W"'*, We!fat'e, and 
the Presf:TIHJJion ofPaJrinrclry, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1249, 1249-310 (1983); McCaffery, Sluuclring TIJUifl1'tis EqualiJy, 
supra note 277, at 600. See general{y CLAUDIA GOlDIN, UNDERSTANDING TilE GENDER GAP: AN 
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF AMERICAN WOMEN 83-118 {1990). This pattern could be said to transfer 
additional wealth from women to men. 
322. See McCaffery, supra note 26, at 1000 (demonstrating how taxes contribute to the self-
perpetuation of single-earner families in the context of the social security system); Davis, supra note I 07, 
at 233 (arguing generally that the tax system helps perpetuate women's inferiority in society by 
"subsidiz[lng) patriarchy''); McCaffery, supm note 26, at 988 (arguing in other contexts that aspects of the 
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filing. Under current social reality, when disparate incomes exist, the 
husband is usually the higher-income spouse and the wife is usually the 
lower-income spouse. The result of joint filing, in tum, triggers joint 
and several liability which, as described above, applies to cause wives to 
pay their husbands' tax deficiencies more often than the other way 
around. Thus, the very fact that husbands tend to earn more than their 
wives operates through the tax system frequendy to require those lower-
earning wives to transfer wealth to their higher-earning husbands by 
requiring them to pay tax deficiencies attributable to those husbands. 
Consequendy, the disparity of spousal incomes, through the operation 
of the tax code, tends to reinforce and exacerbate a gender-based 
inequality of financial resources. In this manner, a disparity in spousal 
incomes is the very condition that creates the opportunity for the higher-
earning spouse to benefit financially from the lower-earning spouse by 
making her liable for his deficiency through the rule of joint and several 
liability. The very fact that the wife earns less than her husband 
potentially results in her havirig to pay his tax bill and compromises her 
economic viability even further. 
rate structure seiVe to perpetuate traditional family patterns); id. at 1029-30 (arguing in other contexts that 
tax laws contribute to the self-perpetuation of certain gender biases); id. at I 030-32 (illustrating how 
employer expectations of women employees can become self-fulfilling prophesies due to the lower 
remuneration the expectations prompted); NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTIIERING: 
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND TilE SOCIOWGY OF GENDER (1978) (making the point that in non-tax, 
psychoanalytic, sociological, and philosophical contexts, such as family dynamics, gender inequalities tend 
to be perpetuated automatically and are self-reinforcing); GOLDIN, supra note 321, at 214; ARLIE 
HOCHSCHILD & ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFf: WORKING PARENTS AND TilE REVOLUTION 
A THOME 254 (1989) (same as Chodorow); Mary E. Becker, Baniers Facing Women in tk Wage-Labor MllTir.et 
and tkNeedfor AddiJionalRemedies: A Rep!J to FiscMI and lAqar, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 934 (1986); Stephen Coate 
& Glenn C. Loury, WlllA..tJinnalive-Action PolicW Elirninak NegaJ:ive SlmoMJes?, 83 AM. EcON. REV. 1220, 1221 
(1993) (modeling self-fulfilling prophesies); Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, PrWt1JiY, Iijficimcy, and tk 
Equal~ q[Men and Women: A .Reui.rionist V1t10 q[Sex Discrimination in Emp~, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. REs. 
J. 585, 634-35 (discussing "nationill" statistical discrimination that leads to self-fulfilling prophesies, using 
female job persistence as an example); Reuben Gronau, Sex-related Wage Differenlials and Women's Interrupted 
Labor Careers-The Chiclr.en or tk Egg, 6 J. LAB. EcON. 277, 294 (1988); McCaffery, Slouching T owllTds Equal~, 
supra note 277, at 615-16, 624 (describing tendency of wage discrimination to be self-perpetuating along 
gender lines in part because of income aggregation); id. at 602-03 (presenting a model illustrating how the 
tax system as a whole contributes to and compounds preexisting discrimination); Carol M. Rose, Women 
and Proptr9: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REv. 421, 443-54 (1992) (asserting that gender 
discrimination is perpetuated through self-fulfilling prophesies); McCaffery, supra note 26, at I 035-46 
(arguing that structural "aspects [of the tax laws] persist to this day, seiVing as an anchor against the 
emergence of more modem and flexible family models"); id. at 988; Christian, Joint Role Structure, supra note 
20, at 250-51 & nn.36-40, 347-48; McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equ~, supra note 277, at 615-24 
(describing how women's shorter average job persistence than men's induces firms to lower women's wages, 
rendering women secondary earners, and that income aggregation found in the tax code compounds this 
problem, giving women further reason to flee the work force, thereby shortening their persistence on the 
job); McCaffery, supra note 26, at 1013 (describing the tendency of the pension and social security systems 
to protect and, therefore, to encourage non-working wives). 
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Not only does joint and several liability function to harm women 
more oflen than men, causing wives to transfer wealth to their husbands 
more frequently than in the other direction, but joint and several 
liability is also responsible for harming women more severe!Y than it 
harms men. This problem also results from the internal design of the 
tax code. As explained above, the tax code is designed to impose joint 
and several liability most frequently on spouses whose incomes differ.323 
Given the social context that husbands tend to earn more than their 
wives, 324 the tax code usually imposes joint and several liability when 
husbands have relatively large earnings and when wives have relatively 
low earnings. Simply stated, the tax code is designed, operating in the 
social context, to hold husbands responsible for their wives' tax 
deficiencies precisely when the husbands most likely earn relatively large 
amounts while at the same time it holds wives responsible for their 
husbands' tax deficiencies precisely when the wives probably have 
relatively low earnings. The tax code is designed to operate in the social 
context in a way that predictably causes joint and several liability to 
cause relatively minor financial burdens for men, while at the same 
time, it tends to impose relative financial peril on women. 
When joint and several liability applies to make a husband 
responsible for his wife's tax deficiency, because of the § 1 incentive for 
disparate-earning spouses to file jointly, he will usually have relatively 
large earnings and will generally be well situated to absorb additional 
liability. Although this shifting ofliability to the non-delinquent spouse 
is similarly unfair, it is less likely to place the husband at serious financial 
risk because he is likely to have comparatively greater resources. By 
contrast, when joint and several liability applies to make a wife 
responsible for her husband's tax deficiency, because of the § 1 incentive 
for disparate-earning spouses to file jointly, she will generally have to 
pay that liability out of comparatively meager resources. This instance 
ofliability shifting is not only unfair, but will predictably and frequently 
place the lower-earning woman in relative economic distress. 325 While 
it is not always the case that joint and several liability applies when 
husbands' earnings are comparatively large or when wives' earnings are 
relatively meager, the fact that it applies most frequently when spouses' 
incomes diverge and the social fact that husbands tend to earn more 
than their wives indicate that when joint and several liability does apply, 
it is likely to harm wives more severely than husbands. The tax code 
creates systemic bias by causing joint and several liability to apply for 
323. See I.R.C. §§ 1(a), 1(d), 6013(d)(3) (1994); su alro mpra notes 311-19 and accompanying text. 
324. Su mpra note 289. 
325. See Beck, supra note 3, at 320, 323-25. 
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precisely those cases in which one spouse, usually the husband, earns 
more than the other, usually the wife. 
b. 7heJoint Return is Designed to Benefit the Higher-Earning Spouse, Usually 
the Husband, through Income Splitting but to Impose the Cost for that Benefit, 
Joint and Several Liabiliry, on the Wife 
The second manner in which joint and several liability relates with 
other tax code provisions to create systemic bias also occurs through its 
interaction with the joint return rate structure. After 1948, both income 
splitting and joint and several liability were statutory consequences of 
joint filing. As discussed above, the IRS and the courts have often 
claimed that joint and several liability is the cost for the benefit of 
income splitting.326 As a policy matter, however, making joint and 
several liability the price charged for income splitting effects a 
distributional injustice. 
When one spouse earns more than the other, as is usually the case 
among married couples, then joint filing does not allocate the benefit of 
income splitting and the burden of joint and several liability equitably 
between the two spouses.327 Under the rate structure for joint and 
separate returns that is contained in I.R.C. §§ 1(a) and 1(d), respectively, 
joint filing triggers rates in which both income splitting and income 
aggregation are incorporated. That is, by filing jointly, a couple is taxed 
under married filing separately rates as if each spouse had earned half 
of the two spouses' combined net incomes. The total joint return tax 
would be computed by doubling the tax that a separate filer would pay 
on half of the couple's combined net taxable income.328 The availability 
of income splitting and the presence of income aggregation in the joint 
return rates tend to benefit husbands and to harm wives in two primary 
respects. As explained above,329 income splitting and aggregation both 
tend to harm wives first by discouraging them from participating in the 
326. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
327. See Beck, supra note 157, at 30, 32 (stating that divorcing wives should be cautious in filingjoindy 
because any tax savings tends to benefit the higher-earning husbands more than their wives). 
328. See Revenue Act of 1948, Pub L. No. 471, § 301, 1948 U.S.C.CAN. (62 Stat. 110, 114) 85, 92-
93; S. REP No. 80-1013, pt. VIII.A., at 15-20 (1948), refrtir!Ud in 1948 U.S.C.CAN. 1163, 1184-87; 
Druker v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1982); Mapes v. United States, 5 76 F.2d 896, 899 (Ct. 
Cl. 1978); Johnson v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 958,965 (N.D. Ind. 1976); Stanley S. Surrey, Federal 
TaxalitmriflheFamily-ThehvenueActrifl948, 61 HARV.L.REV.l097, 1106-07 (1948); seealroBittker,supra 
note 25, at 1412-13; McCaffery, supra note 26, at 990; Philipps & Braford, supra note 109, at 38; Quick 
& DuCanto, supra note Ill, at 65; Robinson & Wenig, supra note 23, at 779; Zelenak, supra note 75, at 
346. 
329. See supra notes 300-04 and accompanying text. 
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paid labor force whenever they are the secondary earner in the family.330 
Wives tend to be the secondary earner both because they tend to earn 
less than their husbands and because of ingrained cultural traditions.331 
Second, income splitting and aggregation also tend to harm wives and 
to benefit their husbands by operating together to effect a transfer of 
330. See Christian, ]oint Rou Structun, supra note 20, at 266-69, 279-82, 287-300; Christian, C~m~pl~, 
supra note 20, at 446-47; Gann, supra note 26, at 35 (stating that the split-income structure is designed to 
benefit the group of taxpaying couples in which only one spouse works); Jones, supra note 23, at 261 
(discussing impact of automatic income splitting on spouses' roles); Zelenak, supra note 75, at 340-41 
(noting that the one-earner couple benefits from income splitting); McCaffery, supra note 26, at 987, 992 
& n.29 (noting that the tax laws encourage one-earner families); Robinson & Wenig, supra note 23, at 793 
n.92 (noting that the tax laws, as reflections of social judgments about lifestyles, reward conformity to 
traditional roles and penalize departures from them); Contra&t with America Hearings, supra note 302, at 85, 
reprinled in 66 TAX NOTE'S at 1344 (statement of Professor Alstott); Jones, supra note 23, at 296; Leuthold, 
supra note 301, at 103 (using data from the 1979 MICHIGANSURVEYOFINCOMEDYNAMICS); McCaffery, 
supra note 26, at 989-96, 1018; McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equal~, supra note 277, at 617-18 (arguing 
that the combined impact on wives of the aggregation effect, social security taxes, and other costs of 
working is so great that it must affect behavior and discourage paid work)j Rosen, supra note 305, at 426; 
Zelenak, supra note 75, at 343, 365-66, 371; Davis, supra note 107, at 21 0-14; Note, supra note I 07, at 368-
70; H.R. REP. No. 104-84, at 13 (1995); Kornhauser, supra note 73, at 64; Alicia H. Munnell, The Coupk 
Versus tk lndWitiual Under tk Federal Personal lnc~m~e Tax, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 247, 263-64 
(HenryJ. Aaron & MichaeiJ. Baskin eds., 1980); Gann, supra note 26, at41, 42 n.137 (noting that the wife 
would be more likely to work outside of the home if she could file separately to avoid the aggregation effect); 
Dateline NBC: Two for tk Mo"!J (NBC television broadcast, May I, 1996), OlJailahk in 1996 WL 6704217. 
In an interview, Linda Kelley, home economist stated: 
Most second incomes do clear a profit, but usually it's not nearly as much as expected. And 
there are some people who even go in the hole because of a second income .... They lose 
money .... It's when both partners work full time that the costs just explode .... Uncle 
Sam ... is very fond of second incomers because his take on their paychecks is so large. 
I d. (quoted from original broadcast); McCaffery, supra note 26, at I 041 n.219; if. Mapes v. United States, 
576 F.2d 896,898 (Ct. Cl. 1978) ("[T]he Code adds to the attractiveness of a prospective spouse without 
taxable income, and detracts from one with it."). 
331. Christian, ]oint Rou Strucbm, supra note 20, at 288-89. Women are considered to be "secondary'' 
wage earners much more frequently than men. See JESSIE BERNARD, WOMEN AND TilE PuBUC INTEREST: 
AN EsSAY ON POUCY AND PROTEST 191 (1971) ("In one study of 53 such two-career families, the wife's 
career was viewed as merely a kind of hobby, an avocation rather than a vocation, in a substantial 
proportion with a traditional orientation."); Carole Pateman, The PabiarcluJJ Welfare State, in DEMOCRACY 
AND THE WELFARE STATE 231,244 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1988). 
Women in the workplace are still perceived primarily as wives and mothers, not workers. 
The view is also widespread that women's wages are a "supplement" to those of the 
breadwinner. Women, it is held, do not need wages in the same way that men do-so they 
may legitimately be paid less than men. 
/d. (footnote omitted); see alroJANE C. HOOD, BECOMING A TwO-JOB FAMD..Y 188 (1983) (wives in middle-
and upper-income families often perceive their work as unnecessary to the family's survival, thus treating 
themselves as ')unior partner[s]"); McCaffery, supra note 26, at 994 (describing married women as 
historically having been the marginal or secondary earners in the family). 
Wives are considered secondary earners because they usually earn less than their husbands. See supra 
note 289. Because wives tend to cam less than their husbands, when one spouse leaves the labor force to 
care for a .child or elder relative, it is usually the wife rather than the husband who does so. Wives arc, 
therefore, properly viewed as secondary earners. This characterization is not intended to express a goal or 
a desired norm, but rather simply describes the current social reality. 
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wealth from the lower-earning to the higher-earning spouse. 332 
Consequently, joint ftling, through the phenomena of income splitting 
and · aggregation, tends to operate in the social context in which 
husbands usually earn more than their wives to effect a transfer of 
wealth from wives to their husbands. In these ways, the so-called benefit 
of joint ftling, that is, the availability of income splitting, is really a 
benefit for huspands only, not a benefit for both spouses who file jointly .. 
Indeed, the "benefit" of joint filing is usually a detriment for wives. 
Filing jointly triggers not only the joint return rates along with their 
concomitant elements of income splitting and income aggregation, but 
also the regime of joint and several liability. On its face, joint and 
several liability is gender neutral. It applies to both spouses, so either 
spouse may have to bear the taxes arising from the other's net income. 
As an empirical matter, however, it has been demonstrated that joint 
and several liability usually harms wives more often and more severely 
than husbands.333 Under joint and several liability, wives pay the tax 
liabilities of their husbands more often, and in greater amounts, than 
husbands pay the taxes attributable to their wives. 
While joint and several liability generally harms wives, joint return 
rates, through income splitting and aggregation as discussed above, 
generally benefit husbands. 334 Because part of the rationale behind joint 
and several liability is that it is the cost imposed for the benefit of income 
splitting, it is especially ironic that the burden tends to fall on one 
spouse, usually the lower-earning wife, while the benefit tends to fall on 
the other spouse, usually the higher-earning husband. The burden of 
joint and several liability tends. to fall predictably and systemically on 
wives while the benefits from income splitting tend to inure regularly to 
husbands. Both the benefit and the cost of filing jointly tend to burden 
wives and to benefit husbands. The wife essentially pays the cost to get 
a benefit that inures to her husband, not to her. That joint and several 
332. For a complete explanation of this recently exposed phenomenon, see Christian, Joint Rat.e 
Structure, supra note 20, at 305-48; Christian, Complici9, supra note 20, at 448-65; see also supra notes 309-10 
and accompanying text. 
333. See supra notes 277-95 and accompanying text. See genera/!y Beck, supra note 3, at 320 n.4 (1990); 
Durst, supra note 284, at 716-21; Kinsey; supra note 285, at 29 (suggesting that, psychologically, men are 
more likely to take aggressive reporting positions than are women and that, in fact, they do so); Edison-
Smith, supra note 4, at 119. 
· 334. See supra notes 300-04, 309-10 and accompanying text. See also Christian, Juint Rat.e Structure, supra 
note 20, at 279-348; Christian, CompliciJy, supra note 20, at 448-50; Edison-Smith, supra note 4, at 120, 
125, Cf Beck, supra note 157, at 30, 32 (stating that divorcing wives should be cautious in filing jointly 
because any tax savings tends to benefit the higher-earning husbands more than their wives); Beck, supra 
note 3, at 322, 376 (noting that, while joint and several liability is generally borne by the wife, the benefit 
of joint filing is generally enjoyed by the husband-that benefit consisting of the savings he obtains by 
shifting his income into his wife's lower tax bracket). 
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liability is viewed as the cost for the benefit of income . splitting, 
therefore, effects a distributional gender-correlated injustice. 
If there is to be a cost imposed for the benefit of income splitting, that 
cost should be designed to fall on the party who enjoys the benefit, not 
on the party that tends to be harmed fromjoint return rates.335 Under 
the current joint return tax system, husbands tend to enjoy the benefits . 
ofboth having their tax liabilities shifted to their wives under joint and 
several liability and enjoying a further transfer of wealth from their 
wives through the operation of income splitting and aggregation. Wives 
tend to be burdened by these same provisions by being discouraged 
from undertaking paid labor, by being forced through joint and several 
liability to pay their husbands' tax deficiencies, and by being coerced 
into transferring additional wealth to their husbands each year through 
the operation of the joint return rate structure. In short, the husband 
tends to benefit from income splitting, but the wife tends to pay the cost 
for that benefit through joint and severalliability.336 Under this analysis, 
it is distributionally and systemically unjust for joint and several liability 
to be the cost imposed for the so-called benefit of income splitting. That 
joint and several liability is justified as the price to be paid for the benefit 
of income splitting, therefore, must fail. Both aspects ofjoint filing tend 
to harm women and to benefit men. As applied to real-world conditions 
in which men earn more than their wives, these elements of joint filing 
do not operate in a neutral fashion. 
c. 7he Internal Revenue Code's Rate Structure is Designed to Induce Most 
Couples to File Jointly, Thereby Making Application of the Joint and Several 
Liabiliry Regime Likely and Endangering Marital Harmony 
A third manner in which joint and several liability interacts with other 
features of joint filing to create systemic bias relates to the incentive most 
couples face to file joindy rather than separately.337 For most couples, 
joint tax liability is generally significandy less than what the combined 
separate return liabilities would be if computed. Therefore, most 
couples are presented with a compelling financial incentive to file joindy 
335. As described, rupra, income splitting harms wives who earn less than their husbands in two ways: 
first, by discouraging them from participating in the paid workforce; and second, by coercing them to 
transfer wealth each year to their higher-income husbands. See rupra notes 300-04, 309-10 and 
accompanying text. 
336. See Beck, rupra note 3, at 322, 376; Beck, rupra note 157, at 32; Edison-Smith, rupra note 4, at 
119-20, 125. 
337. This incentive arises because the tax rates applicable to joint filers incorporate income splitting 
while those applicable to separate filers do not. Compare I.R.C. § !(a) (1994) wilh I.R.C. § l(d). See rupra 
notes 305-08 and accompanying text. 
HeinOnline -- 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 613 1997-1998
1998] JOINT RETURN TAX UAB/UTr 613 
rather than separately.338 As a result, the existence of joint and several 
liability causes most married women to face a conflict between acting in 
their own best interests and acting in the best interests of the marital unit 
as a whole. 
A wife may do either what is in her own best interest and avoid joint 
and several liability by filing separately, or she may choose to serve the 
best interest of the couple as a unit and file joindy to minimize the unit's 
tax liability.339 Whenever spouses' incomes differ, the couple as a unit 
has an incentive to file joindy to enjoy the economic benefits of income 
splitting. However, for the couple to obtain this benefit, not only must 
the wife bear the harm of income aggregation, which discourages her 
labor-force participation, 340 and not only must she transfer wealth to her 
wealthier husband,341 but she must also expose herself to joint and 
several liability, a -regime in which she could be held liable for tax on 
another's income, earnings to which she may have no legal rights. 
Under joint and several liability, she could find herselfliable for taxes far 
beyond her ability to pay.342 As a result, women face a conflict. They 
338. In fact, close to I 00% of married couples choose to file jointly because of this incentive. See supra 
note 236. 
339. It should be noted that a husband could face the same conflict between self-interest and the 
family interests if he earned less than his wife. However, in most situations, husbands are not secondary 
earners. They are, by and large, still the primary breadwinners. q: Kornhauser, supra note 73, at 64 
(suggesting in the context of whether or not the second earner will enter or remain in the labor force that 
the joint return subjects the secondary earner, usually the wife, to psychological stress}; id. at 90 (noting that 
the interdependence of spouses is usually achieved at the wife's expense). 
340. Su Christian,Joint Rate Slmcture, supra note 20, at 288-303; McCaffery, supra note 26, at 989-96, 
10 18; McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equali!J, supra note 277, at 617-18 (arguing that the combined impact 
on wives of the aggregation effect, social security taxes, and other costs of working is so great that it must 
affect behavior and discourage paid work); Rosen, supra note 305, at 426; Zelenak, supra note 75, at 343, 
365-66, 3 71; Davis, supra note 107, at 21 0-14; Note, supra note 107, at 368-70; su also Contract wiJh .AmerUa 
Hearings, supra note 302, at 85, rtprinJed in 66 TAX NOTES at 1344 (statement of Professor Alstott); H.R. REP. 
No. 104-84, at 13 (1995); Gann, supra note 26, at 41; Kornhauser, supra note 73, at 64; Munnell, supra 
note 330, at 263-64. Tax scholars have also identified other aspects of taxation in addition to the joint 
return rate structure that discourage women from working: the social security system, su, e.g., McCaffery, 
supra note 26, at 996-100 I; Jonathan Barry Forman, Promoting Fairness in the Social Securi!J Retirement Program: 
Partial Integration aruJ a Crttfijfor Dual-Earner Couples, 45 TAX LAW. 915, 933, 944-47 (1992), the non-taxation 
of services performed by one family member for another, that is, the non-taxation of imputed income, su, 
e.g., McCaffery, supra note 26, at I 001-05, the non-deductibility of expenses related to having both spouses 
work, su, e.g., id. at 1005-10, and the tax treatment of fringe benefits. See, e.g., id. at 1010-14. . 
341. See Christian, Compf.ici!Y, supra note 20, at 448-65; Christian, Joint Rate Stmcture, supra note 20, 
at 305-48; su also supra notes 309-10 and accompanying text. 
342. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 3, at 323-24 (discussing case of Robert and Alma in which the IRS 
assessed liability against Anna for taxes attributable to her ex-husband of S 12,000, or more than her annual 
income); LaBelle v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1078 (1984}, remaru1ed by an unpublirhed order, (9th Cir. 
1984), rev'd by 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1256 (1986); Kathy M. Kristof, rour Money: Taxpf!YerStuckin IRS' Narrow 
Escape Clause, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1996, at D2, available in 1996 WL 12747967 (describing situation in 
which IRS is pursuing an elderly, sick woman, living on social security, for a joint return tax deficiency 
caused by her former husband). 
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must choose between endangering their marriages343 by acting in their 
own best financial interests and filing separately, or endangering their 
own economic well-being and acting in the best financial interest of the 
couple by fllingjoindy to reduce the combined total tax.344 
This conflict falls on women much more frequendy than on men 
because wives typically earn less than their husbands. 345 In theory, a 
higher-earning husband who files joindy faces this same conflict: joint 
filing lowers the husband's tax bill while separate flling insulates him 
from deficiencies caused by his wife. However, the harm to a higher-
earning husband from a wife's deficiency is likely to be much less 
343. By filing separately, a wife may experience resentment or even physical abuse from her husband 
who prefers to file jointly. S«, e.g., Estate of Aylesworth v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 134, 141 (1955); Osborn 
v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 130 (1993) (Illustrating instances in which wives filed jointly against 
their wishes, rather than separately, because of the threat of physical abuse); Beck, supra note 3, at 332. 
344. s~ Beck, supra note 3, at 332. Some critics might argue that women do not experience a conflict 
in choosing a filing status. In response to this observation, one must recognize that many who do not 
experience such a conflict simply do not understand the costs of filing jointly. They do not realize that 
filing jointly exposes them to joint and several liability for their spouse's tax. See general[y Edward J. 
McCaffery, CogniJWe Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1861 (1994) (asserting that cognitive error often 
induces incorrect decisions with regard to tax). 
Other critics might observe that even women who understand the costs of joint filing may not feel they 
are experiencing a conflict because they may view their interests as aligned with those of their children. 
Consequently, women might not see themselves in conflict with their families in the context of choosing 
a filing status. In fact, if women bond with and feel responsible: for their children, then they might not view 
their choice to file jointly and to benefit the marital unit by lowering the total tax liability as presenting any 
conflict at all. Such wives would prefer to file jointly to increase the total resources available to their 
children. One school of feminist legal scholars would respond to this observation by arguing that women's 
perceived alliance with children is really a method utilized by patriarchy to ensure women's continued 
subjugation. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, Deconrtructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797,828-36, 841 (1989) 
(raising the argument concerning women's perceived alignment with children in non-tax contexts); T J. 
Jackson Lears, The Coru:ept '![Cultural Hegemo'!J: Problems and PossibiliJW, 90 AM. HIST. REV. 567, 569-70 
( 1985) (discussing how Antonio Gramsci has described a concept of cultural hegemony, a picture of how 
the dominant culture rules with the consent of the subjugated groups by shaping a "hegemony" of values, 
norms, perceptions, and beliefs that "helps mark the boundaries of permissible discourse, discourages the 
clarification of social alternatives, and makes it difficult for the dispossessed to locate the source of their 
unease, let alone remedy it"}. Although this argument is subject to dispute, it does tend to reinforce the 
notion that the wife's individual interests may not always be aligned with those of her family. 
Even if a wife views her interests as consistent with those of her children, it should be noted that her 
decision to file jointly does not necessarily make more resources available to those children. It makes more 
resources available to her husband who may or may not use them to benefit the couple's children. 
Finally, the fact that many women view themselves as aligned with their children's interests does not 
alter the fact that filing jointly benefits the family unit by benefiting the husband and that it tends to be 
harmful to the wife as an individual. See generaJ!y, Christian, Joint Rate Structure, supra note 20; Christian, 
Complid!Y, supra note 20. Any given wife may decide that the harm to herself from filing jointly is justified 
because of the offsetting benefit her family experiences. In making this determination, however, she has 
balanced the harm to herself against the benefits to her family and has implicitly faced this very conflict 
between self-interest and family interest. Wives, like husbands, should be able to align themselves with their 
families in choosing a filing status without harming their own financial interests. Justice within the family 
should not be set up to conflict with intimate, harmonious family ties. See OKIN, supra note I 07, at 32. 
345. See supra note 289. 
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significant than the harm to a wife from a deficiency caused by her 
husband because the higher-earning husband is generally better situated 
to handle the typically small tax deficiency generated by the lower-
income taxpayer.346 The wife, by contrast, may find it difficult, perhaps 
impossible, to pay the relatively large tax deficiency arising from her 
husband.347 Although men also theoretically face conflict between 
obtaining the benefit of income splitting and avoiding the risks inherent 
in joint and several liability, their conflict is likely to be much less 
problematic than that faced by women. Furthermore, because wives are 
less likely to create deficiencies than their husbands, 348 the conflict will 
arise less frequently for men than for women. To the extent women are 
aware that joint and several liability accompanies joint filing, women, 
more than men, bear the psychic costs of this conflict. 349 
V. CONCLUSION 
Joint and several liability is problematic for a variety of reasons. It 
shifts liability from one taxpayer to another. The arguments frequently 
used to support it do not, in fact, persuade. Perhaps more importantly, 
as applied in the social setting, it functions to harm women more often 
and more severely than it does men. It also interacts systemically with 
other elements of the joint return system to create a variety of 
injustices-all of which tend most frequently to burden women and to 
benefit men. The doctrine of joint and several liability assumes that 
spouses form one permanent economic unit. 350 Although this 
346. See Beck, supra note 3, at 320 n.4; if. Kornhauser, supra note 73, at 90 (noting generally that the 
interdependence of spouses is usually achieved at the expense of the wife). 
347. q: Beck, supra note 3, at 320 & n.4, 329-30. 
348. See supra notes 282-88 and accompanying text. 
349. q: Kornhauser, supra note 73, at 64. To the extent the public is not aware of the conflict, the 
features of the joint return tax that cause this conflict, income splitting and aggregation, are problematic 
for another reason: any laws that are hidden from those subject to them are suspect as "secret" laws and, 
therefore, ought to have questionable authority. Georg Hegel has argued that law does not have authoritY 
unless it is known. GEORG HEGEL, PHIWSOPHY OF RIGHT 135 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 
1967) (1952). 
Hence making a law is not to be represented as merely the expression of a rule of behaviour 
valid for everyone, though that is one moment in legislation; the more important moment, 
the inner essence of the matter, is knowledge of the content of the law in its determinate 
universality. 
ld.; see abo jOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF lAW: EsSAYS ON lAW AND MORAUTV 51 n.9 (1979); 
THOMAS B. STEPHENS, ORDER AND DISCIPUNE !N CHINA: THE SHANGHAI MIXED COURT 1911-27, at 
78-82 (1992) (discussing the basis for the authority of the laws of China). The gendered nature of the joint 
filing system is generally unknown to the public. To the extent joint returns create unknown conflict and 
bias, they are objectionable as are "secret laws." 
350. See Edison-Smith, supra note 4, at I 07, 122; Quick & DuCanto, supra note Ill, at 67; ABA 
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assumption may have been justified in 1938 when Congress enacted this 
liability rule, that assumption is no longer warranted. Given spouses' 
relatively greater economic independence and the high divorce rate in 
contemporary society,351 marriage can no longer be presumed to create 
a permanent economic unit. For all these reasons;joint and several tax 
liability should, in 1998, no longer be accepted as appropriate.352 
Relief is available for joint and several liability in a limited variety of 
narrowly drawn circumstances. Some common-law defenses exist, and 
Congress has enacted an "innocent spouse" exception to joint and 
several liability. These exceptions, however, are woefully inadequate 
both because they are narrowly drawn, and because they make technical 
distinctions often unrelated to the equities of holding the non-delinquent 
spouse liable.353 These exceptions apply to grant relief far too 
infrequently. As established above,354 joint and several liability tends to 
harm wives more than husbands. Therefore, any inadequacies in the 
exceptions allow the gender-correlated problems of joint and several 
liability to persist. 
Because the exceptions to joint and several liability are inadequate 
and because the rule of joint and several liability, itself, operates 
unfairly, Congress should repeal joint and severalliability,35~or perhaps 
Report, supra note 121, at 2; Beck, supra note 3, at 348. 
351. Beck, supra note 3, at 320 n.4, 329, 383; Quick & DuCanto, supra note Ill, at 67 (noting that 
the tax savings from joint liling must be weighed against the risk from joint and several liability when 
divorce is on the horizon); Edison-Smith, supra note 4, at 122-23 & n.l61; ABA &port, supra note 121, at 
2. 
352. See Edison-Smith, supra note 4, at 107, 122-23, 130; Keller, supra note 148, at 1096. 
While married couples generally file joint returns ~nd may view the resulting tax liability as 
a joint liability of the marriage, it is believed that imposition of joint and several liability on 
every married person who files a joint return with his or her spouse does not reflect current 
societal conditions under which both spouses frequently have their own sources of income 
and deduction. Regrettably, the incidence of divorce, and sometimes the death of one 
spouse, all too often results [sic] in unexpected and inappropriate imposition of liability for 
tax owed on income of the absent spouse. Relief provisions are unduly complex and in 
many instances ineffective. Finally, in actual operation, imposition of joint and several 
liability is simply unfair. It is believed that the changes proposed here would simplify the 
law and eliminate a significant source of unfairness and in this way contribute to the goal 
of supporting voluntary compliance which is essential to our tax system. 
ABA &port, supra note 121, at 8. 
353. See Philipps & Braford, supra note 109, at 43, 55; Beck, supra note 3, at 321, 348-64. I am 
currently writing another article in which I will examine the inadequacies of these exceptions to joint and 
several liability and will demonstrate how the exceptions, themselves, operate to create further gender 
biases. 
354. See Part IV, supra. 
355. See Beck, supra note 3, at 319; Zorn, supra note 21, at 488, 491-92; Edison-Smith, supra note 
4, at I 04, 127 (arguing that Congress should repeal joint and several liability); Murray, supra note 21, at 
58,· 64 (recommending that Congress repeal joint and several liability); CommmJs on Liabilqy of Divorced 
Spuuses, supra note 21, at 395 (quoting ABA resolution recommending the repeal of joint and several liability 
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eliminate it by abolishing the joint return altogether. 356 Both the 
American Bar Association and the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants have taken the position that Congress should eliminate the 
regime of joint and several liability.357 ·Given the often devastating 
effects this rule has on taxpayers and given that both as applied and 
systemically this rule concentrates burdens most frequendy on women, 
the repeal ofjoint and several liability is long overdue. 
adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in February of 1995); Rankin, supra note 21, at 8 (reporting that 
the AI CPA submitted comments to the IRS recommending the repeal of joint and several liability). 
356. In addition to disposing of joint and several liability, eliminating the joint return would also 
address other problems that arise under the joint return filing system, including its probable work 
disincentive effect on married women and the problematic transfer of wealth from wives to husbands that 
it probably induces. Abolition of joint return filing has been proposed by Christian, Joint Rate Structure, supra 
note 20, at 35 7-62 (describing various effects of eliminating the joint return and proposing a system of 
mandatory individual filing); Gann, supra note 26, at 39; Zelenak, supra note 75, at 343 & n.l6, 365-69; 
Davis, supra note I 07, at 236-38; EcllTUJITiic Problems '![Women, supra note 159, at 608-09 (statement of Carlyn 
McCaffery, Assistant Professor, New York University Law School); Harvey E. Brazer, Income Tax Trealmenl. 
'![the Fomi!Y, in THE ECONOMICS OFT AXATION 244-45 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael]. Boskin eds., 1980); 
Harvey E. Brazer, Comrnmt tJJ Mcln!Yf'e & Oldman, Trealmenl. '![the Fami[y, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME 
TAXATION 237 Ooseph A. Pechman ed., 1977); Dulude, supra note 204, at 128; Kornhauser, supra note 
73, at 65, 110-11; James Edward Maule, Tax and Marriage: Unhitching the Horse and Carriage: "But Let There 
Be Spaces in Tour Togelhemess,"67 TAX NOTES 539 (1995); Munnell, supra note 330, at 247-78; Robinson 
& Wenig, supra note 23, at 787, 852; Rosen, supra note 305, at 427-28; Winn & Winn, supra note 75, at 
869-70; Rankin, supra note 21 (reporting that the AICPA recommends the elimination of joint returns and 
the institution of mandatory individual filing). The following commentators have expressed opposition to 
the idea of abolishing joint returns: Bittker, supra note 25, at 1437-42; Contract with America Hearings, supra 
note 302, at 87, 88, rtprirrJul in 66 TAX NOTES at 1345, 1345-46 (statement of Professor Alstott); Mcintyre, 
supra note I 07, at 480. 
35 7. See supra note 355. 
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